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DISCLAIMER 
 
The calculations contained in this document were developed by Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC 
(BSC) and are intended solely for the use of BSC in its work for the Yucca Mountain Project. 
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AGL above ground level 
 
CDF cumulative distribution function 
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1. PURPOSE 
The preclosure safety analysis for the monitored geologic repository at Yucca Mountain must 
consider the hazard that aircraft may pose to surface structures.  Relevant surface structures are 
located beneath the restricted airspace of the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on the eastern slope of 
Yucca Mountain, near the North Portal of the Exploratory Studies Facility Tunnel (Figure 1).  
The North Portal is located several miles from the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), 
which is used extensively by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) for training and test flights (Figure 1).  
The NTS airspace, which is controlled by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for NTS 
activities, is not part of the NTTR.  Agreements with the DOE allow USAF aircraft specific use 
of the airspace above the NTS (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, 
Section 2.1; and Reference 2.1.2 [DIRS 157987], Sections 1.26 through 1.29).  Commercial, 
military, and general aviation aircraft fly within several miles to the southwest of the repository 
site in the Beatty Corridor, which is a broad air corridor that runs approximately parallel to U.S. 
Highway 95 and the Nevada-California border (Figure 2).  These aircraft and other aircraft 
operations are identified and described in Identification of Aircraft Hazards (Reference 2.1.3, 
Sections 6 and 8).   
 
The purpose of this analysis is to estimate crash frequencies for aircraft hazards identified for 
detailed analysis in Identification of Aircraft Hazards (Reference 2.1.3, Section 8).  Reference 
2.1.3, Section 8, also identifies a potential hazard associated with electronic jamming, which will 
be addressed in this analysis.  This analysis will address only the repository and not the 
transportation routes to the site.  The analysis is intended to provide the basis for:  
• Categorizing event sequences related to aircraft hazards  
• Identifying design or operational requirements related to aircraft hazards.   
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NOTE: The purpose of this figure is only for illustrating the location of the Flight-Restricted Airspace relative to the North Portal.  No 
accuracy of information is intended or implied. 
 
Figure 1.  Features Near the Repository 
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NOTE: This figure is for illustrative purposes only. 
Figure 2.  The Beatty Corridor 
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2.3 DESIGN OUTPUTS 
This calculation will be used as input for other calculations. 
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3. ASSUMPTIONS 
No assumption in this analysis requires verification. 
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS THAT CALL FOR DESIGN OR OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
3.1.1. Flight-Restricted Airspace Surrounds the North Portal 
Assumption: A flight-restricted airspace for fixed-wing aircraft extending to 14,000 ft 
above mean sea level (MSL) surrounds the North Portal.  The flight-restricted airspace is 
cylindrical in shape, with a radius of 4.9 nautical miles (NM) (5.6 mi) (Figure 1).  The 
cylinder is centered on the North Portal, which is inside the smallest circle that 
encompasses the surface facilities (Assumption 3.2.6).   
Rationale: A flight-restricted airspace is credited in this analysis to reduce the crash 
frequency due to flights through the NTTR and NTS airspace.  The radius of the flight-
restricted airspace is an important determinant of its effectiveness, as shown in Sections 
7.2.2 and 7.2.3.  The height of the flight-restricted airspace is set to 14,000 ft MSL so that 
aircraft that suffer a crash-initiating event while flying over the airspace would likely be 
able to glide most, if not all, of the way through the area.  Separate restrictions are 
imposed on helicopters (Assumption 3.1.3).  
3.1.2. Restrictions on Overflights of the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Assumption: The annual number of overflights of the flight-restricted airspace by fixed-
wing aircraft is limited to 1,000 overflights per year.  Tactical maneuvering is prohibited 
over the flight-restricted airspace; flights are straight and level.  Carrying ordnance and 
electronic jamming activities over the flight-restricted airspace are prohibited.   
Rationale: A limited number of straight-line overflights can be tolerated, as discussed in 
Section 7.2.3. The prohibition of tactical maneuvering allows the crash rate for normal 
flight to be used and ensures that flight paths are approximately straight as required in the 
derivation of the crash-frequency model (Section 7.2.3).  The prohibition of ordnance 
reduces the threat from accidental release of ordnance during overflights or from 
intentional jettison of ordnance in case of in-flight emergencies. Electronic jamming 
activities are not consistent with transitory flight and as such aircraft overflying the 
flight-restricted airspace are prohibited from engaging in electronic jamming activities 
during overflights of the flight-restricted airspace. 
3.1.3. Helicopter Flights Prohibited Within One-Half Mile of the Relevant Surface 
Facilities 
Assumption: An operational requirement prohibits helicopter flights within one-half 
mile of the relevant surface facilities and areas listed in Table 1.  A design requirement 
will require the helipad associated with the repository to be located at least one-half mile 
from the relevant surface facilities.   
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Rationale: On an hourly basis, general aviation helicopters with reciprocating-piston 
engines crash at a rate of about 7.7 × 10−5 h−1 when crashes during takeoff and landing 
are omitted (Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 3.34).  Such a high crash rate implies 
that very little helicopter activity within crash range of the relevant surface facilities can 
be tolerated without exceeding the 2 × 10−6 y−1 Category 2 event sequence frequency 
threshold (Section 7.1).  DOE-STD-3014-96, DOE Standard, Accident Analysis for 
Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, (Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], pp. 45 and 
46), states that lateral variations in crash locations for a helicopter are conservatively 
assumed to be one-quarter mile on average from the centerline of its flight path.  
Doubling this distance to one-half mile adds further conservatism.   
3.1.4. Duration of Emplacement Activities 
Assumption: An operational requirement will limit the duration of emplacement 
activities to 50 years or less.   
Rationale: Potential aircraft accidents only pose a hazard to radioactive waste prior to 
waste emplacement when the waste is located on the surface. Fifty years is a reasonable 
upper limit for useful life of surface facilities and allows ample time for waste 
emplacement.   
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS USED TO DEVELOP ANALYTICAL FORMULAS 
3.2.1. Crash-Impact Points Uniformly Distributed Beneath the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Assumption: The distribution of crash-impact points for crashes that originate above the 
flight-restricted airspace is assumed uniform throughout the circular area beneath the 
airspace.   
Rationale: Random variations in the distance traveled by aircraft, after initiation of a 
malfunction causing a crash, introduce randomness in the pattern of crashes on the 
ground.  In addition, flight paths will be distributed throughout the area above the flight-
restricted airspace (Assumption 3.2.4).   
3.2.2. Flight Paths On the Beatty Corridor Approximately Straight and Parallel Near 
Yucca Mountain 
Assumption: Flight paths are considered straight lines parallel to the edge of the flight 
corridor for the derivation in Section 7.2.4.2.   
Rationale: The Beatty Corridor is defined in Assumption 3.3.2.  The graphical displays 
of flight paths (Attachment I, Figure I-1) shows that, with respect to the relative sizes of 
the relevant surface structures (Section 3.3.1) the assumption is reasonable in that the 
flights are approximately straight and parallel with respect to the boundary line between 
4808S and 4808N.  Any slight change in direction has no affect on the assumption and 
the analysis. 
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3.2.3. Flight Paths On the Beatty Corridor Uniformly Distributed Near Yucca Mountain 
Assumption: Flight paths are uniformly distributed across the width of the Beatty 
Corridor for the derivation in Section 7.2.4.   
Rationale: The Beatty Corridor is defined in Assumption 3.3.2.  The radar tracks 
provided by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (Attachment I, Figure I-1) 
show that flight paths are concentrated toward the center and away from the edges of the 
corridor.  In this situation, the assumption is conservative because it exaggerates the 
flight density close to the facility.  Although the flight density does not drop immediately 
to zero at the boundary of the Shoshone military operations area (MOA), defining the 
aviation corridor more narrowly with its southwestern edge at the Shoshone MOA 
exaggerates the crash rate density in the corridor and is therefore conservative. 
3.2.4. Uniform Distribution of Overflights of the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Assumption: Overflights of the flight-restricted airspace are approximately uniformly 
distributed across the radius of the airspace.   
Rationale: This assumption is consistent with recent historical observations as recorded 
in Attachment II. 
3.2.5. Altitude of Flights Over the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Assumption: Overflights of flight-restricted airspace are assumed to conservatively be at 
14,000 ft MSL, which is 10,000 ft AGL. 
Rationale: Due to the ceiling of the flight-restricted airspace, the altitude of aircraft is at 
least 14,000 ft MSL (Assumption 3.1.1).  Elevations of the repository surface facilities 
are below 4,000 ft MSL (Reference 2.1.6 [DIRS 175049]).  Therefore, the ceiling of the 
flight-restricted airspace is at least 10,000 ft above the repository surface facilities.  
Assuming the lowest allowable altitude for overflights results in the quickest descent to 
the ground in case of pilot ejection, and thus is conservative.   
3.2.6. Maximum Dimension of the Site 
Assumption: The radius of the smallest circle centered on the North Portal and that 
encompasses the surface facilities where radioactive waste could be located is 1.0 mi.   
Rationale:  This bounding dimension is based on the site plan (Reference 2.1.6 [DIRS 
175049]) and the conceptual design (Reference 2.1.7 [DIRS 176937], Figures 2-11 and 
A3-1).  This area encompasses the surface facilities where waste could be present, 
including the aging pads and the Initial Handling Facility.  
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3.3 ASSUMPTIONS USED TO DEVELOP INPUTS 
3.3.1. Relevant Surface Structures 
Assumption: Relevant structures and areas of the surface facilities are identified and the 
assumed dimensions are given in Table 1.  The dimensions of the structures include the 
entrance and exit vestibules, except personnel entrance vestibules.  The included 
structures and areas are assumed to be in continuous use and to be at full capacity for 
waste transfer, staging, or aging throughout the emplacement period of 50 years 
(Assumption 3.1.4). 
Rationale:  The structure sizes are based on references cited in the footnotes of Table 1 
and the dimensions are rounded up to the nearest 5-ft increment.  Building dimensions 
encompass areas where waste forms can be present such as the interior of structures and 
the entrance and exit vestibules for waste forms.  Office areas and personnel entrance 
vestibules are not included because waste will not be present in such areas.   
The Low Level Waste Handling building has not been included in the relevant structures 
due to its very limited impact to potential offsite dose consequences.  Reference 2.1.8, 
Section 6.1.4.5 ([DIRS 174261]), compares the source term from a fire event involving 
100 low level waste drums with the source term from a seismic event.  The source term 
from the seismic event is at least 10,000 times larger than the fire event release source 
term.  The resultant offsite public dose from the seismic event is 27 mrem (Reference 
2.1.8 [DIRS 174261], Table E-8).  Thus, the resultant dose from the fire event involving 
100 low level waste drums would be less than 0.0027 mrem.  Even if an aircraft crash 
involved 100 times the low level waste inventory assumed in the analyzed low-level 
waste fire, the resultant dose at the site boundary would be less than 0.27 mrem.  When 
this is compared to the performance objective of 15 mrem/yr for an offsite member of the 
public (Reference 2.2.4 [DIRS 173273], Paragraph 63.204), the Low Level Waste 
Handling building can be reasonably excluded from the list of relevant structures.  The 
elimination of the Low Level Handling building is consistent with the methodology of 
DOE Standard, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities 
(Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], p. 19) in that a determination is made whether a facility 
contains sufficient inventory of hazardous radioactive material to pose a potential hazard.    
Calculating the effective target area of the relevant structures by assuming that all 
structures and areas are at full capacity results in conservatively large effective target 
areas.  The aging pads, even if fully available over the entire emplacement period, will 
take years to be filled and emptied.  Construction will likely be staged, thus some 
structures, such as the Wet Handling Facility and the second and third Canister Receipt 
and Closure Facilities, may not be operational during the initial part of the emplacement 
period.     
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application   000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page 26 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Characteristics of Relevant Surface Structures 
Building, Structure, or Areaa Quantity Length 
(ft) 
Width 
(ft) 
Height 
(ft) 
Initial Handling Facility (IHF) 1 305 170 105 
Canister Receipt and Closure Facility (CRCF) 3 425 325 100 
Receipt Facility (RF) 1 325 285 100 
Wet Handling Facility (WHF) 1 385 270 100 
Aging Pad 17Kb, c 1 960 685 20 
Aging Pad 17Lb, c 1 2,000 700 20 
Aging Pad 17Mb, c 1 2,000 685 20 
Railcar and Truck staging area (not a building)c, d 1 1500 140 20 
Loaded site transporters (not buildings)c 2 25 25 20 
 
RATIONALE: a Numbers of primary structures (Reference 2.1.7 [DIRS 176937], Figures 2-11 and A3-1); IHF 
(References 2.1.10 and 2.1.11); CRCF (References 2.1.12 and 2.1.13); RF (References 2.1.14 and 
2.1.15); WHF (References 2.1.16 and 2.1.17).   
b Aging Pad 17K contains 500 spaces.  Aging Pads 17L and 17M contain 1000 spaces each (Reference 
2.1.7 [DIRS 176937], Figure 2-11). Thus, the length for Aging Pads 17L and 17M is twice the given 
dimension plus an assumed 90 ft between the pads (Reference 2.1.7 [DIRS 176937], Figures 2-20 and 
2-21).  Using the pad dimensions is conservative because the pad extends beyond the cask placement 
area.   
c Vertical aging casks are assigned a 20-ft height (Reference 2.1.7 [DIRS 176937], Figures 2-20 and 2-
21). Horizontal transportation casks staged on truck, rail, or site rail transport cart are assumed to be 
less than vertical aging casks but are conservatively assigned a height of 20 ft.  Likewise, the assumed 
height for transporters is 20ft.  The length and width of the transporter are assumed dimensions.  No 
estimate is available of the expected number of transporters in operation at any given time.  Having two 
transporters in use at all times is considered to be conservative. The length and width of the transporter 
are assumed dimensions based on the assumed height of a cask.  The fractional contribution to the 
effective area for the site transporters is less than or equal to 2% (page V-4), while the fractional 
contribution to the effective area for the next largest structure, the IHF, is 4 or 5%.  Thus the overall 
effective target area is not sensitive to the precise dimensions or number assumed for the site 
transporters.  
d The assumed dimensions of the railcar and truck staging area are based on the assumption that 
approximately 50 railcars and trucks are located in the staging area.  Fifty railcars and trucks is a 
reasonable approximation since, operationally, it would be more prudent to minimize the waiting time 
and number of casks in the staging area to minimize the direct radiation from the casks and minimize the 
impact to the inventory of available casks for transportation.  The dimensions assume that the railcars 
are about 100 ft by 20 ft and that there are six rail lines in the area, which would result in a rectangle 
approximately 900 ft by 120 ft.  To provide spacing between rails and to allow for less rails (4 or 5 
instead of 6), a length of 1500 ft and a width of 140 ft is assumed.  
 
 
3.3.2. Definition of the Beatty Corridor 
Assumption: The Beatty Corridor is defined to be a 26-mile wide band, with edges 
parallel to the Nevada-California border, passing between the edge of Shoshone MOA 
and passing within 5 mi of the North Portal at its closest.  (Figure 2) 
Rationale: The entire corridor between the R-2508 complex and the NTTR is used as a 
flight corridor (Figure 2) (Reference 2.1.18 [DIRS 158250]).  Near Yucca Mountain, the 
width of the corridor is approximately 26 miles, measured as the closest distance between 
the Shoshone MOA to R-4808N (Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 158638]).  If the edge of the 
Beatty Corridor is defined to follow the border between R-4808S and R-4808N, and then 
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angle slightly northward in a straight line to southernmost corner of EC South, then the 
closest distance to the North Portal at Yucca Mountain is about five miles (Figure 2) 
(Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 158638], and Reference 2.1.20 [DIRS 149831]). The radar 
tracks for a typical day (Attachment I, Figure I-1) show that the northern half of R-4808S 
is infrequently used (Reference 2.1.21 [DIRS 177034]).  Therefore the effective edge of 
the corridor is actually farther than 5 mi from the North Portal. A more realistic distance 
is about eight miles rather than five miles.   
3.3.3. Assumed Frequency of Flights in the Beatty Corridor Under 10,000 ft 
Assumption: The frequency of flights below 10,000 ft MSL in the Beatty Corridor is less 
than 10,000 per year.  Flights below 10,000 ft MSL are assumed to be general aviation 
piston-engine aircraft.   
Rationale: Radar coverage in the Beatty Corridor below 10,000 ft MSL is not reliable 
(Reference 2.1.22 [DIRS 160817]).  Piston-engine aircraft are more likely than other 
aircraft to fly at low altitudes.  Assumption 3.3.4 discusses the projected flight frequency 
in the Beatty Corridor.  The estimated frequency is five times the estimated 2005 annual 
count based on the average seven-day count.  For the general aviation piston-engine 
flights, the estimated frequency was further augmented by an additional 10,000 flights 
per year to account for flights that occur below 10,000 ft MSL where the radar coverage 
is not reliable.  The calculated crash frequency due to piston-engine general aviation 
aircraft, including the additional flights, is 1.70 × 10−9 y−1 (Section 7.3.1.3 and p. V-6), 
which is a small fraction of the frequency threshold 2 × 10−6 y−1 (Section 7.1).  Therefore, 
the conclusions of this calculation are insensitive to the assumed frequency of flights 
below 10,000 ft MSL.  Even so, the assumed frequency is likely to be conservative for 
the following reasons.  The assumed flight frequency is equivalent to more than one 
flight every hour, 24 hours per day, 365 days per year.  Flights below 10,000 ft MSL are 
less than 7,000 ft above ground level (AGL), given a valley elevation of about 3,000 ft at 
the foot of Yucca Mountain (Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 158638]) and are easily seen from 
the ground.  Such flight activity would be noticed; yet, the area is not known for frequent 
low-altitude flights (Reference 2.1.3, Section 6.9).   
3.3.4. Beatty Corridor Flight Frequency 
Assumption: Estimated annual air-traffic counts in the Beatty Corridor (Table 2) are 
based on the average seven-day count from the 2005 FAA traffic counts augmented by a 
factor of five and rounded up to the nearest 100 to accommodate traffic growth and 
uncertainty associated with data processing.   
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Table 2.  Estimates of Annual Traffic Counts for the Beatty Corridor 
Aircraft Type 
Average Seven-
Day Count 
Estimated 
2005 Annual 
Count 
Estimated Annual Counts 
Used in Crash Frequency 
Calculationa  
Small Military 55 2,860 14,300 
Large Military 42 2,184 11,000 
General Aviation Piston-Engine 64.5 3,354 26,800b 
General Aviation Turboprop 342 17,784 89,000 
General Aviation Turbojet 219.5 11,414 57,100 
Air Taxi (14 CFR Part 135 [DIRS 168507]) 214 11,128 55,700 
Air Carrier (14 CFR Part 121 [DIRS 168506]) 1,748.5 90,922 454,700 
Total Annual Flights 708,600 
NOTES: a Estimated annual counts are five times the estimated 2005 annual counts found in Table 3, rounded up to the 
nearest 100. 
b The general aviation piston-engine count is five times the estimated 2005 annual counts, rounded up to the nearest 
100, and increased by 10,000 per year (Assumption 3.3.3). 
 
Rationale: Records of flights through the Beatty Corridor, in the form of tabular and 
graphical information, (Table 3), were tracked and provided by the FAA in 2005 
(Reference 2.1.21 [DIRS 177034] and Reference 2.1.23 [DIRS 177035]).  These data are 
further discussed in Attachment I.  The tabular information consists of records of each 
flight tracked during two weeks in 2005, including aircraft information such as type, 
engine, weight class, as well as whether the flight was general aviation, air carrier (14 
CFR Part 121, Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]), air taxi (14 CFR Part 135, Reference 
2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]), or military.  Attachment I explains how the FAA data were 
processed and displays an example of flights for one day, on a background of the airspace 
divisions of the NTTR and the R-2508 Range complex.   
Table 3.  Aircraft Counts On the Beatty Corridor From Two Weeks In 2005 
 Seven-Day Count 
Beginning Date 
Average 
Seven-Day 
Count 
Estimated 2005 
Annual Count 
Aircraft Type 6/1/2005 12/1/2005   
Small Military 38 72 55 2,860 
Large Military 45 39 42 2,184 
General Aviation Piston-Engine 83 46 64.5 3,354 
General Aviation Turboprop 361 323 342 17,784 
General Aviation Turbojet* 197 242 219.5 11,414 
Air taxi (14 CFR Part 135) 201 227 214 11,128 
Air carrier (14 CFR Part 121) 1,769 1,728 1,748.5 90,922 
Sum 2,694 2,677 2,685.5 139,646 
SOURCES: Reference 2.1.21 [DIRS 177034] and Reference 2.1.23 [DIRS 177035]. 
 
The data from Table 3 was extrapolated to estimate the annual count and are reported in 
Table 2 as the estimated 2005 annual count.  To show that two weeks of data is sufficient 
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for estimating annual traffic count, the air taxi and air carrier estimated 2005 annual 
count is compared to flight data of the McCarran International Airport located in Las 
Vegas, Nevada.   McCarran International Airport has the largest operations per year of 
the airports in the vicinity of the repository (Reference 2.1.3, Table 6-4).  The number of 
landings at the McCarran airport was 164,477 in 1996 (Reference 2.1.26 [DIRS 175667], 
p. 6), 180,906 in 2002 (Reference 2.1.27 [DIRS 175666], p. 3), and 205,327 in 2004 
(Reference 2.1.28 [DIRS 175664], p. 3).  McCarran airport statistics include air taxi and 
air carrier flights.  The estimated 2005 annual count of air taxi and air carrier flights in 
the Beatty Corridor (Table 2) is 102,050.  Assuming that all of the air taxi and air carrier 
flights equally goes to and comes from McCarran International Airport, although there 
are other airports in the vicinity that can accommodate these flights, the estimated 2005 
annual air taxi and air carrier flights in the Beatty Corridor account for about 25% of the 
landings at McCarran during 2004, which is reasonable since the Beatty Corridor is one 
of about 12 flight corridors into Las Vegas (Reference 2.1.29 [DIRS 168129]).  Thus, two 
weeks of data can reasonably be extrapolated to estimate an annual count. 
The landings at McCarran International Airport increased by about 25% from 1996 to 
2004, and about 13% from 2002 to 2004, which overall represents a 2.5% increase 
compounded per year.  To account for growth and for uncertainties associated with 
tracking, recording, analyzing and extrapolating the data, the estimated 2005 annual 
count was augmented by a factor of five and rounded up to the nearest 100.  Increasing 
the estimated 2005 annual count by 400% reasonably bounds any uncertainties associated 
with the data and the growth trend at the McCarran International airport even if 
McCarran airport had a sustained growth of 2.5% per year for the next 65 years. 
Estimated annual counts (Table 2) are used in Attachment V to determine the annual 
crash frequency associated with flights through the Beatty Corridor. 
The results of the analysis reported in Section 8 show that the conclusions of this 
calculation are insensitive to the flights in the Beatty Corridor in that the flights in the 
Beatty Corridor contribute approximately 5% of the total crash frequency. 
3.3.5. Use of Fatal Accident Rate for 14 CFR Part 135 Crash Rates 
Assumption: The fatal-accident rate, rather than the total accident rate, is used to 
estimate crash rates for commercial flight operations regulated by 14 CFR Part 135 
(Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]).  
Rationale: The total accident rate includes accidents that occur on the ground as well as 
other incidents, such as turbulence that cause injury to passengers or crew.  The fatal 
accident rate is used to discount minor accidents that are not relevant to this analysis.  
This assumption is conservative since some fatal aircraft accidents are not the result of 
crashes.  For example, a person could walk into a spinning propeller or a fatality could 
occur during turbulence without resulting in a plane crash.   
Any accident involving commercial flight that could affect the repository would originate 
on the Beatty Corridor at high altitude and would certainly involve fatalities. The 
calculated crash frequency of 1.11 × 10−8 y−1 (Section 7.3.1.6 and p. V-6), due to 
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commercial flight operations regulated by 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 
168507]), is very low compared to the frequency threshold of 2 × 10−6 y−1 (Section 7.1).  
Therefore, the conclusions of this calculation are insensitive to the assumed accident rate 
for commercial flight operations regulated by 14 CFR Part 135.   
3.3.6. Military Aircraft of Concern  
Assumption:  Small military aircraft of concern for flights over and outside the flight-
restricted airspace are the F-15, F-16, F-22 and A-10. 
Rationale: The F-16s, F-15s, and A-10s are the commonly used fighter and attack 
aircraft for exercises in the NTTR (Reference 2.1.3, Appendix A).  The North Portal is 
located in R-4808W (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Figure 3.1-1), which is indicated 
as R-4808D and E in Figure 2. Of the 9,842 projected flights in R-4808W, over 87% are 
small military planes; Fighters and Attacks, which include Mirages and Tornadoes, for a 
total of 8,612, with 51% being F-16s, 28% being F-15s, 2% being A-10s, and about 7% 
making up the balance (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Table 6 of Appendix A.9).  
Large military planes account for less than 3% of the projected annual flights (Reference 
2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Table 6 of Appendix A.9); helicopters and other aircraft make up 
the balance. Therefore, F-15s, F-16s and A-10s are the small military aircraft of concern 
for the repository surface facilities.  Because F-22s are projected to be the future 
attack/fighter plane of choice, it too is included as a small military aircraft of concern.  
This information was used for collecting historic crash data presented in Attachment III. 
3.3.7. Military Aircraft Crash Rates 
Assumption:  The crash rate of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 for military aircraft overflights of the 
flight-restricted airspace is the updated F-16 accident rate in normal in-flight mode 
derived in Attachment IV.  Crash rates used for military aircraft flying in the Beatty 
Corridor are the crash rate of 1.90 × 10−9 mi−1 for large military aircraft in normal 
operation (Section 6.2.2) and the updated crash rate of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 for the F-16, used 
for small military aircraft. 
Rationale:  The F-16 is projected to have almost twice the number of flights in R-4808W 
as the next most popular aircraft (Assumption 3.3.6).  The estimated crash rate for F-16s 
in normal flight is greater than the corresponding crash rates of F-15s and A-10s 
(Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 4.8).  Table III-1 lists only two crashes for the F-
22 in a 12-year period.  Due to the limited crash data and operating history of the F-22 
and due to the lower crash rates for F-15s and A-10s, it is reasonable to apply the crash 
rate for the F-16 to all small military aircraft.   
The crash rate for the F-16 has been updated from crash data from 1989 to 1998 
(2.736 × 10−8 mi−1) using methodology that has been deemed acceptable by the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Safety Evaluation Report Concerning the Private 
Fuel Storage Facility, Docket No. 72-22 (Reference 2.1.30 [DIRS 154930], Section 
15.1.2.11).  Attachment IV presents the derivation of the crash rates for F-15s and F-16s 
for the date range used in this analysis, 1990 to 2005, using the same methodology 
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employed to derive the 2.736 × 10−8 mi−1 crash rate used in Reference 2.1.30.  As seen in 
Attachment IV, the 10-year average crash rate increases slightly for the first three 10-year 
periods, after which the rate decreases.  To be conservative and to avoid the possibility of 
statistical aberrations that might occur from year to year, the 16-year average from 1990 
to 2005 is used in this analysis. Thus, the updated crash rate for F-16 in normal flight 
mode of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1, which better represents the contemporary flight operations 
experience, is used in lieu of the value given in Table 7. 
Military aircraft may use the Beatty Corridor for transit to and from NTTR airspace.  The 
normal flight crash rate for large military aircraft of 1.90 × 10−9 mi−1 and the updated 
normal flight crash rate for the F-16 of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 are used for flights in the Beatty 
Corridor.  It is appropriate to use the updated F-16 crash rate because it is based on flights 
in the area and because it better represents the contemporary flight operations experience.  
The normal-operations rate is used because the purpose of flight is transit not combat 
training.   
The frequency of a large military aircraft crash originating in the Beatty Corridor is 
1.94 × 10−9 y−1 (Section 7.3.1.2 and p. V-6), which is very low compared to the frequency 
threshold of 2 × 10−6 y−1 (Section 7.1).  Therefore, the conclusions of this calculation are 
insensitive to the contribution from large military aircraft, and thus, the large military 
aircraft crash rate has not been updated. 
The use of small aircraft crash rate for determining crash frequency for overflights of the 
flight-restricted airspace must be justified despite the fact that large aircraft may also be 
used for these overflights.  The frequency of crashes into a surface facility is proportional 
to the crash rate and to the effective target area of the facility (see Equation 9, for 
example).  The effective target area seen by small aircraft is about a factor of two less 
than that seen by large aircraft (Section 7.2.1 and Section V.1).  However, the net effect 
of using the crash rate and effective target area for small aircraft is conservative because 
the crash rate for small aircraft is a factor of fourteen or more higher than that of large 
aircraft (2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 for small military aircraft versus 1.90 × 10−9 mi−1 for large 
military aircraft).  In addition, large military aircraft account for less than 3% of the 
flights near the repository (Section 3.3.6). 
3.3.8. Crash Frequency Density Outside the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Assumption: A uniform crash-frequency density of 8.0 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2 applies to 
military flight activities in the NTTR, NTS, and MOA airspace surrounding the flight-
restricted airspace in all directions, except in the southwest quadrant.  Furthermore, for 
crashes associated with pilot ejection, the corresponding ejection locations and directions 
of travel after ejection are assumed to be uniformly distributed.   
Rationale: The crash-frequency density estimated as follows pertains to the NTTR and 
MOA airspace.  The southwest quadrant is omitted because it is almost entirely within 
the Beatty Corridor, which is treated separately (Assumption 3.3.4).   
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The NTS airspace is controlled by the DOE for NTS activities and is not part of the 
NTTR (Reference 2.1.1 [DIRS 103472], Section 3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section 2.1).  
Agreements with the DOE allow the USAF specific use of the airspace above the NTS.  
The specific use is published in the Weapons Range Management procedure (Reference 
2.1.2 [DIRS 157987], Sections 1.26 through 1.29), which currently limits flights to 
overflight.  However, projected changes in USAF plans regarding the use of NTS 
airspace make it necessary to assume that training activities in other portions of the 
NTTR could be extended into NTS airspace (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 169894], pp. 5 and 
6).  Thus, the assumed density derived from crashes in the NTTR and MOAs will also be 
applied to flights in the NTS.  The assumed density is derived from the number of crashes 
observed over the period from May 1990 through December 2005, which is 15.5 years, 
and the area of the NTTR and MOAs, excluding NTS.  
Table 4 lists 18 crashes involving small military aircraft from May 1990 through 2005.  
The Nellis Air Force Range (also known as Nevada Test and Training Range), consisting 
of approximately three million acres of land, does not include the NTS (Reference 2.1.1 
[DIRS 103472], p. ES-2).  Additional airspace is included in the MOAs, for a total of 
approximately 15,000 mi2 (Reference 2.1.32 [DIRS 177052], p. 2). This is approximately 
the restricted airspace area of the NTTR and the MOA, less the NTS.  The crash 
frequency density is estimated to be:  
(18 crashes) / (15.5 y) / (1.5 × 104 mi2) = 7.7 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2. 
A count of random events may be different for different realizations of the random 
process, that is, the calculated frequency density can change over time because crashes 
are random from year to year and the density will be different when the time span 
changes.  As an example, if a 10-yr time span were used for determining the crash 
frequency density, the density varies from the lowest value of 6.0 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2 
for the 10-yr period of 1995 to 2004 to the highest value of 8.0 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2 for 
the 10-yr period of 1991 to 2000 due to the number of crashes varying from year to year.  
If the most recent 10-yr period of 1996 to 2005 were used, the crash density would be 6.7 
× 10−5 crashes / y / mi2. 
The assumed crash frequency density of 8.0 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2 is conservative 
because it exceeds the calculated frequency density of 7.7 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2, which 
is based on 18 crashes in 15.5 years, it is the highest calculated frequency density using a 
10-yr period over the 1990 to 2005 date range and it exceeds the most contemporary 10-
yr period of 1996 to 2005.   
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Table 4.  Aircraft Crashes Within the Nevada Test and Training Range and Military Operations Areas 
Date Aircraft Serial No. Latitude Longitude Reference 
28-Jan-91 F-16C 85-1423 3723 11449 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #16  
07-Oct-91 F-16CG 89-2059 3730 11612 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #34 
21-Jan-92 F-15C 81-0052 3714 11436 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #42 
10-Aug-92 F-15E 89-0479 3715 11430 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #55 
18-May-93 F-16C 87-0269 3659 11440 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #73 
10-Aug-93 F-16C 86-0250 3730 11616 Footnotes 1, 2, Table III-1, #80 
08-Nov-93 F-16C 88-0448 3711 11526 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #86 
14-Feb-94 F-16C 87-0309 3652 11540 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #96 
16-Jun-99 F-15C 82-0008 3755 11601 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #191 
16-Jun-99 F-15D 79-0013 3755 11601 Footnotes 1, 2, 3, and Table III-I, #192 
03-Aug-00 F-15C 86-0173 3751 11541 Footnotes 1, 2 and Table III-I, #208 
08-Aug-00 F-16CG 88-0542 3658 11431 Footnotes 1, 2 and Table III-I, #209 
04-Dec-02 A-10A 80-0225 3726 11624 Footnotes 1, 2 and Table III-I, #248 
04-Dec-02 A-10A 79-0191 3726 11624 Footnotes 1, 2, 3, and Table III-I, #249 
17-Mar-03 F-15C 80-0040 3704 11436 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #250 
18-Nov-03 A-10A 79-0143 3645 11527 Footnotes 1, 2, and Table III-I, #259 
04-Jun-04 F-15C 79-0054 3659 11439 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #265 
25-Mar-05 F-15C 80-0052 3654 11438 Footnote 1 and Table III-1, #268 
1 See column 2 of Table III-1 for cited reference containing additional information. 
2 Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS169894], pp. 6 and 7 
3 Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS169894], pp. 6 and 7 gives only one crash on this date, however the incident was a 
midair collision with the loss of both planes.   
 
There were two additional events identified by Reference 2.1.31 ([DIRS 169894], pp. 6 
and 7) that were not included in Table 4.  The item dated October 2002 involved an F-
15C that experienced an engine malfunction, but the pilot shut down the engine and flew 
an uneventful single engine approach and landing (Reference 2.1.33 [DIRS 174431]).  
The incident in May 2003 involved an engine undergoing test cell runs (Reference 2.1.34 
[DIRS 174430]).  Although these two events involved a million dollar loss, neither 
incident involved a crash of an aircraft and, therefore, is not included in the list of aircraft 
crashes (Table 4).  An additional event identified by Reference 2.1.31 ([DIRS 169894], 
pp. 6 and 7) involved an HH-60 helicopter, which is not included in this analysis due to 
restrictions on helicopter flights (Assumption 3.1.3).  
3.3.9. Pilot Action 
Assumption:  No credit for pilot action is taken in this analysis. 
Rationale:  For conservatism, no credit is taken for pilot action for the time elapsed after 
the initiating event and before ejecting from the plane.  The pilot is assumed to eject 
immediately after the engine failure or the cause of the in-flight emergency that leads to a 
crash. 
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3.3.10. Robustness of Structures and Components 
Assumption:  No credit is taken for the ability of transportation casks, aging casks, or the 
relevant surface facilities to withstand an impact by an aircraft. 
Rationale:  For conservatism, no credit is taken for the robustness of structures or casks 
to withstand an impact by an aircraft.  Nevertheless, studies show no breach of a 
transportation cask, storage cask, or similar concrete structure, from an impact by a 
Boeing 747-400 or Boeing 767-400, reported in "Plane Tough Storage" (Reference 2.1.35 
[DIRS 167732]) and "Deterring Terrorism: Aircraft Crash Impact Analyses Demonstrate 
Nuclear Power Plant's Structural Strength"; (Reference 2.1.36 [DIRS 167733]).   
3.3.11. Sorting of Military Aircraft Crashes  
Assumption: Data on military aircraft crashes has been collected from May 1990 
through December 2005 and are presented in Table III-1 of Attachment III.  Each aircraft 
crash has been assigned an initiating-event type code that is used to evaluate the crash 
frequency from the allowable overflights of the flight-restricted airspace (Section 7.2.3). 
The following types of crash-initiating events are considered:  
• Type 0 events are not applicable to overflight of the flight-restricted airspace.  
• Type 1 events are applicable to overflight of the flight-restricted airspace.   
Rationale: The aircraft crash data presented in Table III-1 of Attachment III is intended 
to be a comprehensive list of USAF crashes of aircraft of concern (Assumption 3.3.6), to 
the extent possible.  The data is used to evaluate the crash frequency from the allowable 
overflights of the flight-restricted airspace.  Since not all of the crashes are applicable to 
crashes that originate in a cruising type flight, the crashes have been sorted into two event 
types, as follows. 
TYPE 0 EVENTS 
The following initiating events from Table III-1 do not apply to overflight of the flight-
restricted airspace for the reasons stated:   
• Controlled flight into terrain.  Not applicable because maneuvering is prohibited over 
the flight-restricted airspace and because the altitude cap of the flight-restricted 
airspace is 10,000 ft above the repository surface facilities. 
• Midair collision.  Not applicable because maneuvering is prohibited over the flight-
restricted airspace and midair collision is much more likely during simulated combat 
maneuvers.   
• Bird impact.  Not applicable because bird strike is unlikely at 14,000 ft MSL.  The 
USAF has collected information on reported bird strikes with aircraft.  Statistics show 
that over 90% of the bird impacts have occurred at altitudes less that 2,500-ft and 
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only 0.16% of the bird strikes have occurred at altitudes between 10,000 and 15,000 
ft. (Reference 2.1.37 [DIRS 174423]).  In addition, Table III-1 lists nine aircraft 
crashes caused by bird strikes.  Three of the events occurred shortly after take off, 
while the remaining six events occurred between 300 and 2,200 ft AGL. 
• Take-off mishap.  Not applicable because of the location of airports. 
• Landing mishap.  Not applicable because of the location of airports. 
• Abandoned aircraft during maneuvering. Not applicable over the flight-restricted 
airspace because maneuvering is prohibited. 
• Loss of control during maneuvering.  Not applicable over the flight-restricted airspace 
because maneuvering is prohibited.   
• Loss of control during testing.  Not applicable since testing is not consistent with 
transient, no maneuvering flight. 
• Use of piddle pack.  Not applicable since the use of the piddle pack is not considered 
straight and normal flight, which is required over the flight-restricted airspace (Events 
10 and 59 from Table III-1).   
• Engine failure from pilot error.  Error occurred during defensive move during combat 
training, which is not applicable over the flight-restricted airspace because 
maneuvering is prohibited (Event 206 from Table III-1).   
• Spatial disorientation.  Spatial disorientation occurred during maneuvering, which is 
prohibited over the flight-restricted airspace. (Event 128 from Table III-1) 
TYPE 1 EVENTS   
Type 1 events are applicable to overflights of the flight-restricted airspace.  There are two 
subcategories of Type 1 events; Type 1A events where immediate ejection is unlikely, 
and Type 1B events where immediate ejection is considered likely.  These subcategories 
are strictly used for the sensitivity analysis of the glide capability of the plane presented 
in Attachment VI.   It is assumed that the pilot ejects immediately after the engine failure 
or the crash-initiating event (Assumption 3.3.9).   
• Type 1A is a simple engine failure or airframe failure.  Events 39 and 76 (Table III-
1), which are airframe failure events, are categorized as Type 1A because the pilot 
was able to recover and return for an attempted landing in Event 39 and ejection 
occurred 5 minutes after the malfunction in Event 76, indicating that the pilot was 
able to be in control of the aircraft for a period of time. 
• Type 1B is for events that may lead to immediate ejection, such as engine failure with 
complications (fire for example), inadvertent ejection, loss of control (except during 
maneuvering or acrobatics, which is Type 0), centerline tank explosion and unknown.  
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Unknown was used for events with insufficient information for determining the cause 
of the initiating event.  There is one event with an unknown cause and it has 
conservatively been classified as Type 1B. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1 QUALITY ASSURANCE 
This calculation is prepared in accordance with EG-PRO-3DP-G04B-00037 (Reference 2.2.1).   
The Bechtel SAIC Company quality assurance program (Reference 2.2.2) applies to this analysis 
because it is part of the preclosure safety analysis.   
4.2 USE OF SOFTWARE 
Microsoft® Excel 2000 and Mathsoft® Mathcad® Version 11.2a were used in this calculation.  
They are classified as Level 2 software per procedure, IT-PRO-0011 (Reference 2.2.3).  These 
software applications are appropriate because only standard mathematical and sorting functions 
were used to derive the results, which do not depend on the particular software program.  The 
formulas used in this analysis are presented in sufficient detail in Section 7.2 and elsewhere at 
the point of use to allow an independent check to reproduce or verify the results.  The operating 
environment used was Microsoft® Windows 2000 installed on a Dell OPTIPLEX GX260. 
4.3 AIRCRAFT HAZARDS METHODOLOGY 
Reference 2.1.3 (Section 8) identifies the potential aircraft hazards requiring evaluation.  This 
calculation evaluates the aircraft hazards from three distinct sources: aircraft that travel in the 
Beatty Corridor (Assumption 3.3.2), military aircraft that traverse the flight-restricted airspace 
(Assumption 3.1.1), and military aircraft that fly in the NTTR and NTS outside of the flight-
restricted airspace.  Section 6 provides the inputs used in the calculation.  Section 7 develops the 
methodology and presents the analysis.   
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6. INPUTS 
6.1 HAZARDS CONSIDERED 
Hazards considered in this analysis are from Reference 2.1.3 (Section 8), which provides more 
detail about the airspace near the repository.  Dropped ordnance is also considered a hazard 
because ordnance may be carried over EC South and NTS airspace; however, ordnance is not 
armed until over USAF land on the R-4807 or R-4806 bombing range (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 
169894], pp. 3 through 6).  Ordnance is prohibited on flights over the flight-restricted airspace 
(Assumption 3.1.2).  Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict airspace in the vicinity of the repository.  
Table 5 maps the identified hazards to sections in this analysis.  In addition, as a defense-in-
depth measure, Reference 2.1.3 (Section 8) recommends that electronic jamming activities not 
occur while aircraft fly over the facilities and that radio frequency spectrum used at the Yucca 
Mountain site be coordinated through the appropriate Spectrum Management Office.  Electronic 
jamming activities are prohibited over the flight-restricted airspace (Assumption 3.1.2) and 
coordination with the Spectrum Management Office has been identified as a recommendation in 
Section 8, therefore, electronic jamming does not represent a significant risk to the Yucca 
Mountain Repository. 
Table 5.  Aircraft Hazards Considered 
Type of Airspace/Airporta Aircrafta 
Cross Reference to Sections 
in this Analysis  
DOE Designated Airspace 
R-4808 Small attack/fighter military 
aircraft, including dropped 
ordnance from outside the 
flight-restricted airspace 
3.1.2, 7.3.2, 7.3.3, and 7.5 
Military Designated Airspace 
Electronic Combat (EC) South area of R-
4807 and western portion of R-4806 
Small attack/fighter military 
aircraft 
7.3.2 and 7.3.3 
Civilian and DOE Airports 
DOE Area Pad 29 Helicopters 3.1.3 and 7.4 
Field Operations Office Helipad Helicopters 3.1.3 and 7.4 
Federal Airways and Jet Routes (Beatty Corridor; includes R-4808S)b 
Jet Route J-86 Military, commercial and 
general aviation aircraft 
7.3.1 
Jet Route J-92 Military, commercial and 
general aviation aircraft 
7.3.1 
Federal Airway V-105 Military and civilian aircraft 7.3.1 
Federal Airway V-135 Military and civilian aircraft 7.3.1 
Uncontrolled Airspace (Beatty Corridor) 
Class G airspace Small piston-engine aircraft, 
helicopters, and gliders 
7.3.1 
NOTES:  a Reference 2.1.3, Section 8 
               b These federal airways and jet routes are depicted in Reference 2.1.3 (Figure 6-2).  
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6.2 INPUTS FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES 
6.2.1. Aircraft Characteristics for Calculating Effective Target Areas 
The effective target area of an object on the ground is the equivalent area on the ground of the 
object, considering that the aircraft: 
• May have a significant wingspan compared to the dimensions of the object 
• May skid some distance on the ground before striking the object 
• Approaches the object at some angle φ from horizontal. 
 
The effective target area of an object on the ground depends on characteristics of the aircraft 
potentially involved in a crash.  Aircraft characteristics used in this calculation (Table 6) are 
from Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], Tables B-16, B-17, and B-18.   
Table 6.  Aircraft Characteristics Used for Effective Target Area Calculations 
Aircraft Type 
Representative 
Wingspan a 
G (ft) 
Mean Skid 
Distance b 
S (ft) 
φ c 
(degrees) 
Cot(φ) d 
(unitless) 
General Aviation     
Piston engine 50 60 7.0 8.2 
Turboprop 73 60 7.0 8.2 
Turbojet 50 60 7.0 8.2 
Commercial Aviation     
Air carrier (14 CFR Part 121)e 98 1440 5.6 10.2 
Air taxi (14 CFR Part 135)e 59 1440 5.6 10.2 
Military Aviation     
Large aircraft 223 780 7.7 7.4 
Fighter, attack, and trainer aircraft 78 246 6.8 8.4 
NOTES: a Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], Table B-16. 
b Reference 2.1.5  [DIRS 101810], Table B-18.  Takeoff values are used for in-flight crashes of military aircraft 
in accordance with the recommendations of Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], p. B-28. 
c Impact angle is calculated here as tan−1 (1 / cot φ ). 
d Mean of the cotangent of the impact angle (cos φ  / sin φ ) from Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], Table B-17.  
Takeoff values for military aircraft are used for in-flight crashes in accordance with the recommendations of 
Reference 2.1.5  [DIRS 101810], p. B-28. 
e The “air carrier” type includes major airlines that may be scheduled or unscheduled and cargo carriers that fly 
large aircraft.  Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], generally refers to flights regulated by 14 CFR Part 121 
(Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]) as air carriers and those regulated under 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 
2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]) as air taxis.  This corresponds to usage by the Federal Aviation Administration of the 
air-carrier and air taxi types in data that was provided by Reference 2.1.38 ([DIRS 168482]).  The definition of 
air taxis used in Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810], p. 10, includes aircraft under 30 seats or a maximum payload 
capacity of less than 3,401 kg (7,500 lb) that are operating in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 
2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]).  In March 1997, after Reference 2.1.5 [DIRS 101810] was published, the definitions of 
14 CFR Part 121 (Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]) and 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]) 
operations changed (Reference 2.1.39 [DIRS 168398], pp. 1 and 2).  Under the new rules most carriers known 
as commuters now operate under 14 CFR Part 121 (Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]).  Unscheduled 
and14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]) aircraft are a diverse group that includes small aircraft 
and large corporate jets (Reference 2.1.39 [DIRS 168398], p. 2). 
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6.2.2. Crash Rates for Aircraft 
Statistics for crash rates of fixed-wing aircraft (Table 7 and Table 8) are extracted from Data 
Development Technical Support Document for the Aircraft Crash Risk Analysis Methodology 
(ACRAM) Standard (Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367]).   Attachment IV updates these statistics to 
derive the crash rates for small military fixed-wing aircraft that are used in this analysis. 
Table 7.  Crash Rates for Military Aircraft 
Military Aircraft Type 
Crash Rate 
(mi−1) 
Cross Reference 
F-16s (normal flight) 3.86E-08 Attachment IV 
F-16s (special operations) 1.12E-07 Attachment IV 
F-15s (normal flight) 6.25E-09 Attachment IV 
F-15s (special operations) 8.45E-08 Attachment IV 
Large (normal flight) 1.90E-09 Attachment V 
SOURCE: Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 4.8 
 
Table 8. Crash Rates for General Aviation Aircraft 
General Aviation Aircraft Type 
Cruise or Normal-Flight 
Crash Rate (mi−1) Cross Reference 
Single engine, piston 2.233E-07a Attachment V 
Turboprop 3.557E-08b Attachment V 
Turbojet 3.067E-09c Attachment V 
SOURCE: a Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 3.29 
 b Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 3.31 
 c Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 3.32 
 
An estimate of crash rates per mile for unscheduled 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 
168507]) operations is made by using the average hourly fatal accident rate for scheduled and 
unscheduled 14 CFR Part 135 operations for the years 1998 through 2005 (Table 9 and Table 10) 
and the average speed for scheduled 14 CFR Part 135 flights (Table 10) over the same period.  
The fatal accident rate is used rather than the total accident rate (Assumption 3.3.5).   
The crash rate per mile, that being the hourly accident rate divided by the speed, is provided in 
Table 11.  The speed for scheduled 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]) flights is 
used as the speed for both the scheduled and unscheduled 14 CFR Part 135 flights because the 
same type of aircraft fly both the scheduled and unscheduled 14 CFR Part 135 flights.   
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Table 9. Statistics for Unscheduled 14 CFR Part 135 Operations 1998 through 2005 
Year 
Number of Fatal 
Accidents Hours Flown 
1998 17 3,802,000 
1999 12 3,204,000 
2000 22 3,930,000 
2001 18 2,997,000 
2002 18 2,911,000 
2003 18 2,927,000 
2004 23 3,238,000 
2005 11 3,260,000 
Total 139 26,269,000 
NOTES: Reference 2.1.40 [DIRS 177184], Table 9.  Data 
before 1998 is omitted due to the change in the scope 
of 14 CFR Part 121 (Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]) 
and 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 
168507]) that occurred in March 1997 (Reference 
2.1.39 [DIRS 168398], pp. 1 and 2). 
 
Table 10. Statistics for Scheduled 14 CFR Part 135 Flights 1998 through 2005 
Year 
Number of 
Fatal 
Accidents Hours Flown Miles Flown 
Average 
Speed 
(mi/h) 
1998 0 353,670 50,773,000 - 
1999 5 342,731 52,403,000 - 
2000 1 369,535 44,943,000 - 
2001 2 300,432 43,099,000 - 
2002 0 273,559 41,633,000 - 
2003 1 319,206 47,404,000 - 
2004 0 302,218 46,809,000 - 
2005 0 300,000 46,210,000 - 
Total or average 9 2,561,351 373,274,000 146 
NOTES: Reference 2.1.40 [DIRS 177184], Table 8.  Data before 1998 is omitted due to the 
change in the scope of 14 CFR Part 121 (Reference 2.1.24 [DIRS 168506]) and 
14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507])] that occurred in March 1997 
(Reference 2.1.39 [DIRS 168398], pp. 1 and 2). 
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Table 11. Crash Rates for Commercial Aviation 
Commercial Aviation Aircraft 
Type 
Cruise or Normal-Flight 
Crash Rate 
(mi−1) Cross Reference  
Air carrier (14 CFR Part 121 [DIRS 
168506]) 
3.094E-10a Attachment V 
Air taxi (14 CFR Part 135 [DIRS 
168507]) 
3.5E-08 b Attachment V 
NOTES:  a Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Table 2.15 
 b The crash rate for 14 CFR Part 135 (Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]) aircraft is estimated as:  
(139 crashes + 9 crashes)/ (26,269,000 h + 2,561,351 h) x 146 m/h)).  The number of 
crashes, hours and speed are from Table 9 and Table 10. 
 
6.2.3. Historical Data on Military Aircraft Crashes 
Attachment III compiles historical USAF aircraft crash data for military aircraft of concern 
(Assumption 3.3.6).  The crash events were compiled and summarized by evaluating information 
from three types of USAF reports: safety reports, accident investigation reports, and the 
executive summaries from the accident investigation reports (Table III-1). The safety reports 
were the primary source for the data in Table III-1. 
The Safety Reports are compiled and maintained at the Air Force Safety Center located at 
Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Visits to the Air Force Safety Center 
were undertaken in August and September 2004, June 2005, and June 2006.  Safety reports or 
accident investigation reports for USAF military aircraft of concern (Assumption 3.3.6), F-16, F-
15, F-22 and A-10, mishaps that resulted in a crash or pilot ejection that occurred worldwide 
from May 1990 to December 2005 were reviewed.  The latest reports available from the Air 
Force Safety Center during the June 2006 visit were from December 2005. Some reports were 
unavailable from the Safety Center library when the crash data were reviewed. Primary data 
extracted from the reports were the distance that a disabled aircraft traveled after pilot ejection, 
the altitude of ejection, and the cause of the crash.  Information about crashes when the pilot did 
not eject was also obtained.  
The executive summary reports and the accident investigation reports were used to supplement 
the safety reports.  The executive summary reports for years 2000 to 2005 are publicly available 
on the USAF Accident Investigation Board web site at http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/.  Some accident 
investigation reports for F-16s are publicly available on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) search web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html.  Sources for the information in Table III-
1 are referenced in Section 2 and are deemed appropriate sources for USAF aircraft mishap 
information since they are USAF reports. 
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7. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 
7.1 FREQUENCY-SCREENING THRESHOLD 
Event sequences that are expected to occur one or more times before permanent closure of the 
geologic repository operations area are defined as Category 1 event sequences in 10 CFR 63.2 
(Reference 2.2.4 [DIRS 173273]).  Other event sequences that have at least one chance in 10,000 
of occurring before permanent closure are referred to in 10 CFR 63.2 as Category 2 event 
sequences (Reference 2.2.4 [DIRS 173273]).  Less likely event sequences are considered Beyond 
Category 2.  Stating the screening threshold in terms of frequency requires knowledge of the 
duration of the potentially affected activities.  Because aircraft do not pose a hazard to subsurface 
activities, the relevant time period is the duration of emplacement operations.  The duration of 
emplacement operations will not exceed 50 years (Assumption 3.1.4).  A 50-year emplacement 
period gives a threshold frequency of: 
(1/10,000) / 50 y = 2 × 10−6 y−1. 
7.2 METHODS 
The methods derived in this section are used for estimating frequencies of aircraft crashes into 
surface facilities.  In addition, a formula for calculating the effective target area of a surface 
facility is also presented.  These methods form the basis of the frequency calculations in 
Attachment V.   
7.2.1. Effective Target Areas of the Surface Facilities 
The effective target area, A, depends on characteristics of the aircraft (Section 6.2.1), the size of 
the object on the ground, and the characteristics of the site.  A formula for effective target area is 
derived by approximating an object on the ground as a bounding rectangular prism of length L, 
width W, and height H, as discussed in ACRAM Modeling Technical Support Document 
(Reference 2.1.41 [DIRS 158248], Section 4.4).  The formula depends on the wingspan, G, of the 
aircraft, the skid distance, S, which may depend on characteristics of the site as well as those of 
the aircraft, and the approach angle, φ, to the ground, which may depend on site, aircraft, and 
flight characteristics.  The fly-in area is the effective target area of the structure, considering an 
airborne approach at an angle, and ignoring the possibility of hitting the ground and skidding into 
the structure: 
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 ,cot)()21(in-fly φHDGD
GWLA +++=  (Eq. 1) 
where 
 
Afly-in =  effective fly-in target area 
L  = length 
W = width 
G = wingspan 
D = diagonal, D ≡ √(L2 + W2) 
H = height 
φ  = approach angle to the ground 
 
The skid area, which is the effective target area that considers the possibility that the aircraft will 
hit the ground and skid into the structure and ignores the possibility of an airborne approach, is: 
 .)(skid SGDA +=  (Eq. 2) 
where 
 
Askid = effective skid target area 
D = diagonal 
G = wingspan 
S  = skid distance 
 
The total effective target area is Afly-in + Askid.  The impact angle and the skid distance depend on 
characteristics of the aircraft, although they may be limited by characteristics of the site, such as 
topography and landscaping.  Skid distances may also be limited by close proximity to other 
structures.  For conservatism, the calculation of the effective target area does not take credit for 
topography, landscaping effects or the presence of nearby structures. 
Attachment V presents the calculation of the effective area using Equations 1 and 2, the building 
dimensions in Table 1, and the aircraft characteristics in Table 6.  The total effective area of the 
relevant surface structures for each aircraft type is given in Table 12. 
Table 12. Effective Area 
Aircraft Effective Area (mi2) 
Small military aircraft 0.414 
Large military aircraft 0.715 
Piston-engine general aviation 0.325 
Turboprop general aviation 0.336 
Turbojet general aviation 0.325 
Commercial air taxi (14 CFR Part 135 [DIRS 168057]) 0.886 
Commercial air carrier (14 CFR Part 121 [DIRS 168506]) 0.930 
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7.2.2. Effectiveness of a Flight-Restricted Airspace While Ignoring Overflights 
The flight-restricted airspace that is assumed to surround the surface facilities (Assumption 
3.1.1) will reduce the frequency of crashes into any of the facilities from tactical training that 
may occur outside the flight-restricted airspace. 
To derive an expression that accounts for a flight-restricted airspace, first consider a small area, 
δA, on the ground under a flight area.  Suppose the flight area extends horizontally in all 
directions to an unlimited distance.  Further, suppose that the locations of ejection events and the 
directions of travel after ejection are uniformly distributed throughout the flight area.  For 
accidents in which ejection does not occur, the distance between ejection and crash is defined as 
zero.  Let f (r) denote the probability density function (PDF) of the distance, r, that an aircraft 
travels after the pilot ejects and let Φ0 denote the annual number of crashes initiated per unit 
flight area.  The uniform PDF for direction of travel is 1/(2π).   
With the passage of time, crashes into δA are expected.  The crashes that strike the area, δA, are 
randomly selected, have traveled distances distributed according to f (r), and have traveled in 
random directions according to the uniform PDF equal to 1/(2π).  The precise locations of the 
initiation points of the crash trajectories and the directions of travel are not relevant, but the 
endpoints of the crash trajectories are located within δA.  Because the ejection locations and 
directions of travel are uniformly distributed over an infinite flight area, the crash frequency 
density on the ground is equal to the crash-initiation frequency density.  With no restrictions on 
distance or direction of travel, the expected number of crashes into δA at time, T, is given by:  
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The double integral merely indicates that, with no restrictions on distance or direction of travel, 
all possible crash trajectories may be realized. 
Now consider a flight-restricted airspace that prohibits aircraft travel within a radius, R, of δA, 
where the largest dimension of δA is much less than R.  With a flight-restricted airspace in place, 
the uniform crash initiation density applies only to the area beyond R.  Other conditions remain 
the same.  Again, with the passage of time, crashes into δA are expected.  In this case, however, 
crashes with trajectories shorter than R are filtered out by the presence of the flight-restricted 
airspace.  The expected number of crashes, Mc, into δA at the center of the flight-restricted 
airspace at time T is given by:  
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Thus, the flight-restricted airspace reduces the expected number of crashes according to the ratio:  
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application   000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page 46 
 
 
 
 
)].(1[
)](1[
0
0
0
c
RF
TA
RFTA
M
M
−=
Φ
−Φ= δ
δ
 (Eq. 5) 
So far, the flight area has been considered infinite in every direction from δA.  However, the 
repository site is actually near the edge of the restricted NTTR and NTS airspace.  Now assume 
that the ejection locations and directions of travel corresponding to Φ0 are uniformly distributed 
outside the flight-restricted airspace out to an infinite distance; except in the southwest quadrant 
from the center of the flight-restricted airspace, which is almost entirely in the Beatty Corridor 
(Assumption 3.3.8) and is considered in Section 7.2.4.  Excluding the southwest quadrant filters 
out crashes with angles from π to 3π/2.  This results in an edge adjustment of approximately 
0.75, three quarters of the way around the repository.   
Considering the edge adjustment and the effectiveness of the flight-restricted airspace for the 
restricted airspace, the annual crash frequency per unit area at the center of the flight-restricted 
airspace, Φc, is given by: 
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 (Eq. 6) 
In this case, the double integral determines the filtering effect of the flight restrictions 
represented by the flight-restricted airspace and the omission of a quadrant.  An estimate of the 
complementary cumulative distribution function evaluated at the edge of the flight-restricted 
airspace or 1 - F(R) is provided in Section 7.3.2.1. 
7.2.3. Allowing for Overflights of the Flight-Restricted Airspace by Fixed-Wing Aircraft 
To allow flexibility in the use of airspace near the repository, it is assumed that there is a 
specified annual frequency of overflights of the flight-restricted airspace by fixed-wing aircraft 
(Assumption 3.1.2).  Aircraft are assumed to pass straight through the area above the flight-
restricted airspace (Assumption 3.1.2), to be approximately uniformly distributed across the 
radius of the flight-restricted airspace (Assumption 3.2.4), and fly at the minimum allowable 
altitude (Assumption 3.2.5).  Let N be the annual frequency of flights (y−1) that pass over the 
flight-restricted airspace, and λ be the crash rate (mi−1).  The expected annual frequency of 
crashes initiated over the flight-restricted airspace is given by Nλlm, where lm is the mean length 
(mi) of flights over the flight-restricted airspace.  Due to the altitude ceiling of the flight-
restricted airspace, an aircraft flying over the restricted airspace that experience a crash-initiating 
event may have already flown past the facilities or may have sufficient glide ratio to carry it past 
the facilities. Thus, some fraction, pc, of the flights that suffer crash-initiating events during 
overflight of the flight-restricted airspace pose a risk to repository surface facilities.  It is 
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assumed that the impact points on the ground are uniformly distributed within a circular area 
beneath the flight-restricted airspace, Az (Assumption 3.2.1).   
Given an effective target area, A, of the relevant surface facilities, the crash frequency into 
relevant repository facilities is: 
 .
z
c A
A
lpN
F m
λ=  (Eq. 7) 
For a convex area, the mean length, lm, of a chord intersecting the area is given by π multiplied 
by the area divided by the perimeter (Reference 2.1.42 [DIRS 160334], p. 30).  Thus, for a circle 
of radius R: 
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 (Eq. 8) 
where 
 
Az  =  surface area 
Lz = perimeter 
 
Combining Equations 7 and 8 gives the expected annual frequency of crashes that initiate over 
the flight-restricted airspace and strike relevant surface facilities (Table 1): 
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 (Eq. 9) 
NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear 
Power Plants (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6), states that for situations where 
federal airways or aviation corridors pass through the vicinity of the site, the probability per year 
of an aircraft crashing into the plant will depend on a number of factors such as the altitude, 
frequency and crash rate of the flights, and the width of the corridor. The following formula is 
given in NUREG-0800 for conservatively calculating the frequency, F, of aircraft crashes into a 
facility when aviation corridors pass through the vicinity of the site: 
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>+=  (Eq. 10) 
where 
N =  annual frequency of flights passing through flight area 
λ = crash frequency per mile 
w = width of an airway  
d = distance from the edge of the airway to the facility 
A = effective target area 
 
For the flight-restricted airspace, the width of the airspace, w, is twice the radius of the flight-
restricted airspace, 2R, thus Equations 9 and 10 are identical except for the factor, pc, which is 
used to account for the altitude of the aircraft flying over the flight-restricted airspace.  
The fraction, pc, of the flights that suffer crash-initiating events during overflight of the flight-
restricted airspace that pose a risk to repository surface facilities is calculated as follows.   
Aircraft flying over the facilities have an initial altitude of 14,000 ft MSL or above (Assumption 
3.1.1).  Elevations of the repository surface facilities are below 4,000 ft MSL (Reference 2.1.6 
[DIRS 175049]).  Therefore, the ceiling of the flight-restricted airspace is at least 10,000 ft above 
the repository surface facilities.  Conservatively, the aircraft over flying the facilities are 
assumed to be at 10,000 ft AGL (Assumption 3.2.5). 
Data on military aircraft crashes have been collected from May 1990 through December 2005 
and are presented in Table III-1 of Attachment III.  Each aircraft crash has been assigned an 
initiating-event type code that is used for determining which events are applicable to flights over 
the facilities (Assumption 3.3.11). The following types of crash-initiating events are considered:  
• Type 0 events are not applicable to overflight of the flight-restricted airspace.  
• Type 1 events are applicable to overflight of the flight-restricted airspace. 
TYPE 1 EVENTS   
There are two subcategories of Type 1 events; Type 1A events where immediate ejection is 
unlikely, and Type 1B events where immediate ejection is considered likely.  These 
subcategories are only used for the sensitivity analysis presented in Attachment VI.   It is 
assumed that the pilot ejects immediately after the engine failure or the crash-initiating event 
(Assumption 3.3.9).   
To determine the fraction of Type 1 events that pose a hazard to the surface facilities, consider an 
aircraft crossing directly above the center of the flight-restricted airspace.  This is the longest trip 
across the restricted airspace and therefore carries the greatest likelihood of a crash during 
overflight of the area.  An aircraft that has already flown beyond surface facilities prior to the 
crash-initiating event can be eliminated from further consideration.  The radius of the smallest 
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circle centered on the North Portal that encompasses the relevant surface facilities is 1.0 mi 
(Assumption 3.2.6).  Therefore, an aircraft that has already passed 6.6 mi [(4.9NM × 1.1508 
mi/NM) + 1.0 mi)] from the edge of the flight-restricted airspace will have traveled beyond all 
relevant surface facilities.   
Assuming that flights over the flight-restricted airspace are uniformly distributed (Assumption 
3.2.4), the fraction of aircraft that have not flown beyond the repository surface facilities when 
engine failure occurs can be estimated by the ratio of the radius of the flight-restricted airspace 
plus the radius of the smallest circle that encompasses the relevant surface facilities to the 
diameter of the flight-restricted airspace. 
( ) 59.02*1508.19.4 6.6 =× NMmiNM
mi  
If an aircraft experiences a crash-initiating event, anywhere from the edge of the flight-restricted 
airspace up to while over the facilities, the aircraft glide ratio could carry it beyond the surface 
facilities.  Likewise, if an aircraft experiences a crash-initiating event anywhere from the edge of 
the flight-restricted airspace up to the near edge of the smallest circle that encompasses the 
relevant surface facilities, the aircraft may not have sufficient glide ratio to reach the surface 
facilities.  To determine the fraction of aircraft that pose a threat to the facilities requires 
determining the fraction of aircraft that have a glide ratio large enough for the aircraft to reach 
the 1.0 mi inner circle, but less than the glide ratio required to carry the aircraft past the facilities 
or beyond the 1.0 mi circle.  The glide ratio is determined by the distance from the aircraft to the 
near edge and far edge of the circle that encompasses the surface facilities divided by the altitude 
of the flights (Assumption 3.2.5).  Since the aircraft are uniformly distributed (Assumption 
3.2.4), not all of the crash-initiating events will occur at the furthest point from the facility.   
As shown above, only the flights within the first 6.6 miles that have not flown past the facilities 
are of interest.  By dividing the 6.6 miles into 10 discrete sections, glide ratios necessary to carry 
the plane to the edge of the inner circle and past the facilities can be determined for each of the 
sections.  From Figure 3, it can be seen that flights in Sections 1, 2 and 3 are already over the 
area that encompasses the facilities.  Therefore, for Section 1 of Figure 3, the plane would have 
to travel 0.66 miles to clear the facilities.  The glide ratio would be: 
35.0
10000
528066.0 =×
ft
mi
ftmi
. 
For Section 4 of Figure 3, the plane would have to travel 0.64 miles to reach the facilities and 
2.64 miles to clear the facilities.  The glide ratio for the ten sections of Figure 3 varies from 0.34 
to 3.48, as shown in Table 13.  For comparison, the glide ratio for an F-16 is about 8.5, derived 
from a glide ratio of 7 nautical miles for every 5,000 ft of altitude lost (Reference 2.1.43 [DIRS 
177054], p. 5).  Thus, if the F-16 glide ratio of 8.5 were used for determining the fraction of 
aircraft that have less than the glide ratio required to carry the aircraft past the facilities, that 
fraction would be zero, resulting in a zero crash frequency from overflights of the flight-
restricted airspace.  
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Figure 3.  Illustration of Flight-Restricted Airspace Divided into Ten Sections 
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An assessment of the glide capability of aircraft after ejection can be made from the data in 
Table III-1.  Using the glide ratios for the Type 1 crashes in Table III-1, the fraction of the 
aircraft in each section that have sufficient glide ratios to carry them to the facilities but do not 
have sufficient glide ratios to carry them past the facilities can be determined by counting the 
number of aircraft in each section that have glide ratios in the range of the facilities.   There are 
58 observations of Type 1 events for which the glide ratio is known.  Dividing the number of 
flights from each section that have the required glide ratios by 58 gives the fraction of observable 
flights from each section that have the correct range of glide ratios.  Combining this fraction with 
the fraction of the aircraft that would be in each section, 0.1, and the fraction of the aircraft that 
have not flown past the facilities, 0.59, derived above, gives the fraction from each section that 
could endanger the facilities.  Adding up the fraction of aircraft that could endanger the facilities 
from each of the sections gives the total fraction of Type 1 Events that could endanger the 
facilities.  Table 13 shows the calculation of the total fraction. 
Table 13. Calculation of Type 1 Events Endangering Facilities 
Section 
Far 
Distance 
(mi) 
Near 
Distance 
(mi) 
Far Glide Ratio Near Glide Ratio 
Number of 
Flights 
from each 
Section 
within 
Glide Ratio 
Range 
Fraction 
(Number of 
flights/58) 
1 0.66 - 0.35 - 3 0.05 
2 1.32 - 0.70 - 7 0.12 
3 1.98 - 1.05 - 7 0.12 
4 2.64 0.64 1.39 0.34 7 0.12 
5 3.30 1.30 1.74 0.69 8 0.14 
6 3.96 1.96 2.09 1.03 15 0.26 
7 4.62 2.62 2.44 1.38 14 0.24 
8 5.28 3.28 2.79 1.73 16 0.28 
9 5.94 3.94 3.14 2.08 14 0.24 
10 6.60 4.60 3.48 2.43 12 0.21 
Sum of Fractions 1.78 
 
105.0
59.01.078.1
=
××=
c
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Thus, 10.5% of the flights that suffer crash-initiating events during overflight of the flight-
restricted airspace pose a risk to repository surface facilities. 
7.2.4. Crash Frequency Methods for Flights in the Beatty Corridor 
7.2.4.1. NUREG-0800 Model for Airways 
As stated in Section 7.2.3, NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety 
Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6), 
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provides the following formula as one way for calculating the frequency, F, of aircraft crashes 
into a facility when aviation corridors pass through the vicinity of the site: 
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>+=  (Eq. 10) 
where 
N =  annual frequency of flights passing through flight area 
λ = crash frequency per mile 
w = width of an airway  
d =  distance from the edge of the airway to the facility 
A = effective target area 
 
The formula gives a conservative upper bound on aircraft impact probability (Reference 2.1.44 
[DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6).  The formula may be regarded as the product of two factors: 
(1) the uniform areal crash density per year associated with a band that includes the flight 
corridor and extends out the distance to the facility on either side, and (2) the effective target area 
of the facility.   
One feature of the NUREG-0800 (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6) model that 
restricts its applicability to the proposed Yucca Mountain surface facility is its treatment of edge 
effects.  Because a uniform distribution is used, the crash-rate density assigned to the center of an 
airway is the same as that near the edge or beyond it as far away as the facility.  The surface 
facilities for the Yucca Mountain repository will be several miles from the edge of an airway 
(Section 3.3.2), so edge effects are important, and the NUREG-0800 model is very conservative.  
NUREG-0800 (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6) goes on to state that for 
heavily traveled corridors, greater than 100 flights per day, a more detailed analysis may be 
required to obtain a proper value of probability.  The estimated annual number of flights in the 
Beatty Corridor is approximately 708,000 (Section 3.3.4), which is almost 2,000 flights per day.  
Thus, a more detailed analysis is warranted. 
7.2.4.2. An Exponential Model for the Beatty Corridor Airway 
A model to estimate the frequency of aircraft crash into surface facilities was developed in 
“Analysis of Ground Hazards Due to Aircrafts and Missiles” (Reference 2.1.45 [DIRS 173314], 
p. 5).  Solomon introduced the PDF f (x) to describe the probability that a crash occurs at a 
distance x from an intended flight path.  The size of the facility and its distance from the flight 
path are assumed to be such that f(x) can be considered constant across the width of the facility in 
the x direction; that is, perpendicular to the intended flight path.  The incremental distance, dx, 
which is necessary to convert the probability density into a probability, is approximated as ∆x, 
the width of the facility in the x direction, and is absorbed into the definition of the effective 
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target area, A.  The flight path is assumed straight as it passes near the facility (Assumption 
3.2.2).  Solomon argued that f (x) should be symmetrical on either side of the intended flight 
path, about x = 0, and that it should decay monotonically with distance from the flight path.   
Reference 2.1.45 ([DIRS 173314], p.5) adopted the double exponential distribution with decay 
constant, γ, as follows: 
.
2
)( xexf γγ −=  (Eq. 11) 
To apply the double-exponential model to the Beatty Corridor, assume that flights are uniformly 
distributed across the width, w, of the airway (Assumption 3.2.3).  The applicable uniform PDF 
is 1/w.  Because the analysis only concerns one side of the airway, it can be assumed, without 
loss of generality, that x ≥ 0.  The distance from the facility to the edge of the airway is denoted 
by d.  For a site outside the airway, d > 0, the annual crash frequency for N annual flights on the 
airway with crash rate λ (mi−1) into effective target area A (mi2) is given by: 
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 (Eq. 12) 
The crash frequency due to uniformly distributed flight paths across the width w of the airway is 
given by: 
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 (Eq. 13) 
Equation 13 is the same as the NUREG-0800 model (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 
3.5.1.6) for a facility within the airway (Equation 10), except for the term in square brackets.  
Therefore, the edge adjustment, ρ, with respect to the NUREG-0800 model’s value for a facility 
within the airway is e−γd (1–e−γw) / 2.  For airways wide enough that w >> 1/γ, the term in 
parentheses is approximately equal to 1, so that the edge adjustment is approximately e−γd / 2.  A 
special case emerges when the facility is located on the edge of a wide airway such that d = 0 and 
w >> 1/γ.  The term in square brackets becomes approximately equal to 0.5.  In that case, the 
edge adjustment with respect to the NUREG-0800 model is 0.5.  This is not the case for the 
Yucca Mountain facilities since the North Portal is assumed to be 5 miles from the edge of the 
Beatty Corridor (Assumption 3.3.2) 
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The Solomon model (Reference 2.1.45 [DIRS 173314], p. 5) requires estimates of the 
exponential decay constant γ.  For the exponential distribution of crash locations, 1/γ is the mean 
distance to the crash from the intended flight path.  Based on an examination of crash histories, 
Solomon estimated the following exponential decay constants, depending on the type of aircraft: 
• γ = 1 mi−1 for military aircraft 
• γ = 2 mi−1 for general aviation other than aerial application 
• γ = 1.6 mi−1 for air carriers. 
Recall that the edge adjustment for the exponential model is approximately e−γd / 2.  Similarly, 
the NUREG-0800 model (Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6) has an edge 
adjustment if the facility is located outside the airway.  Consider the edge adjustment for the 
NUREG-0800 model, defined as the ratio of crash frequency F, for a facility located outside the 
airway, to the frequency F0, for a facility located within or on the edge of the airway.  Using 
Equation 10, it can be shown that the value of the ratio F/F0 is w / (w + 2d).   
The edge adjustment for the NUREG-0800 model depends on the width of the airway.  To pick a 
concrete example that will allow an illustration of the two models, let the width of the airway be 
26 mi.  In the examples shown, for distances more than a few miles from a wide corridor (Table 
14 and Figure 4), the edge adjustment of the NUREG-0800 model is too conservative.  Even ten 
miles from the airway, the crash frequency is not even reduced by half.  The exponential model 
has a much more pronounced edge effect and appears more reasonable.  Table 14 and Figure 4 
illustrate the models with varying distances from the edge of the airway to the facility, d, and the 
decay constants for the aircraft types. 
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Table 14. Example Edge Adjustments as a Function of Distance From the Airway 
Exponential Model  
exp(−γd) / 2 Distance d 
from Edge of 
Airway (mi) 
NUREG-0800 Model*  
w / (w  + 2d) γ=1 γ=1.6 γ=2 
0 1.0E+00 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 
1 9.3E-01 1.8E-01 1.0E-01 6.8E-02 
2 8.7E-01 6.8E-02 2.0E-02 9.2E-03 
3 8.1E-01 2.5E-02 4.1E-03 1.2E-03 
4 7.6E-01 9.2E-03 8.3E-04 1.7E-04 
5 7.2E-01 3.4E-03 1.7E-04 2.3E-05 
6 6.8E-01 1.2E-03 3.4E-05 3.1E-06 
7 6.5E-01 4.6E-04 6.8E-06 4.2E-07 
8 6.2E-01 1.7E-04 1.4E-06 5.6E-08 
9 5.9E-01 6.2E-05 2.8E-07 7.6E-09 
10 5.7E-01 2.3E-05 5.6E-08 1.0E-09 
NOTES: 
SOURCE: 
*The example assumes w = 26 mi (Assumption 3.3.2). 
Reference 2.1.44 [DIRS 103124], Section 3.5.1.6 
 
Figure 4.  Illustration of Airway Models 
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Thus high-performance military aircraft that fly at a wide range of altitudes are predicted to 
travel the farthest to the crash site from the intended flight path (Table 14 and Figure 4).  General 
aviation that fly at lower altitudes travel the least distance from the intended flight path, while air 
carriers that fly at higher altitudes travel in between the two other types of aircraft.   
 
The sample cumulative distribution function of crash distances for small military aircraft derived 
from data tabulated in Table III-1 is derived in Section 7.3.2.1 and illustrated in Figure 5.  The 
crash cumulative distribution function reasonably supports the Solomon model military 
illustration (Reference 2.1.45 [DIRS 173314], p. 5).  For example, about 95% of the crashes 
from the historical data in Table III-1, depicted in Figure 5, travel approximately 3 mi or less 
following the initiation of the crash event. Figure 4 shows similar results in that at 3 mi from the 
edge of the airway, about 3% of the planes travel further. 
 
7.3 CRASH FREQUENCIES FOR FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT 
7.3.1. Flights In the Beatty Corridor 
The exponential airway model (Equation 13) is used to estimate crash frequencies from air traffic 
passing through the Beatty Corridor.  The Beatty Corridor is a 26-mi wide band, whose edges 
run parallel to the Nevada-California border, that passes between the edge of Shoshone MOA 
and within 5 mi of the North Portal at its closest (Assumption 3.3.2).  Attachment V, Section 
V.2, presents the calculation of the crash frequency from flights in the Beatty Corridor.  
7.3.1.1. Small Military Aircraft In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the updated F-16 crash rate of 2.75 × 10–8 mi–1 (Section 3.3.7), the effective area for small 
military aircraft (Table 12), the assumed number of flights (Table 2), and γ equal to 1 mi−1 for 
military aircraft, the resultant crash frequency is 2.11 × 10–8 y–1.  This is a small fraction of the 
Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, small military 
aircraft traveling in the Beatty Corridor will not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface 
facilities (Table 1). 
7.3.1.2. Large Military Aircraft In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the large military crash rate of 1.90 × 10–9 mi–1 (Table 7), the effective area for large 
military aircraft (Table 12), the assumed number of flights (Table 2), and γ equal to 1 mi−1 for 
military aircraft, the resultant crash frequency is 1.94 × 10–9 y–1.  This is a small fraction of the 
Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, large military 
aircraft traveling in the Beatty Corridor will not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface 
facilities (Table 1). 
7.3.1.3. Piston Engine General Aviation In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the piston engine general aviation crash rate of 2.233 × 10–7 mi–1 (Table 8), the effective 
area for this aircraft type (Table 12), the assumed number of flights (Table 2), and γ equal to 
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2 mi−1 for general aviation, the resultant crash frequency is 1.70 × 10–9 y–1.  This is a small 
fraction of the Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, piston 
engine general aviation traveling in the Beatty Corridor will not pose a significant risk to the 
relevant surface facilities (Table 1). 
7.3.1.4. Turboprop General Aviation In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the turboprop general aviation crash rate of 3.557 × 10–8 mi–1 (Table 8), the effective area 
for this aircraft type (Table 12), the assumed number of flights (Table 2), and γ equal to 2 mi−1 
for general aviation, the resultant crash frequency is 9.30 × 10–10 y–1.  This is a negligible fraction 
of the Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, turboprop 
general aviation traveling in the Beatty Corridor will not pose a significant risk to the relevant 
surface facilities (Table 1). 
7.3.1.5. Turbojet General Aviation In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the turbojet general aviation crash rate of 3.067 × 10–9 mi–1 (Table 8), the effective area 
for this aircraft type (Table 12), the assumed number of flights (Table 2), and γ equal to 2 mi−1 
for general aviation, the resultant crash frequency is 4.97 × 10–11 y–1.  This is a negligible fraction 
of the Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, turbojet 
general aviation traveling in the Beatty Corridor will not pose a significant risk to the relevant 
surface facilities (Table 1). 
7.3.1.6. Commercial Air Taxi In the Beatty Corridor 
Using the commercial air taxi (14 CFR Part 135 [DIRS 168507]) crash rate of 3.5 × 10–8 mi–1 
(Table 11), the effective area for this aircraft type (Table 12), the assumed number of flights 
(Table 2), and γ equal to 1.6 mi−1 for air carriers, the resultant crash frequency is 1.11 × 10–8 y–1.  
This is a small fraction of the Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y.  
Therefore, commercial air taxi will not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface facilities 
(Table 1). 
7.3.1.7. Commercial Air Carrier 
Using the commercial air carrier (14 CFR Part 121 [DIRS 168506]) crash rate of 3.094 × 10–10 
mi–1 (Table 11), the effective area for this aircraft type (Table 12), the assumed number of flights 
(Table 2), and γ equal to 1.6 mi−1 for air carriers, the resultant crash frequency is 8.44 × 10–10 y–1.  
This is a negligible fraction of the Category 2 event sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  
Therefore, commercial air carriers will not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface facilities 
(Table 1). 
7.3.1.8. Total Frequency From Aircraft In the Beatty Corridor 
The estimated crash frequency due to flights in the Beatty Corridor is the sum of the crash 
frequencies of the aircraft that travel in the Beatty Corridor.  The total crash frequency is 
approximately 3.77 × 10–8 y–1 (Attachment V), which is a small fraction of the Category 2 event 
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sequence acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, aircraft traveling in the Beatty 
Corridor do not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface facilities of the repository (Table 
1).   
7.3.2. Flights Beyond the Radius of the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
7.3.2.1. Sample Distribution Function for Travel After Pilot Ejection  
Attachment III presents historical data on distances that fixed-wing military aircraft traveled after 
the pilot ejected.  If the pilot did not eject before impact, then the distance traveled after ejection 
was taken to be zero. If the event involved a failed landing or takeoff, the distance was given as 
not applicable so that the distribution function would not be biased by events that are not likely 
to occur near the repository.  The cumulative distribution function (CDF), that is, the probability 
that the crashing aircraft traveled a distance less than r, can be estimated from the data.  The 
sample CDF as a function of the variable r, Fn(r), is defined as the number of observations less 
than or equal to r divided by the total number of observations, n (Reference 2.1.46 [DIRS 
122506], p. 264).  The sample CDF (Figure 5) is an unbiased estimator of the true CDF, F(r) 
(Reference 2.1.46 [DIRS 122506], p. 507).   
Because the repository surface facilities (Table 1) are not concentrated at the North Portal, but 
are spread out over a 1.0-mi radius (Assumption 3.2.6), credit is only taken for a flight-restricted 
airspace of a 1.0 mi smaller radius.  Thus, using Assumption 3.1.1, the flight-restricted airspace 
radius credited is 4.6 mi (1.0 mi less than the 5.6-mi radius of the flight-restricted airspace).  For 
the 153 applicable observations, for which a distance estimate is possible, 149 of the distances 
are less than the reduced radius of the flight-restricted airspace, 4.6 mi.  Thus, Fn(4.6 
mi) = 149 / 153 = 0.974.   The estimated probability of exceeding 4.6 mi is 1 - Fn(4.6 mi) = 
1 - 149/153= 0.026. 
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Figure 5.  Sample Cumulative Distribution Function of Crash Distances 
 
7.3.2.2. Crash Frequency Density Outside the Radius of the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Recent changes in USAF plans, regarding the use of NTS airspace, include a possibility that 
training activities in other portions of the NTTR and MOA could extend into NTS airspace in the 
future (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 169894], pp. 5 and 6).  Therefore, the annual number of crashes 
initiated per unit flight area, Φ0 = 8.0 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2 in the NTTR and MOA, calculated 
without NTS airspace, is applied to all areas in NTS, NTTR, and MOA airspace beyond the 
radius of the flight-restricted airspace (Assumption 3.3.8).  
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7.3.2.3. Crash Frequency due to Flights Outside the Radius of the Flight-Restricted 
Airspace 
Applying Equation 6, the crash frequency density at the center of the flight-restricted airspace is  
.mi/y/crashes1056.1
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where 
0Φ   =  8.0 × 10–5 crashes/y/mi2 (Section 7.3.2.2) 
)]mi6.4(1[ nF−  = 0.026 (Section 7.3.2.1) 
 
The effective target area of the surface facilities as seen by small military aircraft (Table 12) is 
0.414 mi2.  Thus, the estimated crash frequency due to flights outside the radius of the flight-
restricted airspace is:  
(1.56 × 10−6 crashes / y / mi2)(0.414 mi2) = 6.46 × 10−7 crashes / y. 
The crash frequency of 6.46 × 10–7 y–1 is well below the Category 2 event sequence acceptance 
threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, flights outside the flight-restricted airspace do not pose a 
significant risk to the relevant surface facilities of the repository (Table 1). 
7.3.3. Overflights of the Flight-Restricted Airspace 
Equation 9 is used to estimate the crash frequency for flights over the flight-restricted airspace.   
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where: 
R  = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ  = crash rate of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 (Section 3.3.7) 
cp  = 10.5% of events assumed to pose a hazard to surface facilities (Section 7.2.3) 
A  = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
 
In this case, the full 5.6-mi radius is used because the overflights are counted across the entire 
flight-restricted airspace.  
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The crash frequency of 1.07 × 10–7 y–1 is a small fraction of the Category 2 event sequence 
acceptance threshold of 2 × 10–6 y–1.  Therefore, overflights of the flight-restricted airspace do 
not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface facilities of the repository (Table 1). 
7.3.4. Total Crash Frequency Due to Fixed Wing Aircraft 
Summing the three contributors to the crash frequency: 
• 3.77 × 10−8 y−1 from the Beatty Corridor (Section 7.3.1.8) (4.8% of the total 
frequency) 
• 6.46 × 10−7 y−1 from flights outside the flight-restricted airspace (Section 7.3.2.3) 
(81.7% of the total frequency), and  
• 1.07 × 10−7 y−1 from overflights of the flight-restricted airspace (Section 7.3.3) 
(13.5% of the total frequency). 
The total crash frequency is approximately 7.9 × 10−7 y−1, which gives about a 150% margin to 
the Category 2 event sequence frequency-screening threshold of 2 × 10−6 y−1.   
7.4 HELICOPTER CRASHES 
To avoid the possibility of radiological release due to a helicopter crash into a repository surface 
facility (Table 1), helicopter flights are prohibited within one-half mile horizontally from the 
relevant surface facilities (Assumption 3.1.3).  To facilitate the prohibition, the helipad 
associated with the repository is assumed to be located at least one-half mile from the relevant 
surface facilities (Assumption 3.1.3). 
7.5 DROPPED OR JETTISONED ORDNANCE 
Military aircraft fly over the flight-restricted airspace, outside the flight-restricted airspace and in 
the Beatty corridor.  For overflight of the flight-restricted airspace, ordnance is prohibited 
(Assumption 3.1.2); therefore, the hazard of accidentally dropping or intentionally jettisoning 
ordnance from aircraft that fly over the flight-restricted airspace is considered negligible or non-
existent.   
It is estimated that 5% of the military aircraft carry ordnance, although ordnance is not armed 
until over R-4807 and R-4806 bombing ranges (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 169894], p. 3).  In 
addition, there are no reports of aircraft delivering ordnance that have impacted outside the 
NTTR, or of any flight-related mishaps involving ordnance delivered outside the NTTR and 
inside the NTS during the period of 1993 through 2003.  All ordnance impacts were within the 
designated surface hazard area (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 169894], p. 1).   
The frequency of a crash into a surface facility from aircraft outside the flight-restricted airspace 
is estimated as 6.46 × 10−7 y−1in Section 7.3.2.3.  The frequency of a crash from small military 
aircraft in the Beatty Corridor is 2.1 × 10−8 y−1 (Section 7.3.1.1) and from large military aircraft 
in the Beatty Corridor is 1.9 × 10−9 y−1 (Section 7.3.1.2).  If 5% of the aircraft carry ordnance and 
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the ordnance is jettisoned during the in-flight emergency and it is assumed that all jettisoned 
ordnance impact the facilities, the frequency of an ordnance impact would be 3.3 × 10−8 y−1 [0.05 
× (6.46 × 10−7 y−1 + 2.1 × 10−8 y−1 + 1.9 × 10−9 y−1)], which is well below the screening threshold 
of 2 × 10−6 y−1.  Moreover, as previously stated, there have been no reports of aircraft delivering 
ordnance outside the designated surface hazard area.  Therefore, the hazard of dropped or 
jettisoned ordnance is considered extremely low when compared to the acceptance threshold of 
2 × 10−6 y−1 and ordnance does not pose a significant risk to the Yucca Mountain facilities.  
7.6 UNCERTAINTIES 
To cope with uncertainties, the analysis takes a conservative approach.  Conservative 
assumptions are discussed in context elsewhere in the analysis as applicable, and several are 
summarized as follows:  
• No credit is taken for pilot action, immediate ejection is assumed (Section 3.3.9).   
• The repository is near the edge of the airspace available for training activities.  Therefore, 
aggressive maneuvering and simulated combat, which may lead to ejection, are more likely 
to take place at locations deeper into the NTTR, as opposed to near the repository (Figure 1 
and Figure 2).  Trace plots of aircraft activity during Red Flag exercises at the NTTR in 
August 2003 and April 2004 show that flight activity is concentrated far from the repository 
(Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 169894], Attachments 7 and 8). 
• Flights over the flight-restricted airspace are assumed to be at the lowest allowable elevation: 
14,000 ft MSL, which results in the quickest descent to the ground in case of pilot ejection 
(Section 3.2.5). 
• No credit is taken for phased construction of surface facilities, or for the time needed to load 
and unload the aging pads (Section 3.3.1).  Thus the effective area used in the analysis is 
conservatively large. 
• No credit is taken for the ability of transportation casks, aging casks, or buildings to 
withstand an impact by an aircraft (Section 3.3.10).   
• No credit is taken for increased approach angles, and decreased skid and shadow areas, that 
result from topography, landscaping and the proximity of nearby surface facilities (Section 
7.2.1).  
• The F-16 crash rate, which is the highest military crash rate, is used for all small military 
aircraft (Sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7). 
• The assumed distance to the edge of the Beatty Corridor is conservatively small (Section 
3.3.2). 
7.7 SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS 
Sensitivity calculations are given in Attachment VI. 
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8. RESULTS 
The three contributors to the crash frequency are: 
• 3.77 × 10−8 y−1 from the Beatty Corridor (Section 7.3.1.8) (4.8% of the total 
frequency) 
• 6.46 × 10−7 y−1 from flights outside the flight-restricted airspace (Section 7.3.2.3) 
(81.7% of the total frequency), and  
• 1.07 × 10−7 y−1 from overflights of the flight-restricted airspace (Section 7.3.3) 
(13.5% of the total frequency). 
The total crash frequency is approximately 7.9 × 10−7 y−1.  Assuming that the probability of a 
radiological release upon impact of a crash is 1 (Assumption 3.3.10), the frequency of a 
radiological release is 7.9 × 10−7 y−1, which is well below, with a 150% margin, the frequency 
screening threshold of 2 × 10−6 y−1 and thus categorized as a Beyond Category 2 event sequence.  
Therefore, the aircraft hazard does not pose a significant risk to the relevant surface facilities 
(Table 1). 
Credit for a flight-restricted airspace and operational constraints are taken, as follows: 
• Flights by fixed-wing aircraft in NTS or NTTR airspace within 4.9 NM (5.6 statute 
mi) of the North Portal and below 14,000 ft MSL are prohibited. 
• 1,000 overflights of the flight-restricted airspace per year are permitted above 14,000 
ft MSL for fixed-wing aircraft.  
• Maneuvering over the flight-restricted airspace is prohibited; flight is straight and 
level. 
• Carrying ordnance over the flight-restricted airspace is prohibited. 
• Aircraft overflying the flight-restricted airspace are prohibited from engaging in 
electronic jamming activity while over the flight-restricted airspace. 
• Helicopter flights within 0.5 mi of the relevant surface facilities (Table 1) are 
prohibited.  Helicopter flights are not restricted by the flight-restricted airspace for 
fixed-wing aircraft.  The helipad associated with the repository shall be located at 
least one-half mile from the relevant surface facilities. 
• The duration of emplacement activities is limited to 50 years. 
As defense-in-depth, it is recommended that radio frequency spectrum used at the Yucca 
Mountain project be coordinated with the appropriate Spectrum Management Office, which 
coordinates radio frequency spectrum with affected agencies. 
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ATTACHMENT I.  
FLIGHTS THROUGH THE BEATTY CORRIDOR 
Flights through the Beatty Corridor are counted based on tabular information supplied by the 
Federal Aviation Administration. 
Figure I-1 shows radar tracks for aircraft flying through the public airspace to the southwest of 
the repository site for a typical day.  Note that flights are concentrated between the two restricted 
airspace complexes in what is designated here as the Beatty Corridor.  The image indicates the 
locations of the R-2508 Range complex, R-4808N and R-4808S on the NTTR, and the 
approximate locations of the North Portal, Las Vegas, and the Beatty VORTAC (very high 
frequency omnidirectional range and tactical air navigation station) (Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 
158638]).  R-4808N covers most of the NTS, although the southwest corner of the NTS is 
beneath the triangular R-4808S.  The flights that passed through the Beatty Corridor are shown 
as gray traces.  Flights that did not pass through the Beatty Corridor are not shown.  Note that 
while some flights cross R-4808S, it is not heavily used, especially near the border with 
R-4808N.   
For this analysis, it is useful to separately count air carriers (14 CFR Part 121 Reference 2.1.24 
[DIRS 168506]); air taxis (14 CFR Part 135 Reference 2.1.25 [DIRS 168507]); general aviation 
turbojets, turboprops, and reciprocating-piston aircraft; and small and large military aircraft.  
After a few minor enhancements and error corrections, as described below, the counts are 
performed as follows.  Flights regulated by 14 CFR Part 121 (labeled AC for air carrier) and 
flights regulated by 14 CFR Part 135 (labeled AT for air taxi) are directly counted in the tabular 
information provided by the FAA.  General aviation aircraft (labeled GA for general aviation) 
are identified and further classified by engine type: J = jet, T = turboprop, and P = reciprocating-
piston, making counting straightforward.  Military aircraft are identified and further classified by 
weight class.  Military aircraft in the H weight class (>255,000 lb) are counted as large military, 
and military aircraft in other categories are counted as small military.  The results of the counts 
produced according to the scheme outlined above are provided in Section 3.3.4. 
The flight-count information for 6/1/05 through 6/7/05 (Reference 2.1.21 [DIRS 177034]) and 
12/1/05 through 12/7/05 (Reference 2.1.23 [DIRS 177035]) have, in a few instances, missing 
information that is addressed as follows.  The  “unknown” GA aircraft are classified as the same 
engine type as the other GA aircraft in the altitude range.  For example, an “unknown” GA 
would be classified as a “P” for reciprocating piston when the other GA aircraft at that altitude 
are “P”.  The regional jets are classified as “T” for turboprop since the definitions state that the 
regional jet performs like a turboprop.  Unclassified military aircraft are classified as small 
military aircraft due to their higher crash rate.  Results of the data counting are contained in 
Table 3 in Section 3.3.4. 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application   000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page I-2 
 
 
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application   000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page I-3 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Reference 2.1.21 [DIRS 177034] 
Figure I-1. Flights Through the Beatty Corridor On 7 June 2005 
Beatty Vortac
North Portal Las Vegas
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ATTACHMENT II.  
FLIGHT DISTRIBUTION IN THE NEVADA TEST AND TRAINING RANGE AND 
NEVADA TEST SITE AIRSPACE  
The conceptual model for estimating crash frequencies for overflights of the flight-restricted 
airspace assumes that overflights of the restricted airspace are approximately straight and are 
distributed uniformly over the airspace (Assumption 3.2.4).  The concept of uniform distribution 
of flights within a flight area requires clarification.  The concept of uniformly distributed points 
on a geometric plane is more often encountered, and more readily understood.  For example, 
suppose a hailstorm is said to have distributed hailstones uniformly throughout the front lawn.  
This is taken to mean that if the lawn is divided into smaller zones, the ratio of the number of 
hailstones counted in each zone to the area of the zone will be approximately equal for all zones.  
The shapes of the zones are irrelevant.  The sizes are also irrelevant, except that the statistical 
precision of the calculated density degrades, as the size gets smaller.  Now consider an example 
of lines in a geometric plane: suppose the claim is made that the tracks left by slugs crossing a 
large leaf are uniformly distributed across the leaf.  Attempting to apply the same method for 
lines as for points runs into mathematical difficulties.  To illustrate, suppose the outline of the 
central vein on the surface of the leaf is used as a zone.  The area of the zone is a very small 
fraction of the leaf’s surface due to the narrow width of the vein, but there may be many 
crossings—perhaps a substantial fraction of the number that cross the entire leaf.  The result is a 
large number of crossings per unit area.  In fact, the number of crossings per unit area can be 
made arbitrarily large by further narrowing the zone.  Clearly, a different measure of traffic 
density is needed. 
The literature of integral geometry shows that the conditional probability that a random line that 
intersects a convex area also intersects a smaller convex area within the larger area is given by 
the ratio of the perimeters of the two areas (Reference 2.1.42 [DIRS 160334], p. 30).  Taking for 
granted the fact that the larger area has been intersected, the result indicates that the probability 
of crossing an arbitrarily selected convex area within the larger area is proportional to the 
perimeter of the smaller area.  Thus, a useful measure of traffic density across a convex flight 
area is the number of crossings divided by the perimeter of the flight area.  As an intuitive 
illustration of this claim, imagine marbles rolling randomly, one at a time, on a table where a 
coffee mug is resting.  The probability of a given marble hitting the mug is proportional to the 
diameter of the mug, not its footprint area.  The diameter of the mug, in turn, is proportional to 
the perimeter of the mug.  Finally, note that the crash frequency estimated by Equation 9 
(Section 7.2.3) is proportional to the number of crossings divided by the perimeter of the flight 
area. 
Incursions into concentric circles centered on the North Portal, a 5.8-by-7-mi area termed the 
Yucca Mountain Repository [YMR] Box roughly centered on the North Portal, and an incursion 
area that approximates the NTS, were counted on a monthly basis (Reference 2.1.49 [DIRS 
166809]).  The circles used for the counts are 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 mi in radius (Reference 2.1.50 
[DIRS 161341]) and are designated here as YMR-1, YMR-2, and so on.  Coordinates of the 
YMR incursion area are: northwest corner at 36° 54.00’ north latitude and 116° 28.00’ west 
longitude; southeast corner at 36° 48.00’ north latitude and 116° 22.00’ west longitude 
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(Reference 2.1.49 [DIRS 166809]).  The resulting YMR rectangle is about 7 mi long north and 
south, 5.8 mi wide east and west, and roughly centered on the North Portal (Reference 2.1.19 
[DIRS 158638]); this gives a perimeter length of about 25.6 mi.  The NTS incursion area is 
composed of three separate areas: a triangle and two rectangles (Reference 2.1.51 [DIRS 
160821]), which together form a single polygon that approximately coincides with the NTS 
(excluding R-4808S).  The three areas are defined as follows:   
• First rectangle.  Northwest corner: 37° 16.00’ north latitude, 116° 27.00’ west longitude; 
southeast corner: 36° 46.25’ north latitude, 115° 56.00’ west longitude.   
• Second rectangle.  Northwest corner: 36° 46.25’ north latitude, 116° 14.75’ west longitude; 
southeast corner: 36° 41.00’ north latitude, 115° 56.00’ west longitude.   
• Triangle.  First corner: 36° 46.25’ north latitude, 116° 27.00’ west longitude; second corner: 
36° 41.00’ north latitude, 116° 14.75’ west longitude; third corner: 36° 46.25’ north latitude, 
116° 14.75’ west longitude. 
The perimeter of the NTS incursion area is about 133 mi (Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 158638]). 
An examination of the ratios of the total incursion counts to the perimeters of the corresponding 
flight areas for a recent 18-month period (Table II-1) indicates that flights are approximately 
uniformly distributed within about 7 mi of the North Portal and within the YMR Box.  Air traffic 
is denser for the NTS as a whole and for the larger concentric circle.  Thus, traffic density is 
nearly uniform within about 7 mi of the North Portal, but increases beyond 7 mi from the North 
Portal.  The count for the YMR Box is representative of air traffic within about 7 mi of the North 
Portal. 
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Table II-1.  Aircraft Incursion Counts By Month and Flight Area 
Flight Area Designator NTS 
YMR 
Box YMR-1 YMR-2 YMR-3 YMR-5 YMR-7 YMR-10
Radius of Concentric Circle (mi) - - 1 2 3 5 7 10 
Perimeter of Flight Area (mi) 133 25.6 6.3 12.6 18.8 31.4 44.0 62.8 
Month in 2003   
January 1437 118 7 12 21 53 87 216
February 1205 98 13 45 58 128 224 491
March 1679 207 34 91 139 289 434 757
April 2347 222 47 92 130 301 432 930
May 2418 304 98 196 246 421 634 1999
June 2184 110 30 68 87 184 334 718
July 1499 121 31 57 84 186 290 693
August 2505 185 46 99 143 295 452 846
September 1308 130 36 71 96 187 274 586
October 2904 326 69 129 226 455 664 1097
November 2460 266 48 103 167 392 592 977
December 1735 120 32 56 95 162 228 496
Month in 2004   
January 1525 170 25 76 130 227 311 545
February 1332 183 63 96 142 254 340 533
March 3006 410 55 223 298 660 896 1314
April 1930 274 38 99 169 384 531 927
May 3231 600 80 211 393 828 1317 2191
June 1978 276 62 254 154 280 464 884
   
Average monthly 2038 229 45 110 154 316 472 900
Average annual 24455 2747 543 1319 1852 3791 5669 10800
Average annual / Perimeter (mi-1) 184 107 86 105 98 121 129 172
NOTE: The flight areas are the NTS, the 5.8-by-7-mi YMR Box, and concentric circles surrounding the North 
Portal.   
SOURCES: Reference 2.1.49 [DIRS 166809], Reference 2.1.52 [DIRS 171184]; Reference 2.1.53 [DIRS 171185]; 
Reference 2.1.54 [DIRS 171303]. 
NTS = Nevada Test Site; YMR = Yucca Mountain Repository. 
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ATTACHMENT III.  
INFORMATION ON A SAMPLE OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT CRASHES 
To support the frequency analysis of aircraft hazards, U.S. Air Force (USAF) aircraft crash data 
for the aircraft of concern (Section 3.3.6) were compiled and summarized by evaluating 
information from aircraft crash investigation reports (Table III-1).  There are three types of 
reports used to compile the data on the crashes: Safety Reports, Accident Investigation Reports, 
and Executive Summary Reports.  The Safety Reports are compiled and maintained at the Air 
Force Safety Center located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  The 
Executive Summary reports for years 2000 to 2005 are publicly available on the USAF Accident 
Investigation Board web site at http://usaf.aib.law.af.mil/.  The Accident Investigation Reports 
for F-16s were collected from publicly available reports on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) search web site at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/web-based.html.  Visits to the Air Force Safety Center 
were undertaken in August and September 2004, June 2005, and June 2006.  Safety reports that 
were reviewed were mishaps that resulted in the loss of an aircraft of concern (Section 3.3.6), F-
16, F-15, F-22 and A-10, which occurred worldwide from May 1990 to December 2005.  The 
latest reports available from the Air Force Safety Center during the June 2006 visit were from 
December 2005.  Some safety reports were unavailable when the crash data was compiled.  
Primary data extracted from the reports included the distance that a disabled aircraft traveled 
after pilot ejection, the altitude of ejection, and the cause of the crash.  Information was also 
obtained from the reports about crashes when the pilot did not eject. 
A direct indication of the distance traveled by the aircraft to the crash point after ejection was not 
provided in most reports.  The actual location of the aircraft at the time of ejection was not 
routinely provided.  In such cases, the ground impact location of the ejection seat or the canopy, 
which is released from the aircraft just prior to ejection, was generally used as an estimate of the 
ejection point.  This procedure introduces uncertainties because the canopy or ejection seat could 
have been transported by wind.  Nonetheless, this potential is negligible in most cases because 
ejection altitudes were found to be small, which would tend to minimize the drop time and lateral 
movement of the canopy or seat.  Further, this error is expected to be random in that it could 
either increase or decrease the actual distance from ejection to crash location so that use of the 
entire data set could tend to obscure this error.   
In most cases, the ejection-to-crash distance estimates had to be calculated or inferred, dependent 
upon information included in the reports.  The following methods were used: 
• Scaling from crash maps, or, if not possible, locating the crash and the canopy, ejection 
seat, or the pilot on scaled maps based on map locations included in the crash reports. 
• Use of the Haversine formula (Reference 2.1.55 [DIRS 172067], p. 159) when longitude 
and latitude coordinates of the canopy or ejection seat and the crash location were 
provided in the reports.  As explained in Reference 2.1.55 ([DIRS 172067], p. 159), this 
method is appropriate for calculations involving small angular differences.  The 
calculations of distance require the mean radius of the Earth, taken as 6,371 km 
(Reference 2.1.56 [DIRS 128733], p. F-193). 
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• Use of angle of descent and elevation of ejection. 
In some cases, the altitude or distance traveled after ejection differed between the Safety Report 
and the Accident Investigation Report.  When conflicting information existed, the source of the 
information, that is statements from pilots versus data, was taken into account when determining 
which source to use.  When information concerning the locations of both the canopy and ejection 
seat was available, the ejection-to-crash distance was calculated as the average of the distances 
from the crash site to the canopy and ejection seat. 
 
The data obtained are provided in Table III-1, arranged chronologically.  The table gives: 
• The source document for the event.  Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 174605]) is an electronic 
copy of excerpts organized in electronic files named by year.  The citations for Reference 
2.1.57 ([DIRS 174605]) are by file name, which is the year, followed by the page 
number.   
 
• Description of the initiating event, such as engine failure or midair collision 
 
• Type of aircraft involved 
 
• Serial number of the aircraft 
 
• Date of the event 
 
• Ejection altitude 
 
• Distance traveled from actual or inferred ejection point to the crash site 
 
• Method used to estimate the ejection to crash distance 
 
• Comments that provide additional relevant information 
 
• Glide ratio  
 
• Initiating event type, as defined in Assumption 3.3.11. 
 
Crash reports provided from May 1990 to December 2005 are included in Table III-1, even if an 
ejection-to-crash distance estimate could not be made because of lack of information or if no 
ejection occurred.  Table III-2 provides a summary of information from Table III-1. 
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Table III-1.  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
1 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 174 and 175) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 81-0798 25-May-90 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
2 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 73 
and 74) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 79-0125 20-Jun-90 0 0 NA No ejection NA 0 
3 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 172); Reference 
2.1.59 ([DIRS 175319] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 84-1321 07-Aug-90 1000 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1A 
4 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1990, pp. 3 to 
7); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 173) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 83-1151 03-Sep-90 500 AGL 0.24 Map Ejection was successful.  
Altitude was taken as the 
altitude just prior to the zoom.  
The distance to the crash was 
taken as the mean of the 
distance from the crash site to 
the seat and canopy. 
2.53 1B 
5 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1990, pp. 8 and 
9) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 89-2027 19-Sep-90 0 0 NA No ejection. Night operations. NA 0 
6 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 170 and 171) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 85-1510 20-Sep-90 1665 AGL 1.51 Lat, Long Distance to crash is based on 
canopy and seat distance from 
crash site.  Coordinates are 
given in degrees, minutes, and 
seconds. 
4.79 1A 
7 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1990, pp. 10 
and 11) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-15E 87-0203 30-Sep-90 0 0 NA No ejection.   NA 0 
8 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 99 and 100); 
Reference 2.1.60 ([DIRS 
175320] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0354 23-Oct-90 1500 AGL 1.5 Text Ejection was successful. 5.28 1A 
9 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1990, pp. 12 
and 13) 
Loss of 
Control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 79-0067 24-Oct-90 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  
Mishap occurred during 
maneuvering.  Crashed at sea. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
10 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1990, pp. 14 to 
19); Reference 2.1.61 
([DIRS 175321] p. 5) 
Use of piddle 
pack  
F-16C 88-0461 01-Dec-90 Unknown 0.06 Map Loss of control of aircraft 
during pilot "piddle pack" use. 
Distance is average of canopy, 
seat, and pilot distance to crater.
Unknown 0 
11 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 169) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 79-0400 13-Jan-91 20,000 
MSL  
Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1A 
12 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 167 and 168) 
Centerline fuel 
tank explosion 
F-16A 83-1089 15-Jan-91 3,500 AGL 4.2 Map Distance from ejection to 
aircraft impact; map distances 
transposed to Reference 2.1.62 
([DIRS 172083] p. 23) and 
scaled.  
6.3 1B 
13 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 1 to 
3) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16A 78-0009 24-Jan-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
14 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 1 to 
3) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16A 80-0536 24-Jan-91 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 0 
15 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 4 to 
17); Reference 2.1.63 
([DIRS 175383] p. 3) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 81-0717 26-Jan-91 2,000 AGL 0.62 Map Ejection, aircraft over coastline 
so MSL was taken as AGL. 
Distance calculated as mean of 
distances from point of impact 
to canopy and seat. 
1.64 1A 
16 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 18 to 
24) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical, 
followed by 
immediate 
complete loss 
of control 
F-16C 85-1423 28-Jan-91 13,800 
MSL/8,900 
AGL 
1 Map Successful ejection. Hand 
sketch gives ejection seat 
located 3641 ft from impact.  
Map plots impact point, ejection 
seat as well as ejection point.  
Ejection point was further than 
seat location. The distance of 1 
mi was estimated from map 
using grids and the information 
in the sketch. 
0.6 1B 
17 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 25 
and 26) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 84-1379 15-Feb-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
18 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 104 to 106) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0329 20-Feb-91 300 AGL 0.1 Map Distance to crash based on 
indicated distance from canopy 
to initial impact point, and 
scaled distance from ejection 
seat to initial impact point.  
Ejection distance taken as mean 
of two distances. 
1.8 1A 
19 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 27 to 
34) 
Aircraft fire F-16C 88-0453 13-Mar-91 Unknown 0.34 Map Successful ejection. Distance 
from approximate center of 
crash site to average of canopy 
and seat. 
Unknown 1B 
20 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 35 to 
41); Reference 2.1.64 
([DIRS 175323] p. 3) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16A 82-1003 15-Mar-91 4525 AGL 0.22 Map Air-to-air fighter maneuvering. 
Loss of control during defensive 
role.  Distance from canopy. 
0.26 
 
0 
21 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 42 to 
55) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-15C 78-0526 27-Mar-91 NA NA NA Impacted ridgeline 2.6 NM from 
runway on landing approach.  
Although pilot ejected, altitude 
and distance to crash is not 
applicable per Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
22 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 56 
and 57) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 81-0758 02-Apr-91 0 0 NA Impact with water during 
maneuvering.  No ejection. 
NA 0 
23 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 58 to 
60); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] p. 164) 
Loss of 
control 
F-16C 89-2061 04-Apr-91 Unknown Unknown NA Aircraft went into steep nose-
low spiral.  Ejection was 
successful. 
Unknown 1B 
24 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 61 
and 62) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16A 79-0391 11-Apr-91 NA NA NA Aborted takeoff, successful 
ejection from ground. 
NA 0 
25 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 63 to 
67); Reference 2.1.65 
([DIRS 175324] pp. 2 and 3) 
Bird Impact F-16A 82-0920 18-Apr-91 2800 AGL 0.62 Text Low-level flight, collision with 
bird at 300 ft AGL. 
1.2 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
26 Reference 2.1.66 ([DIRS 
175325] p. 12); Reference 
2.1.58 ([DIRS 172743] pp. 
107 to 109) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 87-0302 07-May-91 506 AGL 0.17 Map Distance to crash based on 
distance from canopy and 
ejection seat to crash site given 
on map in crash report (900 ft).  
Event occurred at takeoff. 
1.77 1A 
27 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 71 
and 72); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 160 and 
161) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16B 81-0814 08-Jun-91 900 AGL 0.5 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and seat to impact crater, 
indicated on diagram adjoined 
to report. 
2.9 1A 
28 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 75 to 
82) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
A-10A 80-0260 16-Jul-91 300 AGL 0.09 Map Low Altitude Training - 
Distance taken from ejection 
seat to impact crater. Ejection 
taken as altitude of event. 
1.6 1B 
29 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 112 and 113); 
Reference 2.1.67 ([DIRS 
175360] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 86-0045 17-Jul-91 2500 MSL 
(AGL) 
Unknown NA Aircraft crashed in sea.   Unknown 1B 
30 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 83 
and 84) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16DG 88-0168 30-Jul-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
31 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 85 to 
91) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15E 87-0172 16-Sep-91 8000 AGL 0.10 Map Successful ejection. Distance 
taken as mean distance from 
crash site to canopy and seats. 
0.07 0 
32 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 92 to 
94) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 80-0209 23-Sep-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
33 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 92 to 
94) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 79-0203 23-Sep-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
34 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 95 
and 96) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 89-2059 07-Oct-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
35 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 97 
and 98) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16B 79-0419 14-Nov-91 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
36 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 99 
and 100); Reference 2.1.68 
([DIRS 175327] pp. 1 and 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 80-0484 27-Nov-91 900 to 
1000 AGL
1 Text Low-level flight. Glide ratio 
calculated with mean ejection 
altitude of 950 ft AGL. 
5.56 1A 
37 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 101 
to 106) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 89-2089 16-Dec-91 11,000 
MSL 
4.47 Lat, Long Close to coast so MSL is taken 
as AGL. Site at 34o11’36.8”N, 
79 o 18’45.7”, canopy at 
34o15’23”N, 79 o 17’20”, seat at 
34o15’13.8”N, 79 o17’18.5”.  
Distance as average of seat and 
canopy. 
2.14 1B 
38 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1991, pp. 107 
and 108) 
Unknown F-16B 82-1040 19-Dec-91 Unknown Unknown NA Aircraft not located. Unknown 1B 
39 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 1 to 
5); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 54 to 56) 
Airframe 
failure 
F-16C 84-1267 13-Jan-92 300 AGL 0.24 Map Pilot was able to land but engine 
did not shut down.  Pilot elected 
to take off again and 
subsequently successfully 
ejected after climb-out. Distance 
taken as average of seat and 
canopy 
4.3 1A 
40 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 6 to 
9); Reference 2.1.69 ([DIRS 
175328] p. 7) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 88-0470 14-Jan-92 900 AGL 0.1 Map Pilot saw terrain and ejected.  
Distance taken as average of 
seat and canopy. 
0.59 0 
41 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 10 to 
13) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15A 75-0071 15-Jan-92 6500 AGL 3.90 Lat, Long Other plane returned to base.  
Initiating event altitude assumed 
for ejection.  Distance taken 
from parachute landing site. 
3.17 0 
42 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 14 to 
19) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 81-0052 21-Jan-92 Unknown Unknown NA Mishap during acrobatics. 
Insufficient information in 
report for altitude and distance. 
Successful ejection. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
43 Reference 2.1.70 ([DIRS 
175329] pp. 3 to 13) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 85-1496 23-Jan-92 15,000 
MSL 
Unknown NA Other plane returned to base.  
Ejection altitude is 15,000 MSL, 
over water, therefore; altitude is 
also AGL; no distance to crash 
is known. 
Unknown 0 
44 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 20 to 
30) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16A 81-0704 03-Mar-92 21,000 
MSL 
Unknown NA Ejection altitude assumed to be 
the altitude of mid-air collision. 
Unknown 0 
45 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 20 to 
30) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16A 81-0706 03-Mar-92 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 0 
46 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 31 to 
38) 
Landing 
mishap 
A-10A 76-0526 11-Apr-92 NA NA NA Although pilot ejected, altitude 
and distance to crash is not 
applicable per Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
47 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 39 
and 40) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16CG 89-2110 24-Apr-92 NA NA NA Loss of power at take-off. No 
apparent ejection. 
NA 0 
48 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 41 
and 42) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-22A 87-0701 25-Apr-92 NA NA NA Premeditated aborted landing 
for testing the F-22 during a 
crash.  No ejection. 
NA 0 
49 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 43 
and 44) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-
16ADF 
80-0610 05-May-92 NA NA NA Crashed on landing. Ejection 
occurred at landing. 
NA 0 
50 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 45 to 
50) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16A 83-1071 21-May-92 Unknown 0.09 Map Event took place during a low 
altitude intercept. Successful 
ejection.  Distance of mean 
from canopy and seat. 
Unknown 0 
51 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 28 to 30) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 90-0749 31-May-92 <3000 
AGL 
Unknown NA Scaling from map was not 
performed because scale is 
given under a text form (as “1  
500”).  Because map may have 
been resized when formatted 
into the compilation report, this 
form of scaling cannot be 
trusted for estimating distances. 
Unknown 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
52 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 51 
and 52) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16DG 88-0160 02-Jun-92 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
53 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 53 to 
56) 
Loss of 
control 
F-15C 85-0116 13-Jul-92 Unknown Unknown NA Impact with water. Successful 
ejection over water. 
Unknown 1B 
54 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 57 
and 58) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 82-0943 31-Jul-92 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
55 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 59 to 
66) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15E 89-0479 10-Aug-92 41 AGL 0 Text During maneuvering exercise, 
saw terrain and ejected; 
unsuccessful ejection 
0 0 
56 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 67 to 
69) 
Loss of 
control during 
testing 
A-10A 78-0695 28-Aug-92 11,800 
AGL 
Unknown NA During a functional flight check, 
mishap occurred at 15,000 ft 
during engine cross bleed start.  
Shutdown one engine for restart 
but would not restart.  Sketch 
was not detailed enough to 
determine distance. 
Unknown 0 
57 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 70 to 
73); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 31 and 
32); Reference 2.1.71 
([DIRS 175330] p.3) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-
16ADF 
81-0697 31-Aug-92 2,000 MSL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Scale 
on sketch not reliable. 
Unknown 1A 
58 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 33 to 38); 
Reference 2.1.72 ([DIRS 
175384] p. 7) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 83-1139 01-Sep-92 2,000 AGL 1.4 Map Distance to crash is measured 
from parachute (near canopy 
and seat) to center of main crash 
site as provided on map. 
3.70 1A 
59 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 93 to 
98); Reference 2.1.73 
([DIRS 175331] pp. 7 to 11) 
Use of piddle 
pack  
F-16C 85-1451 08-Sep-92 2,000 AGL Unknown NA Seat belt interference during 
“piddle pack” use.  Insufficient 
information to determine 
distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
60 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 39 to 41; 
Reference 2.1.74 ([DIRS 
175385] p. 2) 
Bird Impact F-16A 80-0566 18-Sep-92 750 AGL 0.9 Map Used mean of altitudes from 
two sources. Distance scaled on 
map from ejection point to crash 
site. Bird strike shortly after 
liftoff. 
6.3 0 
61 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 44 to 47); 
Reference 2.1.75 ([DIRS 
175333] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 85-1485 22-Oct-92 310 AGL Unknown NA Crash site survey information is 
provided but text is illegible.  
Ejection was successful. 
Unknown 1A 
62 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 101 
and 102); Reference 2.1.76 
([DIRS 175334] p. 3) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16CG 90-0761 27-Oct-92 NA NA NA Unsuccessful landing.  
Although pilot ejected, altitude 
and distance to crash is not 
applicable per Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
63 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 103 
and 104) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 82-0985 30-Oct-92 1,500 AGL 0.8 Text Engine failure during take-off. 
Successful ejection. Distance 
from pilot to crash site. 
2.8 1A 
64 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 105 
to 108) 
Loss of 
control 
A-10A 79-0184 12-Nov-92 Unknown Unknown NA Engine failures with multiple 
malfunctions.  Successful 
ejection. 
Unknown 1B 
65 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 62 to 64) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 81-0993 06-Dec-92 0 0 NA No ejection.   NA 0 
66 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1992, pp. 109 
to 115); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 244, and 
258 to 260); Reference 
2.1.77 ([DIRS 175335] pp. 
3, 4, and 8) 
Bird Impact F-16A 83-1078 17-Dec-92 3200 AGL 0.17 Map Distance to crash is based on 
distance between seat and 
approximate center of crash site 
(ventral fin).  Ground level 
taken as 300 ft MSL.  Bird 
strike was at 1000 ft AGL. 
0.28 0 
67 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 1 and 
2) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16DG 90-0784 18-Feb-93 0 0 Text Ejection was initiated, but 
interrupted by ground impact. 
NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
68 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 3 to 
6); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 72 to 76) 
Aircraft fire F-16A 83-1102 19-Feb-93 1800 AGL 0.2 Map Distance calculated as distance 
from center of crash debris 
(engine) to mean distance to 
ejection seat and canopy; scaled 
on map. 
0.59 1B 
69 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 7 and 
8); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 145 and 146) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 88-0523 23-Feb-93 1210 AGL Unknown NA Several air-start attempts.  
Ejection was successful. 
Unknown 1A 
70 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 9 to 
11) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 79-0027 15-Mar-93 8000 AGL Unknown NA Ejected, but crashed at sea. Unknown 0 
71 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 12 to 
17); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 153 and 
154); Reference 2.1.78 
([DIRS 175336] p. 4) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 79-0379 21-Apr-93 50 AGL Unknown NA Illegible map.  Ejection was 
successful.  Engine failure 
following takeoff.  Crash on 
attempted landing. 
Unknown 1A 
72 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 18 
and 19) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 85-1492 28-Apr-93 NA NA NA Impact with trees on a ridgeline 
during approach for landing. 
Safely ejected. Although pilot 
ejected, altitude and distance to 
crash is not applicable per 
Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
73 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 20 to 
23); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 110 and 
111); Reference 2.1.79 
([DIRS 175337] p. 3) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 87-0269 18-May-93 7,700 AGL 8.3 Map G-induced loss of 
consciousness.  Distance to 
crash measured from canopy to 
crash site; map distances 
transposed to Nevada state map 
Reference 2.1.80 ([DIRS 
156950]) and scaled.  Given 
uncertainties, value calculated is 
taken as the average of distance 
range found (8.0 mi to 8.6 mi). 
5.7 0 
74 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993 pp. 24 
and 25) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 89-2069 18-May-93 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
75 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993 pp. 26 
and 27); Reference 2.1.81 
([DIRS 175338] p. 5) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 90-0832 24-May-93 620 AGL 0 Text Unsuccessful ejection. 0 0 
76 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 28 to 
34) 
Airframe 
failure 
F-15A 77-0117 12-Jun-93 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection approximately 5 
minutes after malfunction. 
Mode II ejection which is < 
15,000 ft.  Insufficient 
information for determining 
altitude and distance. 
Unknown 1A 
77 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 35 to 
37) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16B 82-1042 23-Jun-93 Unknown Unknown NA Mid-air collision, one plane 
landed successfully. 
Unknown 0 
78 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 38 to 
40) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16C 87-0335 27-Jul-93 NA NA NA No ejection. Collision with 
other plane while one plane 
landing and one plane in 
takeoff. 
NA 0 
79 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 38 to 
40) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 86-0275 27-Jul-93 NA NA NA Successful ejection near ground. 
Collision with other plane while 
one plane landing and one plane 
in takeoff.  Although pilot 
ejected, altitude and distance to 
crash is not applicable per 
Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
80 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 41 
and 42) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 86-0250 10-Aug-93 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
81 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 43 to 
48); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 151 and 
152) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0343 11-Aug-93 1700 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  Plane 
crashed in water. 
Unknown 1A 
82 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 49 
and 50) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 82-0990 27-Aug-93 0 Unknown NA Pilot ejected upon landing. NA 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
83 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 51 to 
53); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 148 to 
150)  
Engine failure, 
fire  
F-16A 81-0779 11-Sep-93 22,000' 
MSL 
0.17 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and ejection seat to crash site 
(distances indicated on map).  
Elevation of Union, MO 
approximately 500 ft MSL. 
0.04 1B 
84 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 54 to 
64); Reference 2.1.82 
([DIRS 175339] p. 6) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 86-0253 27-Sep-93 4,600 AGL 0.1 Map Other plane safely returned to 
base. Distance to crash is mean 
of canopy and seat location to 
impact site.  Ground level taken 
from map. 
0.12 0 
85 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 65 to 
66); Reference 2.1.83 
([DIRS 175340] p. 5) 
Engine failure, 
fuel 
emergency 
F-16CJ 91-0350 08-Oct-93 Unknown Unknown NA Engine flame-out due to running 
out of fuel.  Crashed on landing.
Unknown 1B 
86 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 77 and 78) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 88-0448 08-Nov-93 0 0 NA No ejection.   NA 0 
87 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 67 to 
73); Reference 2.1.84 
([DIRS 175342] p. 3) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0325 09-Nov-93 610 AGL Unknown NA Initiating event altitude was at 
10,000 ft MSL/ 1000 ft AGL 
Unknown 1A 
88 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993, pp. 74 
and 75) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 81-0770 29-Nov-93 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
89 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993 pp. 76 to 
78) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16A 82-0927 17-Dec-93 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
90 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1993 pp. 76 to 
78) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15A 75-0054 17-Dec-93 Unknown Unknown NA Insufficient information. 
Successful ejection. 
Unknown 0 
91 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 1 and 
2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
A-10A 78-0669 24-Jan-94 Unknown Unknown NA Attempted single engine 
approach and landing.  Engine 
stalled. Pilot ejected. 
Insufficient information for 
distance to crash from ejection. 
Unknown 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
92 Reference 2.1.85 ([DIRS 
175343] pp. 1 and 2) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16C 87-0270 26-Jan-94 NA NA NA Problems occurred during 
takeoff.  Successful ejection. 
NA 0 
93 Reference 2.1.85 ([DIRS 
175343] pp. 1 and 2) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16D 87-0389 26-Jan-94 NA NA NA Problems occurred during 
takeoff.  No ejection. 
NA 0 
94 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 84 and 85) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 90-0823 02-Feb-94 2000 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1A 
95 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 86 to 88); 
Reference 2.1.86 ([DIRS 
175344] p. 5) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 90-0764 07-Feb-94 2200 AGL 0.78 Map Distance to crash provided on 
map from ejection seat to 
crashed aircraft.  
1.9 1A 
96 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 10) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 87-0309 14-Feb-94 0 0 NA No ejection.   NA 0 
97 Reference 2.1.87 ([DIRS 
175345] p. 1) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2134 16-Feb-94 0 NA NA Ejected on the ground at the end 
of the runway. 
NA 1A 
98 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 3 and 
4) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 80-0486 28-Feb-94 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
99 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 5 to 
7) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16D 88-0171 23-Mar-94 0 0 Text Mid-air collision during runway 
approach.  Ejection was on or 
near the ground.  Other plane 
landed. 
NA 0 
100 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 8 and 
9) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 88-0411 30-Mar-94 NA NA NA Crashed on landing.  Ejected on 
or near the ground. 
NA 0 
101 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 10 to 
13) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15C 78-0497 04-Apr-94 NA NA NA Crashed at take-off.  Although 
pilot ejected, altitude and 
distance to crash is not 
applicable per Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
102 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 14 to 
17) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 79-0058 05-May-94 11,000 
MSL 
(AGL) 
Unknown NA Maneuvering training.  Aircraft 
impacted water after pilot 
ejected. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
103 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 18 to 
22) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 87-0274 06-May-94 15,000 
MSL 
Unknown NA Insufficient information for 
distance to crash. Plane crashed 
in water. Ejection altitude taken 
as altitude of mid-air collision.  
Event occurred over water so 
altitude is AGL. 
Unknown 0 
104 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 18 to 
22) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15C 78-0530 06-May-94 0 0 NA Insufficient information. Plane 
crashed in water. Pilot did not 
eject. 
NA 0 
105 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 23 to 
26) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 80-0227 18-May-94 1200 AGL Unknown NA Mid-air collision. Insufficient 
information of map.  Ejection 
altitude taken as altitude of mid-
air collision.  
Unknown 0 
106 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 23 to 
26) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 81-0940 18-May-94 1200 AGL Unknown NA Mid-air collision. Insufficient 
information of map.  Ejection 
altitude taken as altitude of mid-
air collision.  
Unknown 0 
107 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 27 
and 28) 
Take-off 
mishap 
A-10A 80-0249 08-Jun-94 NA NA NA Crashed at take-off; no ejection. NA 0 
108 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 29 to 
31) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16A 82-0934 12-Jun-94 NA NA NA Aborted takeoff.  Although pilot 
ejected, altitude and distance to 
crash is not applicable per 
Section 7.3.2.1. 
NA 0 
109 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 32 to 
65); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 245 to 
249); Reference 2.1.88 
([DIRS 175346] p. 2) 
Bird impact F-16B 83-1173 01-Jul-94 1500 AGL 0.75 Map Engine failure due to bird 
ingestion.  Distance to crash 
calculated as mean of distances 
from canopy and seat to crash 
site; scaled from map.  Engine 
failure was caused by bird 
ingestion shortly after lift off. 
2.64 0 
110 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1994, pp. 66 
and 67) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 79-0214 17-Sep-94 0 0 NA Controlled flight into ground.  
No ejection. 
NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
111 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 147, 234 and 
235); Reference 2.1.89 
([DIRS 175348] pp. 3 to 8) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 88-0488 20-Sep-94 3300 AGL 7 Text Ejection was successful. 11.2 1A 
112 Reference 2.1.90 ([DIRS 
175349] pp. 1 and 2) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16CG 89-2058 18-Oct-94 NA NA NA Gear-up landing due to 
hydraulic failure.  No ejection. 
NA 0 
113 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 89 to 91); 
Reference 2.1.91 ([DIRS 
175350] pp. 4 to 6) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 90-0814 25-Oct-94 1380 AGL 1.5 Text Distance to crash obtained from 
text. 
5.74 1A 
114 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 1 to 
8); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 70 and 71); 
Reference 2.1.92 ([DIRS 
175351] pp. 4 and 5) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 90-0849 13-Jan-95 4440 AGL Unknown NA Ejection 9 minutes after takeoff.  
Ejection altitude (5640 ft MSL) 
from Reference 2.1.57, ground 
level (1200 ft MSL) from 
Reference 2.1.92 ([DIRS 
175351] pp. 4 and 5). 
Unknown 1A 
115 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 9 and 
10) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 89-2036 26-Jan-95 0 0 NA Impact with water.  No ejection. NA 0 
116 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 52 and 53); 
Reference 2.1.93 ([DIRS 
175352] pp. 1 and 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2000 05-Feb-95 3000 AGL 2.5 Text Ejection was successful. 4.4 1A 
117 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 11 to 
13) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 88-0478 10-Feb-95 NA NA NA Collision with other plane when 
landing.  Successful ejection. 
NA 0 
118 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 11 to 
13) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16D 83-1185 10-Feb-95 NA NA NA Collision with other plane when 
landing.  Successful landing. 
NA 0 
119 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 14 
and 15) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15E 89-0504 18-Apr-95 Unknown Unknown NA Night flight.  Aircraft impacted 
water. 
Unknown 0 
120 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 131); Reference 
2.1.94 ([DIRS 175353] p. 5) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16B 78-0093 15-May-95 2000 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. 
Insufficient information to 
determine distance to crash. 
Unknown 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
121 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 16 
and 17) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 80-0268 19-May-95 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
122 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 18 to 
21) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15C 79-0068 30-May-95 NA NA NA Crashed on runway during take-
off. 
NA 0 
123 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 68 and 69); 
Reference 2.1.95 ([DIRS 
175354] p. 3) 
Engine failure, 
fire  
F-16C 87-0273 25-Jun-95 2000 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  
Insufficient information to 
determine distance to crash.  . 
Unknown 1B 
124 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 22 to 
27) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 82-1018 13-Jul-95 2000 AGL 2.4 Lat, Long Ejection was successful.  
Distance to crash determined 
from longitude and latitude 
using the canopy and pilot 
positions and crash site. 
6.34 1A 
125 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 28 
and 29) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 78-0537 03-Aug-95 Unknown Unknown NA Uncontrolled flight that led to 
ejection. Insufficient 
information on ejection altitude 
and distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
126 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 57 to 59); 
Reference 2.1.96 ([DIRS 
175388] p. 5) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 88-0455 21-Aug-95 4500 AGL 1.7 Text Distance to crash given from 
ejection location to aircraft 
impact. Several engine restarts 
attempted.  
2.0 1A 
127 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 30 to 
32) 
Aircraft fire A-10A 80-0157 29-Aug-95 900 AGL 0.46 Map The initiating event altitude is 
taken as the ejection altitude. 
Distance to crash is rounded up 
from the average between the 
seat and canopy locations to the 
crash site. 
2.7 1B 
128 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 33 to 
36) 
Spatial 
disorientation 
A-10A 79-0200 10-Oct-95 2000 AGL 0.4 Text Ejection after pilot experienced 
Instrumental Meteorological 
conditions. 
1.06 0 
129 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 37 
and 38) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-15A 76-0061 09-Nov-95 NA NA NA Unable to stop on landing; 
ejection was successful. 
NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
130 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 39 to 
45) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16CG 88-0426 28-Nov-95 8280 MSL Unknown NA Engine stall during 
maneuvering.  Insufficient 
information to determine 
distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
131 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1995, pp. 46 to 
52); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 48 and 
49); Reference 2.1.97 
([DIRS 175356] p. 4) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 84-1250 21-Dec-95 1750 AGL 0.93 Lat, Long Distance is difference between 
ejection seat at 34 57 29.22N 
110 55 49.9W and impact crater 
at 34 57 59.5N 110 55 03.6W. 
Ejection altitude taken as 
average of range given. 
2.81 1A 
132 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 1 to 
5) 
Engine failure, 
fuel 
emergency 
F-16C 89-2079 20-Jan-96 410 AGL 0.125 Map Distance to crash is mean 
distance from canopy and seat 
to crash site. 
1.6 1B 
133 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 127 and 128); 
Reference 2.1.98 ([DIRS 
175357] p. 1) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0361 19-Mar-96 2000 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. 
Insufficient information to 
determine distance to crash. 
Unknown 1A 
134 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 101 to 103) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15C 82-0023 21-Mar-96 NA NA NA Excessive sink rate. NA 0 
135 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 129 and 130); 
Reference 2.1.99 ([DIRS 
175358] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 85-1545 07-Jun-96 1550 AGL 1.1 Map Altitude take as mean of the 
altitudes given in the two 
sources.  Distance to crash from 
ejection to aircraft impact; map 
distances transposed to 
Reference 2.1.62 ([DIRS 
172083] p. 89) and scaled.   
Return to airport attempted, 
restarts attempted. 
3.75 
 
1A 
136 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 114 and 115) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 91-0354 11-Jul-96 209 AGL 0.1 Impact 
Angle 
Distance to crash from ejection 
to impact based on tangent of 
impact angle and ejection 
altitude.  Angle of descent was 
taken as average of range 
provided (18 to 25 degrees). 
2.53 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
137 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 9 and 
10) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16CG 89-2093 31-Jul-96 NA NA NA Pilot ejected just before plane 
left runway. 
NA 0 
138 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 95 to 98); 
Reference 2.1.100 ([DIRS 
175359] pp. 1 to 4) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2101 03-Aug-96 5400 AGL 3.82 Lat, Long Plane at 26o 24.95’N, 49o 
57.81’E. Pilot at 26o 22.1’N, 49o
59.7’ E.  Ejection was 
successful. 
3.74 1A 
139 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 11 
and 12) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 78-0636 22-Aug-96 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
140 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 13 to 
15) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-15C 86-0150 26-Aug-96 Unknown Unknown NA Low-level tactical training. 
Successful ejection. 
Unknown 1A 
141 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 16 to 
18); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 60 and 
61) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16A 82-1020 21-Nov-96 4500 AGL 0.47 Lat, Long Restart attempted; pilot ejected. 
Canopy at 36o 21.488’N, 96o 
00.856’W, Seat at 36o 
21.505’N, 96o 00.754’W and 
plane at 36o 21.626’N 96o 
01.283’W. 
0.55 1A 
142 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1996, pp. 19 to 
23) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 87-0372 27-Nov-96 2000 AGL 0.43 Lat, Long Successful ejection.  Distance to 
crash is the mean two pilot seats 
and canopy to the impact point. 
1.14 1A 
143 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 1 and 
2) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16A 81-0684 07-Jan-97 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
144 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 3 to 
5) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15C 85-0099 10-Jan-97 NA NA NA No ejection. NA 0 
145 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 6 to 
8); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 116 to 118); 
Reference 2.1.101 ([DIRS 
175361] p. 2) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 83-1134 29-Jan-97 855 AGL 0.58 Lat, Long Restart attempted; pilot ejected.  
Distance to crash measured 
from impact crater at 32 50 
05.437N 112 42 37.69W and 
seat at 32 49 35.24N and 112 42 
40.3W. 
3.58 1A 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application  000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page III-20 
 
Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
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Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
146 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 122 to 124); 
Reference 2.1.102 ([DIRS 
175362] p. 4) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 87-0385 04-Feb-97 6200 AGL 2.5 Map Distance based on ejection 
location to impact site.  
Distances extrapolated from 
map provided and scaled 
(Reference 2.1.62 [DIRS 
172083] p. 97).  Multiple 
restarts attempted.   
2.13 1A 
147 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 16 to 
18) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 86-0257 18-Mar-97 Unknown Unknown NA Other plane returned to base. Unknown 0 
148 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 19 
and 20) 
Landing 
mishap 
A-10A 80-0156 28-Mar-97 NA NA NA No ejection; flight into ground 
while landing. 
NA 0 
149 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 21 to 
23) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 80-0170 17-Apr-97 1040 AGL 0.32 Map While landing, struck a tower 
1040 ft tall and then ejected.  
Took ejection altitude as the 
height of the tower.  Distance 
taken as mean distance of seat 
and canopy to the NW edge of 
impact crater. 
1.62 0 
150 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 141 and 142) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2095 21-Apr-97 1500 AGL 0.36 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from 
approximate center of impact 
area to canopy and ejection seat; 
scaled from map. 
1.3 1A 
151 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 24 to 
32) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2153 12-May-97 497 AGL 0.15 Map Low-level flight.  Mean of 
canopy and ejection seat to 
crash site. 
1.6 1A 
152 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 33 
and 34) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 78-0690 27-May-97 0 0 NA No apparent ejection. NA 0 
153 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 35 to 
40); Reference 2.1.103 
([DIRS 175363] pp. 4 and 5) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 84-1255 20-Jun-97 9461 AGL 0.73 Lat, Long Loss of situational awareness 
during maneuvering.  Distance 
to crash taken as mean of seat 
and canopy to impact. 
0.4 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
154 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 41 to 
44) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-15E 89-0491 11-Jul-97 2800 AGL 1.66 Map Distance to crash is from 
ejection seat to crash site. 
3.13 1A 
155 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 45 to 
47); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 42 and 
43)  
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16B 82-1037 22-Aug-97 1200 AGL 0.90 Lat, Long Distance from ejection seats to 
impact location using given 
coordinates.   
4.0 1A 
156 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 143) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16D 84-1320 16-Sep-97 Unknown Unknown NA Second aircraft damaged but 
returned to base.  Pilots ejected 
successfully. 
Unknown 0 
157 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 58 to 
64); Reference 2.1.104 
([DIRS 175364] p. 8) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 85-1564 06-Nov-97 4500 AGL Unknown NA Stall. Pilot safely ejected.  Unknown 0 
158 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1997, pp. 65 to 
67) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 83-0033 24-Nov-97 Unknown Unknown NA Crashed at sea during air 
acrobatics; elevation and 
distances unknown. Successful 
ejection. 
Unknown 0 
159 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 1 to 
8) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CG 88-0449 07-Jan-98 Unknown 0.98 Map Other plane returned to base.  
Average distance from impact 
crater to seat and canopy. 
Unknown 0 
160 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 50 and 51) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2131 08-Jan-98 1700 AGL 0.87 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances (indicated on 
map) from edge of aircraft 
impact area to canopy and seat. 
2.7 1A 
161 Reference 2.1.105 ([DIRS 
175365] p. 1) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 89-2067 23-Mar-98 NA NA NA Landing gear collapsed. Pilot 
ejected on runway. 
NA 0 
162 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 9 to 
11) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16DG 90-0792 25-Mar-98 Unknown Unknown NA Defensive maneuver during 
simulated attack. Ejected close 
to water, crashed at sea.   
Unknown 0 
163 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 12 
and 13) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 88-0473 22-Apr-98 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
164 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 14 to 
19); Reference 2.1.106 
([DIRS 175366] pp. 3 and 4) 
Bird Impact F-16C 85-1550 13-May-98 830 AGL 1 Text Bird strike at about 830 ft AGL.  
Ejection was immediate. 
6.4 0 
165 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 20 to 
22) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
A-10A 80-0271 14-May-98 Unknown 0.07 Map During execution of 1G landing 
attitude stall test, pilot lost 
control of plane and ejected 
close to ground. Distance 
calculated as mean of distance 
from nose impact point to seat 
and canopy. 
Unknown 0 
166 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 23 to 
28) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15A 77-0120 05-Jun-98 NA NA NA Aborted takeoff; ejected just 
after takeoff. 
NA 0 
167 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 29 to 
31) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15E 91-0327 16-Jun-98 NA NA NA No ejection. Stopped plane and 
safely egressed. 
NA 0 
168 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 32 
and 33) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16D 90-0798 19-Jun-98 NA NA NA Aborted takeoff; ejected while 
on runway. 
NA 0 
169 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 125 and 126) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 91-0397 22-Jul-98 3000 AGL Unknown  NA Ejection was successful.  Plane 
crashed at sea. 
Unknown 1A 
170 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 34 
and 35) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16CJ 90-0804 24-Jul-98 NA NA NA Aborted takeoff; ejected while 
on runway. 
NA 0 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application  000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page III-23 
 
Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
171 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 65 to 67) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 88-0519 24-Aug-98 1100 AGL 1.5 Map Two maps provided.  One 
(without scale) shows the 
ejection location above the 
shoreline and indicates that 
aircraft was flying true North at 
time of ejection.  The other map 
(with scale) shows coast outline 
with debris field in sea.  
Distance from ejection to crash 
site was calculated as distance, 
on a line North/South, from 
shoreline to center of debris 
field and scaled. 
7.20 1A 
172 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 36 to 
40) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 86-0324 01-Sep-98 300 AGL 0.15 Map G-induced loss of 
consciousness.  Distance to 
crash measured from mean of 
seat impact and canopy to initial 
aircraft impact. Plane 
performing in-flight acrobatics. 
2.64 0 
173 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 41 
and 42) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16D 86-0040 12-Sep-98 0 0 Text While performing surface attack 
tactics, pilot ejected, but 
ejection seat did not clear the 
aircraft before aircraft impacted 
with the ground. 
NA 0 
174 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 43 
and 44) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-15E 89-0497 21-Oct-98 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
175 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 45 to 
47) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16C 90-0730 22-Oct-98 NA NA NA Collision with other plane 
during takeoff. 
NA 0 
176 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 45 to 
47) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16C 88-0414 22-Oct-98 NA NA NA Collision with other plane 
during takeoff. 
NA 0 
177 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 48 
and 49) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 88-0450 09-Nov-98 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
178 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 50 to 
53) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 85-1489 17-Nov-98 1400 AGL Unknown NA Ejection at 2200 ft MSL.  Unknown 1A 
179 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 54 to 
59) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 93-0538 19-Nov-98 Unknown 1.59 Text Loss of thrust, followed by 
ejection. 
Unknown 1A 
180 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 60 
and 61) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 87-0389 04-Dec-98 Unknown Unknown NA Successful ejection. Unknown 1A 
181 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 62 to 
68); Reference 2.1.107 
([DIRS 175367] p. 4) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 84-1314 15-Dec-98 1600 AGL 1.31 Lat, Long Crash following climb-out from 
low level maneuvering.  
Distance to crash is mean of 
distance from seat and canopy 
to plane impact from 
coordinates given on map. 
4.32 1A 
182 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1998, pp. 69 
and 70) 
Landing 
mishap 
A-10A 81-0971 29-Dec-98 NA NA NA Collapse of landing gear.  Pilot 
egressed after landing. 
NA 0 
183 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 183 to 185); 
Reference 2.1.108 ([DIRS 
175369] p. 6) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16DG 88-0154 07-Jan-99 600 AGL 0.05 Map Engine malfunction on takeoff.  
Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from 
approximate center of aircraft 
impact point to canopy and front 
seat; scaled from map. 
0.44 1A 
184 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 3 and 4) 
Loss of 
control 
A-10A 78-0628 21-Jan-99 11,000 4.1 Lat, Long Distance to crash based on 
estimated map coordinates for 
pilot recovery and aircraft 
impact location. Altitude basis 
(AGL or MSL) unknown. 
Assumed to be AGL. 
2.0 1B 
185 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 180 to 182) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CJ 92-3900 21-Jan-99 Unknown 0.28 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from location 
of ejection seat and canopy to 
final aircraft impact location; 
scaled on map.  Engine failed 
after aircraft struck trees on a 
ridgeline.   
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
186 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 176) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15C 84-0011 28-Jan-99 Unknown Unknown NA Midair collision. Both pilots 
ejected.  Insufficient 
information in report for altitude 
and distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
187 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 176) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15C 82-0020 28-Jan-99 Unknown Unknown NA Midair collision. Both pilots 
ejected.  Insufficient 
information in report for altitude 
and distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
188 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 17 to 
19); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 177 to 
179) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 84-1304 03-Feb-99 2650 AGL 2.2 Lat, Long Distance calculated as mean of 
distances from point of impact 
to canopy and seat, based on 
longitude/latitude coordinates.  
In flight fire after engine failure. 
4.37 1B 
189 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 20 to 
25); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 206 to 
208) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 88-0490 26-Mar-99 2175 AGL 0.73 Map Distance calculated as mean of 
distances from first impact point 
to canopy and ejection seat, 
indicated on map.   
1.77 1B 
190 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 26 to 
28); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 204 and 
205) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16DG 89-2175 26-Apr-99 3720 AGL 1.6 Map Landing gear buckled forcing 
the pilot to take off again.  
Aircraft ran out of fuel.  
Although a landing mishap, 
ejection altitude and distance to 
crash are provided because they 
are large enough to yield 
relevant information. 
2.3 0 
191 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 29 to 
35); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 79 to 
83);  
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15C 82-0008 16-Jun-99 3050 AGL Unknown NA Maps are provided but scales, 
given under a text format 
(1”=100’ and 1”=200’) are not 
usable since maps may have 
been resized for formatting into 
the compilation report.  Ejection 
was successful. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
192 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 29 to 
35); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 79 to 
83)  
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15D 79-0013 16-Jun-99 3375 AGL Unknown NA Maps are provided but scales, 
given under a text format 
(1”=100’ and 1”=200’) are not 
usable since maps may have 
been resized for formatting into 
the compilation report.  Ejection 
was successful. 
Unknown 0 
193 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 192 and 193) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16DG 87-0396 18-Jun-99 1490 AGL 1.3 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from ejection 
seat and canopy to approximate 
center of impact area; scaled 
from map. 
4.6 1A 
194 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 191) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 84-1268 01-Jul-99 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject.   NA 0 
195 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 186 to 190) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0284 12-Jul-99 1600 AGL Unknown NA Map provided but without 
sufficient information to 
estimate ejection to crash site 
distance.  Ejection was 
successful. 
Unknown 1A 
196 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 36 to 
38); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 201 to 
203) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 88-0403 11-Aug-99 400 AGL Unknown NA Second plane involved in 
collision landed uneventfully. 
Ejection altitude taken as 
collision altitude. 
Unknown 0 
197 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 39 to 
44); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] p. 200)  
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15A 76-0117 19-Aug-99 11000 
AGL 
1.7 Text Distance calculated as mean 
distances from crash site to 
canopy and ejection seat, 
indicated in text.  Second plane 
involved in collision returned to 
base. Approximate elevation of 
crash site is about 1000 ft. 
0.82 0 
198 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 45 
and 46) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16D 83-1179 20-Sep-99 NA NA NA Failed to stop on landing.  
Ejected while on ground. 
NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
199 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 194 to 196) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 87-0240 17-Nov-99 Unknown 1.1 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and ejection seat to crash site; 
map distances transposed to 
Reference 2.1.62 ([DIRS 
172083], p. 29) and scaled.  
Given uncertainties, value 
calculated is taken as the 
average of distance range found 
(0.9 mi to 1.3 mi).  Second 
plane involved in collision 
returned to base.  
Unknown 0 
200 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 1999, pp. 47 
and 48) 
Landing 
mishap 
A-10A 81-0985 22-Nov-99 NA NA NA Failed to stop on landing.  
Ejected while on ground. 
NA 0 
201 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 5) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 80-0266 20-Jan-00 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject.  Crash was 
12 miles from destination 
airfield.  
NA 0 
202 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 210 to 212) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical  
F-16D 90-0794 16-Feb-00 2300 AGL 1.1 Map Distance to crash from impact 
point to seat location. Scaled 
from map.  Three restarts 
attempted.   
2.53 1A 
203 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 213 to 215) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2094 16-Feb-00 2000 AGL 0.72 Lat, Long Distance based on coordinates 
provided for flight data recorder 
(near canopy) and impact site.  
1.9 1A 
204 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 1 and 
2); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 209) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CJ 93-0534 19-Mar-00 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject.   NA 0 
205 Reference 2.1.109 ([DIRS 
175416]) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15E 88-1682 31-May-00 NA NA NA Aborted take-off.  Pilot did not 
eject.   
NA 0 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application  000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page III-28 
 
Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
206 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 218 and 219); 
Reference 2.1.110 ([DIRS 
175426]) 
Engine failure 
from pilot 
error 
F-16C 84-1311 16-Jun-00 2700 AGL 2.9 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from seat and 
canopy to approximate center of 
main crash site; scaled from 
map. Pilot shut-off throttle 
during defensive move in 
combat training. 
5.7 0 
207 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 216 and 217), 
Reference 2.1.111 ([DIRS 
175592]) 
Bird Impact F-16CG 87-0357 21-Jun-00 2200 AGL 2.3 Map Distance from ejection seat to 
impact crater scaled from map. 
Bird strike at 2,200 ft AGL. 
5.52 0 
208 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 3 to 
8); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 23 to 25) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 86-0173 03-Aug-00 5300 AGL 0.1 Map and 
scale 
Aircraft entered spin condition.  
Loss of control occurred during 
aggressive maneuvering.  
Distance is mean of seat and 
canopy to cockpit. 
0.10 0 
209 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 9 to 
13); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 18 to 
22) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CG 88-0542 08-Aug-00 6840 AGL 0.43 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and ejection seat to crash debris 
as indicated on map.  Second 
aircraft returned to base.   
0.33 0 
210 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 228) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 85-1456 28-Aug-00 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject.   NA 0 
211 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 14 
and 15); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] p. 222) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 83-1138 31-Aug-00 1700 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1A 
212 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 16 to 
18) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-15E 96-0203 12-Sep-00 NA NA NA No ejection.  Landing gear 
collapse. 
NA 0 
213 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 220 and 221) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2088 12-Oct-00 12,600 
AGL 
0.42 Impact 
angle 
Distance to crash based on 
ejection altitude and angle of 
impact.  
0.18 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
214 Reference 2.1.112 ([DIRS 
175427]) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-15C 78-0489 03-Nov-00 NA NA NA Engine ingested a binder 
containing orders shortly after 
takeoff while pilot was raising 
landing gear.  Pilot landed 
without problems. 
NA 0 
215 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 224 to 227) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CJ 90-0811 13-Nov-00 Unknown Unknown NA Aircraft and ejected pilot both 
landed in sea.   
Unknown 0 
216 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 224 to 227) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CJ 90-0801 13-Nov-00 0 0 NA Pilot apparently did not eject.  
Plane crashed into sea.   
NA 0 
217 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2000, pp. 19 to 
23); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 250 to 
252) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CG 89-2104 16-Nov-00 2000 AGL 0.12 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from ejection 
seat and canopy to approximate 
center of crash area (ventral 
fin), scaled from map.  Collision 
involved light civil aircraft. 
Ejection altitude taken as 
collision altitude. 
0.32 0 
218 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 229 and 230) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 86-0313 13-Dec-00 11,000 
AGL 
10.5 Map Distance to crash from ejection 
to approximate center of radar 
crash plots and debris 
accumulated on sandbar; map 
distances transposed to 
Reference 2.1.62 ([DIRS 
172083] p. 23) and scaled.  
Given uncertainties, value 
calculated is taken as the 
average of distance range found 
(10 mi to 11 mi).   
5.00 1B 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
219 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 277 to 279) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
A-10A 80-0158 12-Jan-01 Unknown Unknown NA Scaling from map was not 
performed because scale is 
given under a text form 
(1”=75’).  Because map may 
have been resized when 
formatted into the compilation 
report, this form of scaling 
cannot be verified for estimating 
distances. 
Unknown 1A 
220 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 253 to 256) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 87-0330 21-Mar-01 2,000 AGL 1.1 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and ejection seat to initial 
impact.  Scaled from map. 
2.90 1A 
221 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 1 to 
7); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 261 to 263) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F15-C 86-0169 26-Mar-01 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
222 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 1 to 
7); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 261 to 263) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F15-C 86-0180 26-Mar-01 0 0 NA No ejection. NA 0 
223 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 280 to 282) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16D 90-0837 03-Apr-01 Unknown ~0 Map Ejection seat located in 
wreckage area.  
NA 1A 
224 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 283 to 286) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16CG 89-2063 12-Jun-01 NA ~0 Text Loss of control during flight 
maneuvers at low altitude. 
Ejection was attempted but 
interrupted by ground impact. 
NA 0 
225 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 264 to 266); 
Reference 2.1.113 ([DIRS 
175428]) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering  
F-16CJ 90-0815 06-Jul-01 1500 AGL 0.02 Map G-induced loss of 
consciousness.  Distance to 
crash (indicated on map) based 
on location of ejection seat and 
center of debris field. 
0.07 0 
226 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 316 to 319) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16B 78-0100 17-Jul-01 0 0 Text Ejection was attempted but 
interrupted by ground impact. 
NA 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
227 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 10 to 
15); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 267 to 
271) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 89-2050 18-Jul-01 2000 AGL 1.5 Map Distance to crash (indicated on 
map) based on location of seat 
and canopy and initial impact. 
4.0 1A 
228 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 320 to 325) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16DG 88-0167 23-Jul-01 6200 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1B 
229 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 272 to 276) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0226 26-Jul-01 6600 AGL 1.6 Map 
 
Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from canopy 
and seat to impact; map 
distances transposed to 
Reference 2.1.62 ([DIRS 
172083] p. 29) and scaled.  
Given uncertainties, value 
calculated is taken as the 
average of distance range found 
(1.5 to 1.7 mi).  Ground 
elevation is approximately 500 
ft. 
1.3 1A 
230 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 16 
and 17) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 78-0676 03-Sep-01 Unknown Unknown NA Low altitude training.  Pilot 
ejected. 
NA 0 
231 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 18 
and 19) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16CG 88-0533 17-Oct-01 NA NA NA Ejection during takeoff while on 
ground. 
NA 0 
232 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2001, pp. 20 
and 21) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 84-1217 25-Oct-01 NA NA NA Landing gear collapse.  Ejected 
while on ground. 
NA 0 
233 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2002, pp. 1 to 
5) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 83-1133 10-Jan-02 3700 AGL Unknown NA Negative G flight while 
maneuvering.  Insufficient 
information to determine 
distance to crash. 
Unknown 0 
234 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 346 to 350) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 80-0233 17-Jan-02 Unknown 0.52 Lat, Long Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from location 
of aircraft to canopy and 
ejection seat. 
Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
235 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 346 to 350) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 79-0085 17-Jan-02 Unknown 1.01 Lat, Long Distance to crash based on 
location of aircraft and ejection 
seat. 
Unknown 0 
236 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 339 to 343) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CJ 91-0415 20-Mar-02 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 0 
237 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 344 and 345) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CJ 92-3919 15-Apr-02 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  
Crashed at sea. 
Unknown 1A 
238 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 326 to 329) 
Loss of 
control during 
testing 
F-15C 80-0022 30-Apr-02 0 0 NA High-speed dive; airframe 
failure.  No apparent ejection. 
NA 0 
239 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2002, pp. 6 to 
12) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16 CJ 96-5027 29-May-02 12,000 
AGL 
3.32 Lat, Long Ejected successfully.  Mean 
distance from canopy and seat 
to crash site using coordinates 
estimated from the map. 
1.46 1B 
240 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 330 and 331) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
A-10A 82-0655 27-Jun-02 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 0 
241 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2002, pp. 13 to 
15); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 351 and 
352)  
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 78-0541 21-Aug-02 Unknown Unknown NA Loss of control during 
maneuvers. Ejection was 
successful. Crashed at sea. 
Unknown 0 
242 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2002, pp. 16 to 
18) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-15C 80-0015 03-Sep-02 NA NA NA Landing gear struck a trench 
short of the runway. 
NA 0 
243 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 332 and 333) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 87-0316 09-Sep-02 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 0 
244 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2002, pp. 19 to 
21); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 334 to 
338),  
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 86-0348 11-Sep-02 249 AGL 0.32 Text Distance to crash based on 
locations of ejected pilot and 
crash site relative to end of 
runway. 
6.79 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
245 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 11 to 17) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CG 89-2006 25-Oct-02 27800 
AGL 
1.24 Lat, Long Distance to crash based on 
coordinates provided for pilot 
location and crash site. Ejection 
altitude taken as altitude of 
impact.  Ground level 
approximately 4200 ft from 
map. 
0.24 0 
246 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 11 to 17); 
Reference 2.1.114 ([DIRS 
175615]) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16CG 89-2111 25-Oct-02 27800 
AGL 
2.50 Lat, Long Distance to crash based on 
coordinates provided for pilot 
location and crash site. Ejection 
altitude taken as altitude of 
impact.  Ground level 
approximately 4200 ft from 
map. 
0.47 0 
247 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 27) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16C 88-0397 13-Nov-02 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject.  NA 0 
248 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 6 to 9) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 80-0225 04-Dec-02 0 0 Text Ejection was initiated but was 
unsuccessful.  Map shows 
wreckage of the two aircraft 
involved in the mishap.  
Ejection seat is shown inside 
wreckage of plane.   
NA 0 
249 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 6 to 9) 
Mid-air 
collision 
A-10A 79-0191 04-Dec-02 740 AGL 0.02 Map Map shows wreckage of the two 
aircraft involved in the mishap.  
Distance to crash based on 
location of ejection seat and 
impact crater of the aircraft that 
does not contain the ejection 
seat.  Distance to crash scaled 
from map. Ejection altitude 
taken as altitude of collision. 
0.14 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
250 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 132 to 134, and 
241 to 243) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-15C 80-0040 17-Mar-03 Unknown 0.06 Map Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from 
approximate center of impact 
crater (cockpit) to ejection seat 
and canopy.  Scaled from map 
(horizontal and vertical axes do 
not have the same scale).  
Second aircraft damaged but 
returned to base.  
Unknown 0 
251 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 236 to 240) 
Bird impact F-16C 89-2052 29-May-03 320 AGL Unknown NA Catastrophic engine failure 
immediately after takeoff, most 
likely due to bird strike. 
Unknown 0 
252 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 360 to 362) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15E 87-0186 04-Jun-03 9,080 MSL Unknown NA Map is supplied but 
uncertainties about exact 
locations of canopy and seat are 
too significant to derive a 
meaningful ejection distance. 
Unknown 0 
253 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 138 to 140) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16C 88-0451 10-Jun-03 1120 AGL 0.56 Map Distance to crash based on mean 
of distances from point of 
aircraft impact to canopy and 
ejection seat.  Scaled from map.
2.64 1A 
254 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2003, pp. 4 to 
6); Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 119 to 121)  
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-16CG 88-0424 12-Jun-03 5800 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  
Ground level approximately 600 
ft.  
Unknown 1A 
255 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2003, pp. 7 to 
13) 
Bird Impact F-16C 85-1445 13-Jun-03 1270 AGL 0.43 Map Bird strike at 425 ft AGL 
causing engine failure.  Distance 
to crash is mean distance from 
canopy and ejection seat to 
point of impact. 
1.8 0 
256 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 26); Reference 
2.1.115 ([DIRS 175431]) 
Controlled 
flight into 
terrain 
F-16CG 89-2084 09-Sep-03 400 AGL Unknown NA Crash into sea.  Unknown 0 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
257 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2003, pp. 14 to 
17); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] pp. 135 to 
137) 
Abandoned 
aircraft during 
maneuvering 
F-16C 87-0327 14-Sep-03 140 AGL ~0 Map Pilot ejected when he 
determined maneuver could not 
be successfully completed.  
Canopy located in crash debris 
field.  
Unknown 0 
258 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 355 and 356) 
Engine failure, 
fire 
F-16C 84-1303 22-Sep-03 4,000 AGL 1.95 Lat, Long Distance to crash calculated as 
mean of distances from center 
of crater impact to ejection seat 
and canopy.  Although text 
describes the end part of 
coordinates as seconds of arc, 
they clearly are decimal 
fractions of minutes because 
they are greater than 60. 
2.6 1B 
259 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 353 and 354); 
Reference 2.1.116 ([DIRS 
175432]) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
A-10A 79-0143 18-Nov-03 2,000 AGL 0.12 Map Speed brakes stuck open, hence, 
categorized as 1B.  Distance to 
crash based on location of 
canopy and fuselage; scaled 
from map. 
0.32 1B 
260 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 357 to 359) 
Loss of 
control 
A-10A 78-0700 25-Feb-04 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 1B 
261 Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 
174605], file 2003, pp. 18 to 
20); Reference 2.1.58 
([DIRS 172743] p. 287)  
Bird Impact F-15E 88-1701 06-May-04 Unknown Unknown NA Bird strike at 700 ft AGL.  
Ejection was successful. 
Unknown 0 
262 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 288 to 311) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 85-1555 17-May-04 0 0 NA Pilot did not eject. NA 0 
263 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 288 to 311) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 86-0260 17-May-04 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 0 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application  000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
  Page III-36 
 
Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
264 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] pp. 312 to 314); 
Reference 2.1.117 (DIRS 
175434]) 
Inadvertent 
ejection 
F-15C 81-0027 21-May-04 14,500 
AGL 
12 Map Distance to crash measured 
from ejection to aircraft impact; 
map distances transposed to 
Reference 2.1.62 ([DIRS 
172083] p. 23) and scaled.  
Given uncertainties in scaling 
from two maps, ejection 
distance is rounded off to the 
closest mile.  
4.40 1B 
265 Reference 2.1.58 ([DIRS 
172743] p. 315) 
Engine failure, 
mechanical 
F-15C 79-0054 04-Jun-04 Unknown Unknown NA Ejection was successful. Unknown 1A 
266 Reference 2.1.118 ([DIRS 
177050], pp. 1, 7 to 9) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-22 00-4014 20-Dec-04
 
NA NA NA Ejection was successful. 
Inoperative flight control system 
rendered the aircraft unflyable. 
NA 0 
267 Reference 2.1.119 ([DIRS 
177051], Executive 
Summary, pp. 1, 7 and 8) 
Take-off 
mishap 
F-16D 92-3927 18-Mar-05 NA NA NA Ejection was successful.  
Throttle stuck in after burner 
due to shifting of cargo in 
cockpit, which is in violation of 
procedure.   
NA 0 
268 Reference 2.1.32 ([DIRS 
177052], Executive 
Summary, pp. 1, 2, 8 to 10) 
Loss of 
control during 
maneuvering 
F-15C 80-0052 25-Mar-05 1750 AGL Unknown NA Ejection was successful.  
Initiating event was during 
maneuvers. Ejection altitude is 
average of range given. 
NA 0 
269 Reference 2.1.120 ([DIRS 
177053], pp. Executive 
Summary, pp. 1, 2, 5 to 8) 
Engine failure,
mechanical 
F-16D 91-0469 18-Apr-05 1160 MSL Unknown NA Engine failure.  Several restart 
attempts.  Ejection was 
successful. 
Unknown 1A 
270 Reference 2.1.43 ([DIRS 
177054], Executive 
Summary, pp. 1, 5 to 8) 
Engine fire F-16C 87-0337 28-Jun-05 0 NA NA Engine fire.  Pilot landed the 
plane and ejected on the 
runway.  Classified as 1A since 
the pilot flew 53 NM to the 
landing site, which showed that 
the pilot was in control of the 
plane. 
NA 1A 
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Table III-1 (continued).  Information Extracted from Air Force Aircraft Mishap Reports 
 
No. Sourcea 
Initiating 
Event 
Description 
Aircraft 
Type 
Aircraft 
Serial No. Date 
Ejection 
Altitude 
(ft)b 
Distance 
to Crash 
(mi)c 
Distance 
Methodd Comment 
Glide 
Ratioe 
Initiating 
Event 
Typef 
271 Reference 2.1.121 ([DIRS 
177055], Executive 
Summary, pp. 1 and 2) 
Landing 
mishap 
F-16C 86-0624 9-Oct-05 NA NA NA Tire failure on landing.  Pilot 
egressed from plane after 
stopping. 
NA 0 
272 Reference 2.1.122 ([DIRS 
177056], Executive 
Summary, pp. 1 to 8) 
Mid-air 
collision 
F-16C 85-1469 28-Oct-05 NA NA NA Mid-air collision with F-16C 
and the refueling boom during 
air-to-air refueling.  Both planes 
returned to base for successful 
landing.  No ejection. 
NA 0 
NOTES: aInformation is extracted from the sources listed.  Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 174605]) is an electronic copy of excerpts organized in electronic files by 
years.  The citations for Reference 2.1.57 ([DIRS 174605]) are by file name, given by year, followed by the page number. 
 
bThe “Altitude/Elevation” provided in the Aircraft Flight Mishap Report form provided in most of the safety reports did not always correspond to the 
ejection altitude.  Thus, it was not used to determine altitude at ejection except when it seemed appropriate from the context of the event.  In case of 
take-off or landing mishaps, NA was used in this column, with the exception of Event 190.  When no ejection occurred for events other than take-off or 
landing mishaps, a value of zero (0) was used. 
 
cThe ejection-to-crash distances are shown with the number of significant digits that can be obtained from the data of the relevant event.  In case of 
take-off and landing mishaps, NA was used in this column, with the exception of Event 190.  When no ejection occurred for events other than take-off 
or landing mishaps, a value of zero (0) was used. 
 
dThe abbreviation, Lat, Long, is used for the ninth column, using latitude and longitude coordinates given in accident report text or on maps. 
 
eThe dimensionless glide ratio is calculated as (distance to crash in mi)(5,280 ft/mi) / (ejection altitude in ft AGL, if known).  When there was no 
ejection, the glide ratio is considered undefined. 
 
fEvent type is described in Assumption 3.3.11. 
 
. 
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Table III-2.  Summary Information Derived from the Crash Data 
Descriptiona 
Value 
(dimensionless) 
Fraction of 
Applicable Events 
(Type 1A or Type 1B) 
Number of Type 1A events 72 0.73 
Number of Type 1B events 27 0.27 
SOURCE: 
NOTES: 
Table III-1. 
aSee Assumption 3.3.11 for a discussion of event types. 
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ATTACHMENT IV.  
DERIVATION OF SMALL MILITARY AIRCRAFT CRASH RATE 
The purpose of this attachment is to derive the updated crash rate for the small military 
aircraft.  The methodology used to determine an updated crash rate for the F-16 aircraft in 
Aircraft Crash Impact Hazard at the Private Fuel Storage Facility: Report to Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Revision 4 (Reference 2.1.123 [DIRS 157607], Tab D) will be 
used.  This methodology has been found acceptable by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission in Safety Evaluation Report Concerning the Private Fuel Storage Facility, 
Docket No. 72-22 (Reference 2.1.30 [DIRS 154930], Section 15.1.2.11), thus it is deemed 
appropriate for this application.   
 
F-16 Crash Rate 
 
Table IV-1 provides F-16 information from Reference 2.1.4 ([DIRS 137367], Tables 4.7 
and 4.8), which is used, along with the data provided in Table IV-2, to update the F-16 
crash rate provided in Table 4.8 of Reference 2.1.4 ([DIRS 137367], Table 4.8). 
 
Table IV-1 F-16 Flight Data from Kimura (Reference 2.1.4) 
 Estimated Miles Mishaps Mishap Rate/mile 
Normal Flight 8.3 × 108a 47.16% 32a 15.09% 3.86 × 10−8a 
Special Operations 9.3 × 108a 52.84% 104a 49.06% 1.12 × 10−7a 
Take offs /landing 
mishaps 
- - 76a 35.85% - 
Total 1.76 × 109 100% 212 100% - 
 
F-16 flew 3,730,000 hoursa 
 
Derived flight miles/flight hours 471.85 (1.76 × 109 miles/3.73 × 106 hours) 
a Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
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Table IV- 2. F-16 Annual Flight Safety Statistics 
Year 
Mishaps 
(yr-1) 
Flight Hours 
(yr-1) 
FY89 15 385,179 
FY90 17 408,078 
FY91 23 461,451 
FY92 19 445,201 
FY93 20 433,949 
FY94 18 400,474 
FY95 11 386,429 
FY96 13 374,517 
FY97 11 367,038 
FY98 15 360,245 
FY99 21 352,275 
FY00 15 343,085 
FY01 19 337,315 
FY02 10 368,707 
FY03 17 355,557 
FY04 8 343,198 
FY05 9 324,238 
SOURCE: Reference 2.1.124 [DIRS 177041] 
 
The aircraft data presented in Table III-1 is from 1990 to 2005; therefore, the same data 
range is used to determine an updated crash rate.  The methodology for determining the 
updated crash rate is presented below.  This same methodology is used to determine the 
crash rates for various 10-year periods. 
 
Updated for 1990 – 2005 (16-Year Crash Rate for Normal Flight) 
   
Total Mishaps (1990 – 2005) 246                 (From Table IV-2) 
   
Total Flight Hours 6,061,757                  (From Table IV-2) 
   
 Consider flight miles/flight hours constant (471.85 from Table IV-1) 
Total Flight miles 2.86 × 109  (Total flight hours x 471.85) 
   
 Consider percentage of normal flight miles to total flight miles is constant (47.16% from Table IV-1) 
Normal Flight miles 1.349 × 109 (Total flight miles x 47.16%) 
   
 Consider percentage normal flight mishaps to total mishaps is constant (15.09% from Table IV-1) 
Normal Flight mishaps 37.12 Total mishaps x 15.09% 
   
16-Year Adjusted F-16 accident rate in Normal Flight (mi-1) 2.75 × 10−8    (mishaps/mile) 
 
Table IV-3 presents the updated crash rate for rolling 10-year periods.  The 1989-1998 
period was also included as a comparison to the crash rate presented in Reference 2.1.30 
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([DIRS 154930], Section 15.1.2.11), which was found acceptable by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
Table IV-3. F-16 Rolling 10-year Updated Crash Rates 
Years Crash rate (mi-1) 
FY89-FY98 2.73 × 10−8 
FY90-FY99 2.86 × 10−8 
FY91-FY00 2.87 × 10−8 
FY92-FY01 2.89 × 10−8 
FY93-FY02 2.79 × 10−8 
FY94-FY03 2.79 × 10−8 
FY95-FY04 2.65 × 10−8 
FY96-FY-05 2.65 × 10−8 
 
The FY89-FY98 value of 2.73 × 10−8 compares well with 2.736 × 10−8, which is the 
updated F-16 crash rate used in Reference 2.1.30 ([DIRS 154930], Section 15.1.2.11).  
As can be seen in Table IV-3, the rolling 10-year updated crash rate increases and then 
decreases with the last two 10-year periods having the lowest crash rates.  However, to be 
consistent with the aircraft crash data set presented in Table III-1 and to avoid the 
possibility of statistical aberrations, the average crash rate for the entire period of 1990 to 
2005 previously calculated will be used.  The resultant crash rate is 2.75 × 10−8 mi-1, as 
shown above. 
Updating for 1990 – 2005 (16-year Crash Rate for Special Operations Flight) 
Total Mishaps (1990-
2005)  246(From Table IV-2)   
     
Total Flight Hours 6,061,757(From Table IV-2)   
      
 Consider flight miles/flight hours constant (471.85) 
Total Flight miles 2.860 × 109    
      
 Consider percentage of special operations miles to total flight miles is constant (52.84%) 
Special Operations Flight 
miles 1.511 × 109    
      
 Consider percentage special operations flight mishaps to total mishaps is constant (49.06%) 
Special Operations Flight 
mishaps 120.69   
      
16-Year Adjusted F-16 accident rate in Special Operations Flight 7.99 × 10−8 (mishaps/mile) 
 
The updated special operations crash rate is used in the sensitivity analysis found in 
Attachment VI.  
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F-15 Crash Rate 
 
Table IV-4 provides F-15 information from Reference 2.1.4 ([DIRS 137367], Tables 4.7 
and 4.8), which is used, along with the data provided in Table IV-5, to update the F-15 
crash rate provided in Table 4.8 of Reference 2.1.4 ([DIRS 137367], Table 4.8). 
 
Table IV- 4 F-15 Flight Data from Kimura (Reference 2.1.4) 
 Estimated Miles Mishaps Mishap Rate/mile 
Normal Flight 6.4 × 108a 47.41% 4a 4.26% 6.25 × 10−9a 
Special Operations 7.1 × 108a 52.59% 60a 63.83% 8.45 × 10−8a 
Take offs /landing 
mishaps 
- - 30a 31.91% - 
Total 1.35 × 109 100% 94 100% - 
 
F-15 flew 2,864,000 hoursa 
 
Derived flight miles/flight hours 471.37 (1.35 × 109 miles/2.864 × 106 hours) 
a Reference 2.1.4 [DIRS 137367], Tables 4.7 and 4.8 
 
Table IV- 5 F-15 Annual Flight Safety Statistics 
Year 
Mishaps 
(yr-1) 
Flight Hours 
(yr-1) 
FY89 5 214,592 
FY90 13 227,617 
FY91 5 276,393 
FY92 7 220,866 
FY93 8 217,539 
FY94 7 210,231 
FY95 9 206,640 
FY96 6 200,758 
FY97 8 192,073 
FY98 8 188,205 
FY99 17 189,109 
FY00 25 179,372 
FY01 21 183,706 
FY02 10 194,847 
FY03 14 193,611 
FY04 12 189,596 
FY05 12 169,158 
SOURCE: Reference 2.1.125 [DIRS 177042] 
 
The methodology for determining the updated crash rate is presented below.  This same 
methodology is used to determine the crash rates the 16-year period of interest as well as 
for various 10-year periods. 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application 000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
Page IV-5  
 
 
 
Updated for 1990 – 2005 (16-Year Crash Rate for Normal Flight) 
   
Total Mishaps (1990-2005) 182 (From Table IV-5) 
   
Total Flight Hours 3,239,721 (From Table IV-5) 
   
 Consider flight miles/flight hours constant (471.37 from Table IV-4) 
Total Flight miles 1.53 × 109 (Total flight hours x 471.37) 
   
 Consider percentage of normal flight miles to total flight miles is consistent (47.41% from Table IV-
4)) 
Normal Flight miles 7.24 × 108                       (Total flight miles x 47.41%) 
   
 Consider percentage normal flight mishaps to total mishaps is constant (4.26% from Table IV-4) 
Normal Flight mishaps 7.75               Total Mishaps x 4.26% 
   
16-Year Adjusted F-15 accident rate in Normal Flight (mi-1) 1.07 × 10−8    (mishaps/mile) 
 
Table IV-6 presents the updated crash rate for the rolling 10-year periods.   
Table IV- 6 F-15 Rolling 10-year Updated Crash Rates 
Years Crash rate (mi-1) 
FY89-FY98 6.72 × 10−9 
FY90-FY99 7.88 × 10−9 
FY91-FY00 9.16 × 10−9 
FY92-FY01 1.11 × 10−8 
FY93-FY02 1.16 × 10−8 
FY94-FY03 1.23 × 10−8 
FY95-FY04 1.29 × 10−8 
FY96-FY05 1.35 × 10−8 
 
As can be seen in Table IV-6, the 10-year crash rates for F-15s are lower than the 10-year 
crash rates for F-16s shown in Table IV-3.  Therefore, conservatively, the F-16 crash rate 
will be used. 
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ATTACHMENT V.  
EFFECTIVE TARGET AREAS AND BEATTY CORRIDOR CRASH 
FREQUENCY 
V.1 EFFECTIVE AREAS 
As discussed in Assumption 3.3.1, a number of structures and areas are potentially included in the 
effective-area calculation, indexed by n varying from 1 through 11 as follows.   
n 1 11..≡  
1 Initial Handling Facility (IHF) 
2 Canister Receipt and Closure Facility (CRCF) 
3 Receipt Facility (RF) 
4 Wet Handling Facility (WHF) 
5 Aging Pad 17K 
6 Aging Pad 17L  
7 Aging Pad 17M 
8 Railcar and Truck staging area 
9 Loaded site transporter 
10 Not Used 
11 Not Used 
This calculation considers three CRCFs and two generic transporters carrying waste packages 
or aging casks.  To allow for duplicates, the vector Q gives the numbers of each structure or 
area to be included.  Additional vectors specify, in ft, the lengths L, widths W, and heights H 
of the relevant structures and areas (Assumption 3.3.1).     
Q
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
0
0
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  W
170
325
285
270
685
700
685
140
25
1
1
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  L
305
425
325
385
960
2000
2000
1500
25
1
1
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  H
105
100
100
100
20
20
20
20
20
1
1
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  
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The effective-area formula is simplified by defining the diagonal D (in ft) across the floor of each 
structure or area. 
D L2 W2+≡  
The effective areas depend on characteristics of the aircraft types included.  Subscripts distinguish 
the aircraft characteristics and the effective areas for each aircraft type as follows (Section 6.2.1). 
m 1 7..≡  
1  Small military aircraft 
2  Large military aircraft 
3  General aviation, piston-engine 
4  General aviation, turboprop 
5  General aviation, turbojet 
6  Commercial air taxi (14 CFR Part 135) 
7  Commercial air carrier (14 CFR Part 121) 
The wingspans G (ft), cotangents C of the approach angle from horizontal (dimensionless), and 
mean skid distances K (ft) according to aircraft type are as follows (Section 6.2.1):  
G
78
223
50
73
50
59
98
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  C
8.4
7.4
8.2
8.2
8.2
10.2
10.2
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  K
246
780
60
60
60
1440
1440
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application 000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
Page V-3  
 
 
 
The effective areas of each structure or area (indexed by n=1,..., 11) and for each type of aircraft 
(indexed by m=1,..., 7) are given by Equations 1 and 2 as follows, with a conversion to mi2: 
The total effective areas (mi2) of the relevant surface structures and areas by aircraft type are 
given by  
Yn m, Ln Wn⋅ 1 2
Gm
Dn
⋅+⎛⎜⎝
⎞
⎠⋅ Gm Dn+( ) Hn⋅ Cm⋅+ Dn Gm+( ) Km( )⋅+
⎡⎢⎣
⎤⎥⎦
Qn
52802
⋅≡  
Y
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
-22.00·10 -23.62·10 -21.56·10 -21.66·10 -21.56·10 -23.93·10 -24.32·10
-29.08·10 -11.51·10 -27.30·10 -27.65·10 -27.30·10 -11.75·10 -11.88·10
-22.44·10 -24.25·10 -21.93·10 -22.04·10 -21.93·10 -24.76·10 -25.16·10
-22.63·10 -24.51·10 -22.09·10 -22.20·10 -22.09·10 -25.14·10 -25.54·10
-24.54·10 -27.92·10 -23.55·10 -23.66·10 -23.55·10 -29.90·10 -11.03·10
-28.65·10 -11.39·10 -27.00·10 -27.13·10 -27.00·10 -11.81·10 -11.86·10
-28.53·10 -11.37·10 -26.89·10 -27.01·10 -26.89·10 -11.80·10 -11.84·10
-23.18·10 -26.73·10 -22.05·10 -22.10·10 -22.05·10 -11.00·10 -11.03·10
-33.61·10 -21.78·10 -31.54·10 -31.97·10 -31.54·10 -21.13·10 -21.60·10
00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10
00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10 00.00·10
=  
Am
n
Yn m,∑:=  
A
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-14.14·10
-17.15·10
-13.25·10
-13.36·10
-13.25·10
-18.86·10
-19.30·10
=  
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The fractional contributions to the effective area from each structure or area by aircraft type are 
given by: 
Zn m,
Yn m,
n
Yn m,( )∑⎡⎢⎣ ⎤⎥⎦
≡  
Z
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.2 0.2
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
0.21 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.2 0.2
0.21 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.2
0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11
0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.02
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
=  
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V.2 CRASH FREQUENCY CONTRIBUTION FROM BEATTY CORRIDOR
The frequency of crashes into repository facilities for each aircraft type on the Beatty Corridor 
depends on the crash rate per mile λ, (Section 6.2.2 and Assumption 3.3.7) and annual flight 
frequencies N (Section 3.3.4). 
N
14300
11000
26800
89000
57100
55700
454700
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  λ
2.75 10 8−⋅
1.9 10 9−⋅
2.233 10 7−⋅
3.557 10 8−⋅
3.067 10 9−⋅
3.5 10 8−⋅
3.094 10 10−⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡  
In addition, the distance d (Assumption 3.3.2) to the airway in miles and the width w of the 
airway in miles are needed. 
d 5≡
w 26≡
The exponential decay constants γ in mi-1 for each aircraft type (Section 6.2.1) are needed to 
compute the edge adjustment factors ρ for the Beatty Corridor calculation (Section 7.2.4.2).   
γ
1
1
2
2
2
1.6
1.6
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
:=  .
The edge adjustment factors ρm indexed by aircraft type are given by the bracketed part of  
Equation 13 as follows: 
ρm
exp γm− d⋅( ) 1 exp γm− w⋅( )−( )⋅
2
:=  
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ρ
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-33.37·10
-33.37·10
-52.27·10
-52.27·10
-52.27·10
-41.68·10
-41.68·10
=  
Using Equation 13 and the effective target areas that were computed above, the estimated annual 
crash frequencies for each aircraft type in the Beatty Corridor are given by:   
Fm
Nm λm⋅ ρm⋅( )
w
Am⋅:=  
F
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-82.11·10
-91.94·10
-91.70·10
-109.30·10
-114.97·10
-81.11·10
-108.44·10
=  
The total crash frequency due to aircraft on the Beatty Corridor is 
m
Fm∑ 3.77 10 8−×=  
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ATTACHMENT VI.  
SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS 
This attachment presents the sensitivity calculations.  All sensitivity calculations start 
with the calculated results reported in Section 7.3.4 of the analysis.  
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 7.9 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Pilot Action: 
Taking credit for pilot action could potentially reduce the calculated crash frequency.  
From Table III-2, 73% of applicable events are Type 1A and 27% are Type 1B.  Section 
3.3.11 defines Type 1A events as those events where immediate pilot ejection is unlikely 
and Type 1B are events where immediate ejection is likely due to the complete loss of 
controllability.  The percentages for Type 1A and Type 1B can be reasonably applied to 
flights outside of the flight-restricted airspace since aggressive flight maneuvers, which 
are not included in Type 1 events, occur far from the repository as seen in the trace plots 
of aircraft activity during Red Flag exercises at the NTTR (Reference 2.1.31 [DIRS 
169894], Attachments 7 and 8).  In addition, the military flights to the south of the flight-
restricted airspace, Figure 1, are in the Beatty Corridor where flights are considered 
straight and parallel to the edge of the flight corridor (Assumption 3.2.2).  Thus, if pilots 
successfully took appropriate action for all the Type 1A events, the crash frequency for 
flights outside of the flight-restricted airspace would be: 
( ) ( ) 77 1074.173.011046.6 −− ×=−××  y-1 
A more realistic estimate of the fraction of overflights that could pose a hazard to the 
surface facility would account for the time required to make a decision regarding ejection 
or landing during a Type 1A event, whichever appears to be the safest course of action.  
Because so little time is required to fly 6.6 mi [(4.9NM × 1.1508 mi/NM) + 1.0 mi)] or 
less, at cruising speed, the fraction of Type 1A initiating events that may result in a crash 
inside the flight-restricted airspace is near zero.  From Section 7.2.3, 10.5% of Type 1 
events could endanger the facilities.  Thus, for a more realistic case, the fraction of 
crashes that occur during overflight of the repository is estimated as:  
(0.73)(0) + (0.27)(0.105) = 0.03. 
Using the more realistic fraction of aircraft of 0.03, the crash frequency from overflights 
of the flight-restricted airspace would be: 
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.y1005.3
)mi414.0(
)mi6.5(2
)03.0()mi10(2.75)y000,1(
2
18
2
181
c
o
−−
−−−
×=
×=
= A
R
pNF λ
 
where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 2.75 × 10-8  (mi-1) (Section 3.3.7) 
cp  = 3% of events assumed to result in a crash (above) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
Adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside flight-restricted airspace 1.74 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the flight-restricted airspace 3.05 × 10-8 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 2.4 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Thus, the overall crash frequency would be reduced by about 70% to 2.4 × 10-7  y-1 if 
pilot action were credited in the analysis. 
Altitude of Overflights: 
Flights over the flight-restricted airspace are assumed to be at the lowest allowable 
elevation, 14,000 ft, resulting in the quickest descent to the ground in case of pilot 
ejection (Assumption 3.2.5).  This altitude and the derived glide ratios from Table III-1 
are used in Section 7.2.3 to determine the fraction of flights that pose a risk to the surface 
facilities.   
Varying the altitude of the overflights of the flight-restricted airspace changes the fraction 
of flights that either have the capability to glide past the facilities or do not have 
sufficient glide capability to reach the facilities.  Thus, the fraction of events that pose a 
risk to the facility changes with the altitude that the plane is flying.  Using the same 
methodology developed in Section 7.2.3, the following demonstrates this relationship.  
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Table VI-1 Altitude Sensitivity 
Altitude 
(ft MSL) 
Largest 
Glide 
Ratio 
Smallest 
Glide 
Ratio 
Fraction of Type 1 
Events Endangering 
Facilities  
(without rounding) 
14000 3.48 0.34 0.105 
15000 3.17 0.31 0.101 
16000 2.90 0.28 0.088 
17000 2.68 0.26 0.077 
18000 2.49 0.24 0.070 
19000 2.32 0.23 0.065 
20000 2.18 0.21 0.061 
21000 2.05 0.20 0.056 
22000 1.94 0.19 0.047 
23000 1.83 0.18 0.046 
24000 1.74 0.17 0.037 
25000 1.66 0.16 0.037 
 
As can be see in the above table, the fraction of Type 1 flights decreases by about 65% 
when the altitude is changed from 14,000 ft MSL to 25,000 ft MSL.  Using 0.061 as an 
example, the crash frequency from overflights of the flight-restricted airspace would be: 
.y1020.6
)mi414.0(
)mi6.5(2
)061.0()mi10(2.75)y000,1(
2
18
2
181
c
o
−−
−−−
×=
×=
= A
R
pNF λ
 
where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 2.75 × 10-8  (mi-1) (Section 3.3.7) 
cp  = 6.1% of events assumed to result in a crash (Above) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
 
Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is reduced about 5% to: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 6.20 × 10-8 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 7.5 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Frequency Analysis of Aircraft Hazards for License Application 000-00C-WHS0-00200-000-00E 
Page VI-4  
 
 
F-16 Crash Rate For All Small military Aircraft 
About 28% of the flights in the NTS are F-15s (Section 3.3.6).  The updated crash rate, 
1.07 × 10−8 mi−1, for the F-15 (Attachment IV) is less than half the updated F-16 crash 
rate of 2.75 × 10−8 mi−1 (Section 3.3.7), which is conservatively used in the analysis.  
Assuming that 28% of the flights are F-15s and the balance of the flights are F-16s, the 
weighted average of the crash rates is:  
 % Crash rate (mi-1) % Crash (mi-1) 
F-16 0.72 2.75 × 10-8  1.98 × 10-8  
F-15 0.28 1.07 × 10-8  3.00 × 10-9  
  Total 2.28 × 10-8  
 
The change in the crash rate changes the frequency from overflights of the flight-
restricted airspace. 
.y1085.8
)mi414.0(
)mi6.5(2
)105.0()mi10(2.28)y000,1(
2
18
2
181
c
o
−−
−−−
×=
×=
= A
R
pNF λ
 
where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 2.28 × 10-8  (mi-1) (above) 
cp  = 10.5% of events assumed to result in a crash (Section 7.2.3) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
 
The frequency contribution from flights outside of the flight-restricted airspace does not 
change from Section 7.3.2.3. 
For the Beatty Corridor, the crash rate for small military aircraft was changed to 
2.28 × 10-8 mi-1. 
 m 1 7..≡  
1  Small military aircraft 
2  Large military aircraft 
3  General aviation, piston-engine 
4  General aviation, turboprop 
5  General aviation, turbojet 
6  Commercial air taxi (that is, 14 CFR Part 135 flights) 
7  Commercial air carrier (that is, 14 CFR Part 121 flights) 
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λ
2.28 10 8−⋅
1.9 10 9−⋅
2.233 10 7−⋅
3.557 10 8−⋅
3.067 10 9−⋅
3.5 10 8−⋅
3.094 10 10−⋅
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
⎠
≡
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 8.85 × 10-8 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.41 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 7.7 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Thus the overall frequency is reduced slightly by using a weighted average of the crash 
frequency for F-15s and F-16s.
 
Fm
Nm λm⋅ ρm⋅( )
w
Am⋅:=  
F
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-81.75·10
-91.94·10
-91.70·10
-109.30·10
-114.97·10
-81.11·10
-108.44·10
=  
The total crash frequency due to aircraft on the Beatty Corridor is 
m
Fm∑ 3.41 10 8−×=  
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Distance to the Edge of the Beatty Corridor 
A realistic distance from the surface facilities to the edge of the Beatty Corridor is about 
8 mi, approximately 3 mi farther than the assumed distance of 5 mi (Section 3.3.2).  
Changing the distance to the edge of the Beatty Corridor from 5 miles to 8 miles only 
affects the crash frequency from the Beatty Corridor.   
d 8≡  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The edge adjustment factors ρm indexed by aircraft type are given by the bracketed part of  
Equation 13 as follows: 
ρm
exp γm− d⋅( ) 1 exp γm− w⋅( )−( )⋅
2
:=  
ρ
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-41.68·10
-41.68·10
-85.63·10
-85.63·10
-85.63·10
-61.38·10
-61.38·10
=  
Using Equation 13 and the effective target areas that were computed above, the estimated annual 
crash frequencies for each aircraft type in the Beatty Corridor are given by:   
Fm
Nm λm⋅ ρm⋅( )
w
Am⋅:=  
F
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-91.05·10
-119.65·10
-124.21·10
-122.30·10
-131.23·10
-119.17·10
-126.95·10
=  
The total crash frequency due to aircraft on the Beatty Corridor is 
m
Fm∑ 1.25 10 9−×=  
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Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 1.25 × 10-9 y-1 
Total 7.5 × 10-7 y-1 
 
The frequency of crash has been reduced by about 5%. 
 
Categorizing Events 
This section evaluates the effect of misclassifying events on the crash frequency for 
flights over the flight-restricted airspace.  Section 3.3.11 describes the process of 
categorizing the mishaps listed in Table III-1 and Section 7.2.3 describes how the 
categories were used to determine the fraction of events that posed a threat to the 
facilities based on glide ratios.  Because both Type 1A and 1B events are treated the 
same, only the effect of classifying an event as Type 1 or Type 0 is addressed. 
Type 1 to Type 0 
Ten percent of the Type 1 events, 10 events, were randomly chosen and changed to Type 
0 events; Table III-1 event numbers 6, 15, 27, 36, 39, 51, 57, 61, 95, and 258.  Some of 
the events had known glide ratios and some of the events did not.  This changed the 
number of Type 1 events to 89 with 51 with known glide ratios.  Using the same 
methodology presented in 7.2.3, the fraction of Type 1 events that could endanger the 
facilities is 0.107.  This is about a 2% increase in the value derived in Section 7.2.3, 
which results in increasing the contribution to the frequency due to overflights to 
1.09 × 10-7 y-1, which results in no change to the overall frequency.  Thus, changing 10% 
of the Type 1 events to Type 0 events resulted in no change in the overall crash 
frequency.  
Type 0 to Type 1 
Ten percent of the Type 0 events, 17 events, were randomly chosen and changed to Type 
1A events; Table III-1 event numbers 20, 41, 44, 67, 90, 103, 130, 149, 173, 176, 190, 
206, 210, 225, 245, 250, and 272.  This changed the number of Type 1 events to 116 with 
65 with known glide ratios.  Using the same methodology presented in Section 7.2.3, the 
fraction of Type 1 events that could endanger the facilities is 0.108, which results in 
increasing the contribution to the frequency due to overflights to 1.10 × 10-7 y-1, which 
results in no change to the overall frequency. Thus, changing 10% of the Type 0 events to 
Type 1 events results in no change to the overall crash frequency. 
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All Type 0 to Type 1 
The last sensitivity study performed on categorizing events was to make all events 
applicable to the repository, that is, all events are Type 1.  This changed the number of 
Type 1 events to 272 with 87 with known glide ratios.  Using the same methodology 
presented in Section 7.2.3, the fraction of Type 1 events that could endanger the facilities 
is 0.117.  This is about an 11% increase in the 10.5% value derived in Section 7.2.3.   
Using 0.117, the change in the percent changes the frequency from overflights of the 
flight-restricted airspace. 
.y1019.1
)mi414.0(
)mi6.5(2
)117.0()mi10(2.75)y000,1(
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c
o
−−
−−−
×=
×=
= A
R
pNF λ
 
where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 2.75 × 10-8  (mi-1) (Section 3.3.7) 
cp  = 11.7% of events assumed to result in a crash (above) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
 
Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is increased slightly to: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.19 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 8.0 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Glide Ratios/Distance to Crash 
The glide ratios for the 58 Type 1 events with known glide ratios range from 0.04 to 11.2 
with the average glide ratio of 3.1.  For comparison, the glide ratio for an F-16 is about 
8.5, derived from a glide ratio of 7 nautical miles for every 5,000 ft of altitude lost 
(Reference 2.1.43 [DIRS 177054], p. 5).  To determine the sensitivity to the glide ratio, 
the glide ratios were increased and decreased by 10% by increasing or decreasing the 
distance to crash.   
Increasing the Glide Ratio by Increasing the Distance to Crash 
Using the same methodology presented in Section 7.2.3, the fraction of Type 1 events 
that could endanger the facilities is 0.10, when the glide ratios were increased by 10%.   
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Using 0.10 in the above equation for the crash frequency from overflights of the flight-
restricted airspace gives a crash frequency of: 
.y1002.1
)mi414.0(
)mi6.5(2
)10.0()mi10(2.75)y000,1(
2
17
2
181
c
o
−−
−−−
×=
×=
= A
R
pNF λ
 
where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 2.75 × 10-8  (mi-1) (Section 3.3.7) 
cp  = 10% of events assumed to result in a crash (above) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 1,000 overflights per year (Assumption 3.1.2) 
 
Section 7.3.2.1 determined the sample distribution function for travel after the pilot 
ejections from the aircraft.  Increasing the distance traveled by 10% (same as increasing 
the glide ratio by 10%) changes the cumulative probability of exceeding 4.6 miles to 
3.9%.   
Applying Equation 6, the crash frequency density at the center of the flight-restricted 
airspace is  
.mi/y/crashes1034.2
)039.0)(mi/y/crashes100.8(75.0
)]mi6.4(1[75.0
26
25
0c
−
−
×=
×=
−Φ=Φ nF
    
where 
0Φ   =  8.0 × 10–5 crashes/y/mi2 (Section 7.3.2.2) 
)]mi6.4(1[ nF−  = 0.039 (above) 
 
The effective target area of the surface facilities as seen by small military aircraft (Table 
12) is 0.414 mi2.  Thus, the estimated crash frequency due to flights outside the radius of 
the flight-restricted airspace is:  
(2.34 × 10−6 crashes / y / mi2)(0.414 mi2) = 9.69 × 10−7 crashes / y. 
Thus, the crash frequency contribution from flights outside the flight-restricted airspace 
increases.  The contribution from the Beatty Corridor does not change.  Summing the 
three contributors results in: 
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Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 9.69 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.02 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 1.1 × 10-6 y-1 
Thus, increasing the glide ratios by 10% by increasing the distance to crash, results in an 
overall crash frequency of 1.1 × 10-6 y-1.   
Decreasing the Glide Ratio by Decreasing the Distance to Crash 
When the glide ratios were decreased by 10%, the fraction of Type 1 events that could 
endanger the facilities is 0.112.  Using the value of 0.112, the frequency from overflights 
increases slightly to 1.14 × 10-7 y-1, calculated above. 
Decreasing the distanced traveled by 10% (same as decreasing the glide ratio by 10%), 
does not change the cumulative probability of exceeding 4.6 miles, thus the frequency 
flights outside of the flight-restricted airspace does not change.   
The contribution from the Beatty Corridor also does not change.  Thus, adding the three 
contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.14 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 8.0 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Decreasing the glide ratio by 10% resulted in a slight increase in the overall crash 
frequency.   
Solomon Model Gamma Factor 
The discussion of the Solomon model (Reference 2.1.45 [DIRS 173314], p. 5) applied to 
the flights in the Beatty Corridor is presented in Section 7.2.4.2, which also illustrates 
that the Solomon model for military aircraft compares reasonably well with the sample 
cumulative distribution function of crash distances (Figure 5).   
To show the relationship between the gamma factor, γ, and the crash frequency, the crash 
frequency was determined with all aircraft types using the same value for γ.  The change 
in the gamma factor for the Solomon model only affects the crash frequency for the 
Beatty Corridor.  For γ=1, the crash frequency for the Beatty Corridor is 6.61 × 10-7 y-1. 
Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 6.61 × 10-7 y-1 
Total 1.4 × 10-6 y-1 
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For γ=1.6, the contribution from the Beatty Corridor is 3.29 × 10-8 y-1. 
Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.29 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 7.9 × 10-7 y-1 
 
For γ=2, the crash frequency for the Beatty Corridor is 4.46 × 10-9 y-1. 
Thus, adding the three contributors, the overall crash frequency is: 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 4.46 × 10-9 y-1 
Total 7.6 × 10-7 y-1 
 
Using γ=2 for all aircraft, the crash frequency reduces to 7.6 × 10−7 y−1.  For γ=1.6 for all 
aircraft, the crash frequency remains the same at 7.9 × 10−7 y−1.  And using γ=1 for all 
aircraft, the crash frequency increases to 1.4 × 10−6 y−1.  Thus, there is a slight impact to 
the crash frequency if the gamma factor were 1.6 or 2, and an increase in the crash 
frequency if γ=1 were applied to all aircraft.  This shows that the Solomon model is 
somewhat sensitive to the gamma factor when all aircraft use the γ=1.  Applying a γ=1 to 
non-military aircraft would be overly conservative because of the differences in aircraft 
and flight characteristics as discussed in Section 7.2.4.2. 
 
Honoring the Flight-restricted Airspace 
This sensitivity study will take the calculated overall crash frequency, 7.9 × 10−7 y−1 
(Section 8), and after imposing some assumptions used only in this sensitivity study, 
determine the number of additional flights through the flight-restricted airspace that will 
have to occur in order to increase the crash frequency above the threshold of 
2.0 × 10−6 y−1.  The purpose of this study is to determine the sensitivity of pilots honoring 
the flight-restricted airspace. 
The elevation of the surface facilities is less than 4,000 ft MSL (Reference 2.1.6 [DIRS 
175049]) and the elevation of the surrounding mountains is about 6,000 ft MSL 
(Reference 2.1.19 [DIRS 158638]).  Assuming that any flight that violates the flight-
restricted airspace flies at an elevation of 6,500 ft MSL to avoid the mountains, the flights 
would be at 2,500 ft AGL.  The fraction of flights that pose a threat to the facility from 
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the glide ratios is 0.176 at an altitude of 2,500 ft AGL (6,500 ft MSL) using the same 
methodology as in Section 7.2.3. 
For additional conservatism, assume that all of the flights that violate the flight-restricted 
airspace are performing exercises or acrobatics.  If the special operations crash rate for F-
16s were updated for the period of interest from 1990 to 2005 using the methodology in 
Attachment IV, the crash rate would be 8.0 × 10−8 mi−1.  Using Equation 9, the updated 
special operations crash rate for F-16s, and the fraction 0.176 of flights that pose a hazard 
to the facility, the number of flights flying at 6,500 ft MSL would have to be about 2,300 
per year to result in a total crash frequency greater than the Category 2 event sequence 
screening threshold.   
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where: 
R = flight-restricted airspace of radius 5.6 mi (Section 3.1.1) 
λ = crash rate of 8.0 × 10-8  mi-1 (above and Attachment IV) 
cp  = 17.6% of events assumed to result in a crash (above) 
A = effective target area of 0.414 mi2 for small military aircraft (Table 12) 
N = 2,300 overflights per year (derived) 
 
Even if the lifetime special operations crash rate of 1.12 × 10−7 mi−1 (Table 7) were used 
instead of the updated crash rate of 8.0 × 10−8 mi−1, it would still take about 1,650 flights 
at an altitude of 6,500 ft MSL, in addition to the 1,000 flights over the flight-restricted 
airspace, the flights outside of the flight-restricted airspace and the contribution from the 
Beatty Corridor, to exceed the Beyond Category 2 event sequence screening threshold of 
2.0 × 10−6 y−1. Thus, it is unlikely to have about 1,650 flights per year violating the flight-
restricted airspace, and doing so would be a total disregard of the flight-restricted 
airspace. 
Phased Construction 
Construction of the surface facilities (Table 1) will likely be staged so that some of the 
surface structures may not be present during the initial part of the emplacement period.  
The aging pads, even if fully available over the entire emplacement period, will take 
years to be filled and emptied.  The amount of waste in the staging areas will also 
fluctuate over time.  For an example of the effect of phased construction on the crash 
frequency, assume that the WHF and two of the three CRCFs become operational 10 
years after the beginning of surface operations, which represents an 80% capacity factor 
for these facilities over the 50-year emplacement period.  Also assume that the aging pads 
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and the staging areas are at an average of 80% capacity over the emplacement period.  
Using these assumptions, the effective target area is reduced to about 0.347 mi2, which 
results in a crash frequency of 6.6 × 10−7 y−1, or a 16% decrease in the overall frequency. 
Military Crash Density 
The crash frequency density used for determining the crash rate for military flights 
outside of the flight-restricted airspace (Section 3.3.8) is based on the number of crashes 
that occurs in the NTTR and the MOAs over the time period of interest.  As stated in 
Section 3.3.8, the calculated frequency density can change over time because crashes are 
random from year to year and the density will be different when the time span changes.  
Thus, this sensitivity looks at how the crash density can change with respect to time and 
the assumed number of crashes per year. 
For this sensitivity, starting in 2006, it is assumed that a specified number of crashes 
occur every year for 10 years.  The number of crashes are zero, one, and two crashes per 
year as well as the average crash rate of 1.16 crashes/yr over the 15.5 years from 1990 to 
2005 used in the crash frequency (18 crashes/15.5 yrs = 1.16 crashes/yr).   
Table VI-2.  Estimated Crash Density 
Time Span 
0 crashes/yr 
(Crashes/yr/mi2) 
1 crash /yr 
(Crashes/yr/mi2)
1.16 crashes/yr 
(Crashes/yr/mi2) 
2 crashes/yr 
(Crashes/yr/mi2)
1990-2006 7.27E-05 7.68E-05 7.74E-05 8.08E-05 
1990-2007 6.86E-05 7.62E-05 7.74E-05 8.38E-05 
1990-2008 6.49E-05 7.57E-05 7.74E-05 8.65E-05 
1990-2009 6.15E-05 7.52E-05 7.74E-05 8.89E-05 
1990-2010 5.85E-05 7.48E-05 7.74E-05 9.11E-05 
1990-2011 5.58E-05 7.44E-05 7.74E-05 9.30E-05 
1990-2012 5.33E-05 7.41E-05 7.74E-05 9.48E-05 
1990-2013 5.11E-05 7.38E-05 7.74E-05 9.65E-05 
1990-2014 4.90E-05 7.35E-05 7.74E-05 9.80E-05 
1990-2015 4.71E-05 7.32E-05 7.74E-05 9.93E-05 
 
This table shows that the crash frequency density changes over time when the number of 
crashes assumed in each year is the same.  With zero and one crash per year assumed, the 
frequency density trends down with each additional year.  With the average of 1.16 
crashes per year, the crash frequency remains the same over the years.  With two crashes 
assumed per year, the crash frequency density increases with each additional year 
because two crashes per year is greater than the average crash rate used in the analysis. 
Even using the highest crash density of 9.9 × 10−5 crashes / y / mi2, the overall crash 
frequency is 9.4 × 10−7 crashes / y. 
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From Table 4, from 1990 to 2005,  
o 6 years had 0 crashes 
o 3 years had 1 crash 
o 6 years had 2 crashes 
o 1 year had 3 crashes (1993). 
 
Thus, it is considered improbable that there would be 2 crashes in the NTTR and MOAs 
each year for the next ten years. 
 
Counts in the Beatty Corridor 
To evaluate the potential increase in flights in the Beatty Corridor, the counts were 
increased by a factor of two and a factor of ten.  All other inputs remain the same.  
For an increase by a factor of two, the overall frequency increases by about 5%. 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 7.54 × 10-8 y-1 
Total 8.3 × 10-7 y-1 
 
For an increase by a factor of ten, the overall frequency increases by about 40%. 
Outside Flight-restricted Airspace 6.46 × 10-7 y-1 
Over the Flight-restricted Airspace 1.07 × 10-7 y-1 
Beatty Corridor 3.77 × 10-7 y-1 
Total 1.1 × 10-6 y-1 
 
As shown in Section 3.3.4, the assumed counts used in the frequency analysis (Table 2) 
already increases the annual counts by a factor of five and it reasonably represents the 
growth trend at the McCarran International airport. 
 
